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Summary 
The aim of this study was to explore the interrelationship between collective 
bargaining and pay equity. A qualitative case study methodology was used. 
Eighty-six interviews were conducted with union and management pay equity 
negotiators, labour lawyers, Pay Equity Commission R' eview Officers, and 
other informants. A collection of documentary evidence supplemented these 
interviews. 
The empirical work focused on explaining issues of structure, style and power 
in pay equity bargaining and the complex intertwinings of the structural 
properties of gender and class were considered crucial to an explanation of 
these. The key structural dynamic in the negotiation of pay equity was found 
to be the degree and effectiveness of a labour-feminist politic combined with 
employer/state commitment, which are themselves interconnected and represent 
the transformative face of gender and class power relations. 
The thesis, in providing a theoretically informed discussion of detailed case 
study material, contributes towards the debate on the effectiveness of collective 
bargaining as a vehicle for implementing equal pay policy. It also informs the 
debate on labour-management cooperation in labour relations, especially in 
public sector collective bargaining. Because legislated pay equity is bargained 
within a new set of legal parameters, the study may also aid our understanding 
of the relationship between collective bargaining and the law. Finally, the 
thesis attempts to unravel the interwoven complexities of gender and class 
power relations in the collective bargaining process. 
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CHAPTER I 
Collective Bargaining and Pay Equity: 
Introduction and Methodology 
The gendered differential in pay is a matter of public policy concern and 
academic interest in a number of countries, and there have been attempts in 
many of these countries to close the wage gap. Work on pay equity in Canada 
has focused upon the practical application of pay equity legislation and the 
implications for human resource management (for example, Conklin and 
Bergman, 1990; Kelly, 1988; Weiner and Gunderson, 1990), alongside a 
sociological and/or feminist critique of its concept and implementation (for 
example, Cornish, 1986; Cuneo, 1990; Fudge and McDermott, 1991; 
Warskett, 1990). All Canadian pay equity initiatives, whether legislated or 
not, require the joint negotiation of pay equity with unions in organised 
workplaces. The aim of this study is to further our understanding of the 
interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay equity. 
McDermott and Cornish provided some useful observations on the potential 
clash between pay equity and traditional labour relations law and practices, 
but, in spite of some consultative stage predictions that pay equity was 
incompatible with collective bargaining (Davies, 1988; Gandz, 1987; 
MacKenzie, 1988; Robb, 1988; Shamie, 1986), any thoroughgoing analysis of 
the interrelationship between pay equity and collective bargaining has not yet 
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been conducted. Case studies of comparable worth in the United States 
(Acker, 1989; Blum, 1990; Evans and Nelson, 1989) did not focus on this 
important interrelationship either, although Acker's analysis did consider the 
role of the labour relations system in the process and outcome of 
implementation. 
Canadian pay equity policy is the latest in a series of attempts to tackle the 
gender wage gap, which has persisted in spite of a dramatic increase in 
women's participation in the workforce since World War II (Ehrenberg, 1989; 
Gunderson, 1989). Canada is not the only country to have introduced policies 
to redress wage discrimination against women. . 
Most of the OECD countries 
had passed anti-discrimination laws by 1980 (Whitehouse, 1992), and equal 
pay for men and women doing equal work is embodied in Article 119 of the 
Treaty of Rome, the basis for the European Community (Docksey, 1987). 
However, equal pay legislation was largely restricted to the same or similar 
work, and thus did not address the effects of sexual segregation. Despite the 
strong arguments that labour market structure underpinned gender differences 
in wages, policies were based on an assumption that wage discrimination was 
at an individual rather than a structural level. Thus, policy thinking was still 
characterised by the individualism of the neo-classical model, which was 
reflected in the complaints mechanism incorporated in most countries' 
legislation. 
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The persistence of the wage gap even after equal pay legislation led to some of 
the countries in the Whitehouse study introducing amendments or new 
legislation in the 1970's and 1980's to extend equal pay to work of equal 
value. Equal value had been codified into the International Labour Convention 
100 in 1951 (McDermott, 1991), but was not implemented in most countries 
for many years. 
The policy of equal value recognised that the wage gap could only be tackled 
by building in the comparison of female-dominated with male-dominated work. 
The underlying premise of equal value is that wage discrimination is the result 
of the historical undervaluation of women's work, which led to the sexual 
segregation of jobs and low pay. In order to calculate a non-discriminatory 
wage, equal value is measured in terms of the demands made on the employee, 
regardless of the similarity of the jobs, using a gender-neutral job evaluation 
scheme. However, most of the equal value legislation introduced at this stage 
was still based on the assumption of wage discrimination being an aberration, 
rather than systemic, because legal redress could only be triggered by 
individual complaints and offer individual remedies. 
In certain countries, continued evidence of a significant wage gap despite anti- 
discrimination legislation resulted in political lobbying from women's groups, 
often in alliance with the labour movement, to reform equal pay policies so 
that they were proactive. In contrast to the complaint-driven model, proactive 
equal value is based on the assumption that wage discrimination is structural 
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and systemic. Proactive legislation shifts the emphasis from the individual 
victim of discrimination to those with more power in the workplace to do 
something about it: the employers. 
The first country to move in a proactive direction was the United States. 
Here, the wage policy of proactively implementing equal value was often 
termed "comparable worth, " an emphasis upon the technical method involved, 
whereas in Canada it was always called "pay equity, " a name that encapsulated 
its primary aim of equitable pay. As early as 1973, the American Federation 
of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) requested a job 
evaluation study to compare wages of female- and male-dominated jobs. 
However, implementation was delayed until 1986, after much political debate 
and a controversial court case. 
In the meantime, the comparable worth movement developed steadily in 
America, forming the National Committee on Pay Equity (NCPE) in 1979 
(Blum, 1991). The NCPE was a labour-feminist alliance made up of 
organisations and individuals such as the Coalition of Labour Union Workers, 
women's and minority groups, lawyers, researchers, and state and local 
agencies (Portman, Grune and Johnson, 1984). From an original strategy of 
pursuing comparable worth through the legal system, the movement shifted to 
a strategy of legislation combined with collective bargaining. According to the 
NCPE, all but five states had taken action on comparable worth by 1989, and 
1,739 localities (for example, cities, counties, school districts) had undertaken 
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initiatives, too, although the majority of these had been in Minnesota, the first 
state to require implementation at local level (Blum, 1991). 
In Britain, the Equal Pay Act, 1970, was aimed at wage discrimination but it 
failed to address sexual segregation, focusing only on same or broadly similar 
work. The European Equal Pay Directive, 1975, was designed to implement 
the principle of equal pay laid down in Article 119 and introduced the concept 
of equal pay for work of equal value. UK legislation did not provide for this 
and, after pressure from the European Court of Justice, it was amended in 
1983 to incorporate equal pay for work of equal value. But, like other 
complaints-driven legislation, despite some notable successes in a few 
individual court cases, effectiveness has been limited (National Pay Equity 
Campaign [NPEC], 1991). 
In the face of a continued gender wage differential of 26% (Dickens, 1989) 
despite existing equal pay legislation, the National Pay Equity Campaign was 
established in 1991. This is a broad based coalition of working women, trade 
unionists, academics and other supporters working for effective and accessible 
pay equity legislation (NPEC, 1991). Also, the British Equal Opportunities 
Commission, a statutory body charged with keeping legislation under review, 
has called for extensive changes to strengthen the equal pay legislation (Equal 
Opportunities Commission, 1990). 
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The Northern Ireland Equal opportunities Commission has developed a 
proactive strand in its strategy to achieve equal pay for women. The 
Commission combines litigation with negotiation, su pporting unions through 
training and advice, putting pressure on employers to carry out pay audits and 
job evaluation exercises, in addition to recommending legislative changes and 
developing a strategy for formal investigations (Jones, 1991). 
The European Community Action Programme, agreed in October 1990, linked 
social and equality issues to the economic context of the Single Market. 
Action on equal pay is a vital part of this strategy, in addition to the Treaty of 
Rome provisions on the principle of equal pay. Guidance on discriminatory 
pay systems has been provided in a series of important decisions by the 
European Court of Justice. All member states have adopted measures to 
comply with the equal pay principle embodied in the Treaty of Rome, but there 
are variations in the scope of comparisons and the definition of equal value 
(Collins, 1991). 
A proactive initiative was undertaken in Australia, when the New South Wales 
public sector was the focus for a job evaluation exercise as part of wider 
changes in industrial relations and work organisation in the country. The 
Director of the Office of Equal Opportunity in Public Employment was a 
consultant to the project and was instrumental in the design of a non- 
discriminatory job comparison system which would allow the capture of 
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women's work and therefore provide a route to equal value for women civil 
servants (Burton, 199 1). 
In the proactive initiatives described so far, unions had little or no role to play 
in their implementation. There were a few exceptions, for example, the state 
of Oregon in the US established a joint task force to implement the comparable 
worth legislation. Overall, however, the most important role the labour 
movement played in American comparable worth developments was the 
lobbying for the legislation, in alliance with women's groups. Conversely, not 
only was most of the Canadian proactive legislation successfully lobbied for by 
strong labour-feminist alliances, but also implementation became a joint 
responsibility, with employers legally required to negotiate pay equity with any 
unions present in their organisations. 
In. the mid 1980's a persistent wage gap despite existing anti-discrimination 
laws gave Canadian lobbyists ammunition in their campaign for proactive pay 
equity legislation. Equal pay laws had been passed in all provinces since 
1971, either in labour standards or human rights legislation. In 1977, equal 
pay for work of equal value legislation was passed in the federally controlled 
sector. Two provinces also introduced equal value laws: Quebec (1975) and 
the Yukon (1987). 
A good indication of the ineffectiveness of this legislation is the record of the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission, the government agency responsible for 
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the enforcement of human rights legislation covering the federal sector. From 
its establishment in 1978 to 1983, only 60 formal equal value complaints were 
received, and of these, 22 were either dismissed or withdrawn (Cadieux, 
1984). The relatively few successful complaints were virtually all from'the 
public sector unions, implying that unorganised and organised private sector 
women remained unaffected by the Act's equal value provision (Warskett, 
1991). Furthermore, very few employers had reviewed their job evaluation 
and compensation systems to comply with the Canadian Human Rights Act, 
1978 (Cadieux). 
In response to this apparent failure of the existing legislation, in 1985 the 
province of Manitoba pioneered a proactive approach to equal value. Public 
sector employers were statutorily required to implement equal value by 
reviewing wage structures using a gender-neutral job comparison scheme. In 
1987, Ontario introduced pay equity legislation covering the private sector as 
well as the public sector, the most comprehensive and ambitious initiative so 
far. After Manitoba and Ontario had introduced statutory pay equity, the 
Canadian Human Rights Commission published a policy document. In it, the 
Commission endorsed the proactive programmes and commented: "[the] 
complaint-driven model, requiring the filing of a complaint with the 
Commission to trigger compliance, is seriously flawed" (1987, p. 6). 
This view, expressed by the statutory agency responsible for enforcing a 
complaint-driven model of equal value, echoes the criticism made of the 
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current British law by the Equal Opportunities Commission. The Canadian 
response to the evident inadequacies of the previous equal value legislation was 
different from the British partly because the provinces have jurisdiction over 
90% of labour relations and therefore have the political power to pursue 
legislative initiatives of their own, and because some of the provinces had the 
political will to tackle equal pay for women with a policy that recognised the 
systemic nature of discrimination. 
Three of the Atlantic provinces - Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and New 
Brunswick - passed pay equity laws to cover the public sector in 1988,1988 
and 1989, respectively. The fourth - Newfoundland - introduced pay equity in 
the public sector in 1988, as a matter of political policy rather than statutory 
requirement. 
Given that all these Canadian programmes require joint labour-management 
implementation of pay equity, it is crucial to understand the interrelationship 
between collective bargaining and pay equity. One school of thought, 
expressed during the consultative phase of the Ontario legislation, was that pay 
equity was incompatible with collective bargaining. Extreme levels of conflict 
would affect union-management, intraunion and interunion relationships 
(Davies, 1988; Gandz, 1987; MacKenzie, 1988; Robb, 1988; Shamie, 1986). 
This was based on the understanding that pay equity was an administrative, 
technical, mechanism superimposed upon collective bargaining, a power-driven 
process. 
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An opposite assumption underlay governments' policy of joint implementation, 
largely based upon Manitoba's experience where a multi-union, multi-employer 
process had apparently worked relatively smoothly, with a new level of 
cooperation reached between the parties (Ellis-Grunfield, 1987; Ouimet, 1988; 
Roome, 1989). Governments of both provinces studied in this research wanted 
and expected pay equity bargaining to be more cooperative than conventional 
wage bargaining. 
Another view of pay equity bargaining emerged during the early stages of 
implementation which envisaged negotiations working much as they had 
before, in principle, except that the parties would bargain within newly defined 
parameters. From this perspective pay equity and collective bargaining were 
seen as compatible, even if there were difficult times ahead (Cornish and 
Trachuk, 1988; Lennon-Shilton, 1989). 
Given these different opinions of what would happen in Canadian pay equity 
negotiations, this research set out to investigate the impact of pay equity 
implementation on bargaining structures, styles and power relationships. The 
other dimension of the relationship between collective bargaining and pay 
equity centres upon the effectiveness of collective bargaining as a vehicle for 
implementing equal pay for women. 
Both Canadian and British studies concluded that changes towards women's 
equality through the collective bargaining mechanism have not worked 
(Burkart, 1990; Cadieux, 1984; Chaykowski, 1990; Colling and Dickens, 
1989; Cornish, 1986; Dickens and Colling, 1990; Dickens, Townley and 
Winchester, 1988; MacKenzie, 1988; Robb, 1987; Sarra, 1986). Feminist 
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critique of the labour movement's historical role in women's discriminatory 
wages, linked with unions' uneven record on internal and external equality, 
indicated the possible barriers to women's equality in the collective bargaining 
process (Barrett, 1980; Briskin and Yanz, 1983; Cockburn, 1981 and 1983; 
Frager, 1983; Gaskell, 19ý6; Hartmann, 1976; Milkman, 1980; Phillips and 
Taylor, 1980; Rubery, 1978; White, 1983). 
Two American studies of comparable worth implementation raised the issue of 
interwoven gender and class power relations underlying the process (Acker, 
1989; Blum, 1991). Acker argued that in the state of Oregon, union- 
management and interunion conflict marginalised women's interests, distorting 
the original objective of comparable worth policy. In their study, Evans and 
Nelson (1989) concluded that the implementation process, and the role of 
collective bargaining, varied according to the degree of centralisation together 
with economic and political factors. All of these studies established the 
importance of gender relations in understanding how the parties' frames of 
reference and practices affected the process and outcome. 
This research builds on the previous studies by examining the gender and class 
dynamic as a means to an end; namely, to further our understanding of the 
complex interrelationship between pay equity and collective bargaining, thus 
shifting the focus clearly to a labour relations perspective. 
The aim when developing a methodology for this project was the need to 
account for both agency and structure in a complex and dynamic process. 
Hyman argued that industrial relations could not be understood without 
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exploring the subjective dimension, but cautioned against a neglect of structural 
influences "of which the actors themselves may be unconscious" (1972, p. 76). 
He proposed a dialectical analysis of consciousness and structure. 
Integrating Agency and Structure 
Nearly twenty years later Hyman suggested that many of the problems which 
beset the development of industrial relations theory were still the difficulty of 
integrating different levels of generality. As an illustration of this problem, he 
identified two opposing forms of one-sidedness in writing on trade unionism: 
"The one approach effectively denies the potential or significance of conscious 
human ... practice in the face of the structural detenninations... ; while in the 
other, the scope for working-class creativity is treated as unlimited regardless 
of the [structural] context" (1989, p. 137). These opposite views of social 
reality reflect an historical tension in the social sciences between micro and 
macro levels of analysis, between agency and structure, and in turn between 
vol. untarism and determinism. 
Giddens (1976 and 1984) attempted a resolution of the agency/ structure 
dilemma. He defined structural properties as institutionalised features of social 
systems. For Giddens, social systems are "the patterning of social relations" 
(1984, p. 377). We should note that the degree of "systemness" (Giddens' 
term) is very variable in his theory, and does not denote clusters of social 
relations whose boundaries are clearly set from others. The institutionalised 
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features evident in structural properties are "... rules and resources, recursively 
implicated in the reproduction of social systems -" Most important, he 
envisaged structural properties as not only constraining but enabling, because 
of the inherent relation between structure and agency. 
Giddens' term 'structuration' refers to the constitution of social structures as 
they are reproduced and transformed by the active doing of subjects. Because 
social structures are produced by human agency, they may be transformed 
deliberately or without intention, gradually or rapidly, radically or not 
(Manicas, 1980). This is why they are both constraining and enabling. The 
concept of 'duality of structure' highlights the dynamic nature of structuration: 
it social structures are both constituted by human agency, and yet at the same 
time are the very medium of this constitution" (Giddens, 1976, p. 121). In 
other words, social structures are both the medium and the outcome of human 
interaction. Ollman captured the idea well: "-structure is but a stage in 
process" (1971, p. 18). 
Power is an essential part of structuration theory: "Every interaction is also a 
moral and power relation" (Giddens, 1976, p. 118). Giddens noted that power 
relations, based on rules and resources, are characteristically imbalanced: 
"What passes for social reality stands in immediate relation to the distribution 
of power, not only on the most mundane levels of everyday interaction, but 
also on the level of global cultures and ideologies... " (1976, p. 113). Yet, 
given the relationship between structure and agency, he saw power as two- 
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way, as the capacity of the agent to mobilise resources. His term "dialectic of 
control" (1984, p. 374) described how the less powerful managed resources in 
such a way as to exert control over the more powerful in established power 
relations. 
In this study, it is argued that the process of pay equity bargaining cannot fully 
be understood without taking account of structural properties, especially gender 
and class relations, and their enabling as well as constraining characteristics. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the term gender is used to differentiate it 
from sex and to indicate its social construction rather than biological origin. It 
may be defined as "a network of beliefs, personality traits, attitudes, feelings, 
values, behaviours and activities differentiating men and women through a 
process of social construction that has a number of distinctive features" 
(Beneria and Roldan, 1987). Gender has to be understood as historical, 
operating at all levels of society, and involving a ranking of all activities 
whereby those associated with men are ranked higher than those associated 
with women. Both the outcome and the means of this social construction is the 
asymmetrical and structured access to resources generating male privilege and 
domination and female subordination (Beneria and Roldan, 1987; Gilligan, 
1982). Despite this asymmetrical access to resources, according to Giddens' 
"dialectic of control, " change is possible through action, and feminist politics 
should be understood in this context. 
There is little consensus in the literature on the definition of class, but it is 
possible to identify a difference, in broad terms, between the view that class 
should be located in the economic ownership and possession of the means of 
23 
production, and the view that emphasises the cultural and historical dimensions 
of class formation (Beneria and Roldan, 1987). For this project, neither of 
these definitions is sufficient, rather a combination of both, following Beneria 
and Roldan, who studied women and economic development in Mexico City. 
Consequently, the concept of class in this thesis will include a-number of 
dimensions. 
The criteria of ownership and possession of the means of production, including 
control over the labour process and the state's role as public employer, 
economic manager and legislator, are important. But so are human agency, 
social perceptions and values, beliefs and forms of consciousness, and an 
extension of the social construction of class beyond the workplace. Added to 
this is the inclusion of factors that call into question an assumed "common" 
relationship to the means of production and forms of class consciousness - 
relations of gender, race and ethnicity. In research exploring the structural 
dynamic of equality bargaining, the gender dimension requires the 
acknowledgement of the sexual division of labour and other hierarchies in the 
workplace and the household. It should also be pointed out that gender is not 
envisaged as a sub-category of class. The emphasis is upon structural 
properties as unequal power relationships of class, gender, race, and ethnicity 
(see Adams, Briskin and McPhail, 1988), which are open to modification, 
according to Giddens. 
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Race and ethnicity are clearly important structural properties, yet limited time 
and space in this project precluded a comprehensive analysis of these factors as 
well as the intertwinings of gender and class. In the Newfoundland case study, 
race and ethnicity did not emerge as crucial aspects of interaction and 
structure, possibly because of the low rates of immigration compared to other 
Canadian provinces. In Ontario, it would be expected to emerge as more 
significant, given the higher rates of immigration in the province. However, 
based on the information collected, which was qualitative and only partially 
structured, race and ethnicity did not come through as crucial in the 
understanding of the sets of negotiations studied and presented in the thesis. 
This may be partly because both of them took place at a centralised level. In 
the supplementary information collected (but not presented in detail) on 
decentralised hospital bargaining, a muted theme touching upon race and 
ethnicity did emerge, adding to the complexity of the gender and class 
dynamic. 
It should be emphasised here that the aim is to use insights from Giddens' 
structuration theory in order to more clearly understand pay equity bargaining, 
and not, therefore, to apply the theory in its entirety. Since the production and 
reproduction of structural properties are achieved at the level of everyday 
interaction, and even though these properties are not always visible to the 
participants, it is possible to explore the workings of social relations of power 
from interviews as accounts of interaction (Silverman, 1985). One way of 
doing this is to understand that there are mediations of interaction and structure 
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in processes of social reproduction, analytically separate but in practice 
operating simultaneously (Giddens, 1976). Identification of these mediations in 
the empirical data can indicate how gender and class interact and saturate the 
pay equity bargaining process. 
Research Design 
The general research question is: What is the nature of the interrelationship 
between pay equity and collective bargaining? 
For analytical purposes, this general question can be broken down into the 
following questions: 
1. How and why does bargaining pay equity change the nature of the 
bargaining process - does it tend to centralise or decentralise the bargaining 
structure, and how far can it be negotiated separately from conventional wage 
bargaining; does bargaining style become more cooperative or more 
adversarial; and do unions enjoy more or less power when bargaining pay 
equity? 
2. How does the collective bargaining process affect the implementation of 
pay equity - how far does the interplay of the structural properties of gender 
and class act as a constraint upon achieving equal pay for women, and how far 
do these same properties enable change? 
The case study method is suitable when 'how and why' questions are being 
asked about a contemporary set of events in a real-life context, when the 
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boundaries between phenomenon and context is not clearly evident, and when 
multiple sources of evidence are used (Yin, 1989). The research questions of 
this project matched these characteristics well. Gardner (1991), in her paper 
on research dýsign for industrial relations, pointed out -that if we are interested 
in processes, then case studies are the best choice. 
Analysis was qualitative because the dynamic nature of pay equity bargaining, 
involving complex relationships and structural properties, would more 
effectively be revealed qualitatively than in quantitative analysis. Attempts to 
construct models based on statistical analysis no matter how sophisticated can 
sometimes result in "... overly simplified representations of a more complex, 
dynamic and multidimensional reality" (Godard, 1989, p. 36). 
Using quantitative methodology, it is very difficult to account for agency and 
the meanings that people bring to their world and their behaviour in it. As 
Schutz remarked: "... social reality has a specific meaning and relevance 
structure for the beings living, acting and thinking within it... " (1962, p. 59). 
A major strength of qualitative analysis is that it provides the tools for a 
researcher to more effectively reveal agency and the significance of individual 
behaviour, allied with an ability to locate this interaction within a framework 
of structural constraints and opportunities. 
Moreover, in order to understand the present, it is important to trace the 
historical development of gender relations of power, for example, the 
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development of patriarchy. Qualitative methodology allows the researcher to 
more easily do this, whereas quantitative methods present a 'snapshot view' 
(Kessler-Harris, 1988). Thus, although research was primarily qualitative, 
descriptive statistics were included where they helped to clarify the degree of 
internal and external equality currently achieved in the unions discussed. 
In the context of this research, * qualitative methodology seems more 
appropriate, despite some weaknesses critics have identified in the approach. 
One criticism is that the perceived absence of a rigorous scientific method 
leaves the qualitative researcher more easily affected by values, compromising 
the validity of the research. This position is opposite to Giddens' (1976) view 
of the research process. He captured the complexity of the relationship 
between the researcher and the social world she is studying by referring to the 
"double hermeneutic circle, " the system of meanings that the participants in 
social practice are part of, which the researcher has to analyse and understand,, 
which in turn is (has been) influenced by and influences the system of 
meanings that the researcher herself uses to analyse and understand. In other 
words, "... not only how we know, but that which we know about, is 
determined at least partially by the concepts of every day life" (Isaacs, 1987, 
p. 66). 
A complementary view is that natural science knowledge is socially and 
politically organised in much the same way as our knowledge of the social 
world (Feyerabend, 1970-, Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1970). Thus, we could argue 
that values are integral to the research process when observing the natural 
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world, even when using what critics would term a (value-free) scientific 
method. Continuing the argument which perceives similarities between the 
natural and social world, and thus the inevitability of values being part of any 
research process (to some degree at least), Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
introduced in the natural sciences, too, the notion that what we observe is 
influenced by how we observe it. In the measurement of minute particles: 
"The very fact of observing the electron disturbs it. The moment we 
illuminate the electron, it recoils .... If we don't illuminate the electron, 
however, we don't see (detect) it. " Therefore, "there is always an 
undetermined interaction between observer and observed... " (Eisberg and 
Resnick, 1974, p. 74). 
Nevertheless, a qualitative researcher should be aware of the criticism related 
to this debate on values: the possible lack of reliability in terms of research 
findings. In this research, considerable care was taken to organise the tapes, 
transcripts, and analysis sheets (for each interview) in a systematic way so that 
another researcher could follow the chain of thought. Each direct quote from 
an interview was referenced with the page number of the verbatim transcript 
(or notebook if not taped). 
Although internal validity is occasionally raised as more of an issue for 
qualitative than quantitative research, the internal consistency of this thesis was 
made explicit in the structure and content of the text. External validity is 
perhaps the strongest criticism of qualitative research, and is less effectively 
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countered, in spite of the argument that case studies are chosen using the 
principle of conceptual isation, and not statistical generalisation. In this 
research design, the richness of the empirical data generated qualitatively, and 
its potential insight into the complexities of pay equity bargaining, outweighed 
this last consideration. 
Selection of Research Sites and Employee Groups 
Since 1985, when the province of Manitoba introduced proactive pay equity 
legislation, five other provinces in Canada have introduced pay equity 
initiatives. The provinces of Ontario and Newfoundland were chosen as case 
studies for investigation of pay equity bargaining in the public sector. 
Ontario was selected as a 'typical' case (Bryman's term, 1988). Pay equity 
implementation in that province was required by proactive legislation, as in 
four other provinces. Also, implementation was to be joint union-employer in 
unionised workplaces, as in all the other provinces with pay equity initiatives, 
including Newfoundland, whose pay equity programme was the result of 
political policy rather than statutory requirement. In addition, Ontario's 
legislation covered the public sector, as did all other pay equity initiatives. All 
these characteristics made Ontario 'typical' of the other provinces with pay 
equity progranunes. However, Ontario was also different from other 
provincial initiatives since its legislation also covered private sector employers 
with over ten employees. Also, amongst its exemptions once pay equity had 
been achieved was bargaining strength, an unusual 'loophole' affecting 
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maintenance of pay equity. These two last factors made the study more 
interesting, but, overall, the province's pay equity programme was 'typical' of 
other provinces. 
Newfoundland's pay equity implementation is 'unique' (Bryman's term, 1988), 
or 'deviant' (Yin's term, 1989) because it is not legislated, but introduced as a 
political policy. This political rather than legal framework makes it a 
significant contrast to Ontario's legislated programme. In addition, 
Newfoundland was chosen as my home province because ease of access was an 
important criterion; research was to be carried out while working full-time, so 
at least one site had to be local. 
The pay equity programme in Newfoundland was centralised, so investigation 
was conducted only at provincial level. Ontario's pay equity legislation was 
negotiated at different levels in the province: some pay equity bargaining was 
done entirely at provincial level (the civil service), whereas some (the health 
care sector) included provincial combined with local level bargaining, with 
some bargaining units bargaining the whole process locally. The level of 
analysis therefore changed according to the nature of the bargaining structure. 
Because of this complexity in pay equity bargaining in Ontario, and limitations 
on time and space, it was decided to present in detail the two sets of 
centralised pay equity negotiations (see Chapters V and VI), using information 
collected at six Toronto hospitals for comparison with the main findings. 
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Public sector employees were the subject of investigation because they were 
the ones whose wages were assessed in both provinces during the period the 
research took place. Public sector employees were originally of interest to the 
researcher because their employers are also- governments, generating 
interesting political and economic tensions resulting from the liberal democratic 
concept of government sovereignty, especially in an era of economic 
restructuring and recession. Governments have traditionally been envisaged 
as model employers (Beaumont, 1987) and it was of interest to assess the 
effectiveness of their pay equity policies. Also the public sector experienced 
the most dramatic growth in Canadian unionism since the late 60's. Given that 
public sector unions have large women memberships, these unions could be 
expected to have stronger policies and practices for women than most private 
sector unions, implying a stronger commitment to issues like pay equity. 
The actual groups of employees studied were determined by the pay equity 
schedule in each of the provinces. In Ontario, pay equity implementation was 
carried out in the civil service first, followed by the health care sector. In 
contrast, the health care employees in Newfoundland were covered first, 
followed, in theory, by the civil servants. In practice, political and economic 
factors caused the stalling of pay equity implementation in the Newfoundland 
civil service. 
Data Collection 
Ontario data was collected during two visits to Toronto, for three weeks in 
early summer 1991 and for one week in winter 1991. Subsequently, a number 
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of telephone interviews were carried out. Toronto was where centralised pay 
equity bargaining for the civil service took place. Research in Newfoundland 
was spread out over a longer period of time because it was the researcher's 
home and plaýe of work. The data in Newfoundland was mainly collected 
during the summer of 1992. Pay equity bargaining was centralised so most 
data was collected in St. John's, Newfoundland, with some telephone 
interviews of negotiators living in other parts of the province. 
In the early stages of data collection, key informants from management and 
unions set up the trail of investigation (see Yin, 1989, for his analogy of case 
study research with a criminal investigation). In Ontario, networking was 
strong between women involved in pay equity in unions, government, 
academia and interest groups. This enhanced data collection generally, and led 
to a better understanding of the political processes involved. Update telephone 
interviews Were conducted in both provinces with key informants at about six 
to twelve month intervals from the initial collection of data. 
Interviews were the main method of data collection, together with documentary 
analysis of interest group, union and government papers, including notes of 
meetings. Notes were made of informal conversations before and after the 
'formal' interviews. Comments made at the end of the taped interviews were 
often quite revealing. Decisions by interviewees on whether to be taped or not 
were recorded as significant. 
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The interviews were designed to be responsive and flexible, to take advantage 
of their interactive nature. This format provided for the establishment of 
rapport, encouraging the emergence of issues the interviewee felt were 
important, and to allow the interviewee some influence over where the 
interview was going. As. Oakley has pointed out, the interviewee should not be 
perceived merely as an "objective instrument of data production" (1981, p. 
58), but as a subject in her own right. 
Nevertheless, it was decided that interviews had to be partially structured as 
there were specific topics of interest, so these factors were monitored by the 
researcher during the interview. 
For example, it was apparent from an earlier analysis of Ontario provincial 
government papers that the government wanted and expected a more 
cooperative bargaining process than had been experienced in conventional wage 
bargaining, although there was some evidence (Gibb-Clark, 1990) that this had 
not happened in Ontario. Early pay equity bargaining in Newfoundland had 
also pointed towards a more cooperative mode of bargaining (Roome, 1989). 
A synthesis of Walton and McKersie's (1965), Lewicki and Litterer's (1985), 
and Peterson and Tracey's (1976) conceptualization of distributive and 
integrative bargaining, led to a differentiation between 'adversarial" and 
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cooperative' bargaining. For interviews with pay equity negotiators, 
indicators of cooperative bargaining were recorded on the interview schedule, 
to be ticked off as they were covered during the interview. Indicators of 
cooperative bargaining were listed as mutual goals, the open exchange of 
information, trust, and problem solving. 
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It should be emphasised that these points were not the subject of direct 
questions to the interviewee. Information on them was gained through the use 
of a general, open-ended question near the beginning of the interview, once 
basic facts were established, like the interviewee's negotiating experience -and 
the existing structure for wage negotiations. The question used was: 'How 
did your experience with pay equity bargaining compare with your experience 
in conventional wage bargaining? ' Mostly, the specific information needed 
was gained as a result of this format. If not, any residual points were 
addressed at the end of the interview. 
Overall, forty-five people were interviewed in Ontario, including union and 
management pay equity negotiators, Review Officers and relevant staff at the 
Pay Equity Commission, a Vice-Chair at the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, 
Chairs of unions' women's committees, labour lawyers, and informants on the 
political processes leading to the legislation of pay equity. In Newfoundland, 
forty-one people were interviewed, including all the members of the joint Pay 
Equity Steering Committee, most of the members of the rating committees, and 
Chairs of the unions' women's committees, and other relevant informants. A 
few of the people were interviewed together. The Director of Review Services 
and five Review Officers were interviewed together at the Pay Equity 
Commission in Ontario. 
Most of the interviews were taped; only a very few refused to be taped. The 
transcripts (or notes) were analysed to locate evidence for the complex 
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intertwining of structural properties as an integral part of the pay equity 
bargaining process. Interview transcripts were not assumed to be simply 
reports of actual events, but were treated as displays of different perspectives. 
To cite Massey and Meegan (1985, p. 127): "The job of the researcher is ... to 
structure together what are often fundamentally different understandings of 
what is going on. " 
Main Arggment, Contribution and Structure of Thesis 
The underlying premise of this thesis is that the interrelationship between pay 
equity and collective bargaining has to be explained in terms of the complex 
intertwining of the structural properties of gender and class, which articulate as 
both constraints and opportunities for change. 
The main argument of the thesis is that the key structural dynamic in pay 
equity bargaining is the degree and effectiveness of a labour-feminist politic 
combined with employer/state commitment, which are themselves 
interconnected and represent the transformative face of gender and class power 
relations. This transformative element is in constant articulation with the 
combined pressures of the reinforcing elements of gender and class, the most 
powerful of which is hierarchy. The transformative dynamic is agency-driven, 
which builds in the possibility of a varied shifting between the enabling and 
constraining characteristics of the mediations of the structural properties. The 
overall permutation of enabling and constraining factors is therefore variable 
and explains the specificity of different pay equity negotiations. In strategic 
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terms, this structural dynamic means that the success of the unions in 
encapsulating an effective labour-feminist politic is essential if any effective 
change is going to be made to the established hierarchy at the heart of 
inequitable wages. 
The structural dynamic summarised above addresses both research questions 
noted earlier in this chapter. As well as increasing our understanding of the 
constraints and opportunities located in the interplay of gender and class in pay 
equity bargaining, the overall permutation of the enabling and constraining 
factors largely explains the patterns identifiable in bargaining structure, style 
and power. According to the effectiveness of the labour-feminist politic in 
combination with the degree of employer/state commitment, attempts were 
made (with varying degrees of success) to manipulate bargaining structures to 
gain advantage. Also, although the negotiations studied were conducted 
separately on a fonnal level, there were considerable pressures in all 
negotiations (eventually) to integrate pay equity and conventional wage 
bargaining in practice. 
Patterns in bargaining style also varied according to the permutation of 
enabling and constraining factors; nevertheless, in general, negotiations tended 
to be more cooperative. Variations of this generally more cooperative style 
within and between sets of negotiations can be explained as pressure points, 
where the transformative aspect of gender and class most clearly challenged the 
status quo: the gender-class based established hierarchy of wages. The 
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bargaining power dynamic depended largely on unions' ability to recognise, 
access and effectively use the (unequal) resources available to them. In the 
negotiations studied, the unions' power increased in general because of the 
legislation itself, but the specificity in power relations was due to variations in 
the commitment and/or ability of different unions to control the direction of the 
negotiations. In an extremely technical process, potentially mystifying, the 
only way to achieve a high level of control was through the absorption and 
effective utilisation of the labour-feminist politic already referred to. 
To analyse the structural dynamic of negotiations in this way represents a new 
way of thinking about and understanding collective bargaining. The thesis 
contributes towards the debate on equal pay for women, how best to achieve it, 
and in particular whether collective bargaining is a suitable vehicle to 
implement policies designed to redress discriminatory wages. In the course of 
investigating these questions, the work also explores women's disadvantaged 
pay position and the alternative explanations offered for it, and addresses the 
role of job evaluation in establishing pay equity, as well as the question of 
whether pay equity is negotiable. In addition, the research feeds into the 
debate on labour-management cooperation, joint decision-making and whether 
consensus decision making works in a labour relations context. It is a 
contribution towards our knowledge and understanding of public sector 
collective bargaining. Because legislated pay equity bargaining is conducted 
within new legal parameters, the study contributes to our understanding of the 
relationship between collective bargaining and the law. Finally, at a 
theoretical level, the analysis of structural properties in pay equity bargaining 
attempts to unravel the interwoven complexities of gender and class power 
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relations as both constraints and opportunities in the collective bargaining 
process. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. After Chapter I introduces the topic 
and explains the methodology used in the research, Chapter 11 examines 
alternative explanations for the gender wage gap, leading to a feminist analysis 
of the development of the sexually segregated labour market. Given the 
historical contribution of the labour movement towards women's inequality, 
described in Chapter II, the main section of the next chapter assesses Canadian 
unions' equality bargaining achievements in a review of women's internal and 
external equality. A short final section in Chapter III deals with current trends 
in public sector collective bargaining to place the rest of the chapter in context 
and to set the scene for the following chapter. Chapter IV explores the issues 
and debates which have emerged so far concerning the interrelationship 
between pay equity and collective bargaining. 
The Newfoundland case study is presented in Chapter V and the Ontario case 
study is presented in Chapter VI. Each of these chapters examines the 
bargaining structure, style and power in pay equity bargaining for the 
respective provinces, before considering gender and class dimensions. Chapter 
VII integrates the case study and previous material by identifying the structural 
dynamic of pay equity bargaining, and places pay equity in the context of an 
overall strategy of equality for women. 
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CHAPTER H 
The Gender Wage Gap 
Pay equity policies were introduced in response to a persistent wage gap. The 
nature and success of policy varies according to the explanation accepted for 
gender differentiated wages. This chapter assesses two different types of 
explanations of the gender wage gap: labour market and feminist/historical. 
After a discussion of the explanations incorporated in the labour market 
theories, the chapter moves on to examine the explanations derived from a 
feminist/historical perspective, including debates surrounding the relative 
contributions of organised labour, employers and the state to the shaping of a 
sexually segregated labour market. 
According to Statistics Canada (1990b), women earned 60% of men's earnings 
(full-year full-time) in 1971, and this had increased to 65% in 1985, and 68% 
in 1990. However, for all earners the percentage was lower - 47% in 1971, 
56% in 1985, and 60% in 1990 - pointing to the contribution of part-time 
earnings and differential bonus programmes to the overall wage gap. Allowing 
for the methodological problems in calculating the extent of the gap, empirical 
research has consistently concluded that it amounts to an overall differential of 
approximately 40% (Robb, 1987). 
As mentioned above, explanations for the wage gap fall broadly into two 
categories. In the next section, labour market explanations for the wage gap 
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will be considered. Both the neo-classical theories and the segmented labour 
market theories fall into this category. The human capital explanation of the 
wage gap is based upon the neo-classical premise that individuals behave 
rationally in a single competitive market. According to- this theory, women 
choose low skilled, low pressured, easy entry-exit, non-career jobs, because of 
their household responsibilities (Becker, 1964; Kuch and Haessle, 1979; 
Mincer, 1974). As Ornstein commented, "human capital treats individuals as 
petty capitalists investing in tiny enterprises - themselves" (1982, p. 35). 
Women, then, do not generally 'invest' in themselves in terms of human 
capital - education, experience, and occupational skills - and therefore 
command low wages in the labour market. The inference we draw from this 
approach to the wage gap is that low wages are a direct result of personal, 
individual, failings. 
Empirically, subsequent investigators have tried to identify which human 
capital components are most strongly correlated with earnings. For example, 
Ornstein found that, although an analysis of earnings revealed that education 
and experience did have important effects, gender and its interactions explained 
"about as much variance in wages as the human capital measures! " (1982, p. 
34). Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck conclude that empirical work on wage 
discrimination in Canada has revealed an unexplained residual, "reflecting 
wage differences between men and women that cannot be accounted for on the 
basis of human capital attributes" (1990, p. 44). Indeed, in an attempt to 
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identify (within the human capital model) a rationale for individual differences 
in the amount of human capital people choose to invest in, Ornstein found that, 
even when an ability variable was held constant, social background, race, and 
gender strongly influenced on human capital levels. 
At a theoretical level, the strong influence of certain non-human capital 
variables signals the failure of the human capital theory to take account of the 
structure of the economy and other institutions; reflecting its neo-classical 
roots, the human capital theory displays the flaws of methodological 
individualism. Also, the neo-classical assumption of a single, homogeneous, 
perfectly competitive labour market is undermined by Ornstein's data, which 
shows that men and women with equal abilities obtain different returns on their 
human capital, pointing clearly to the existence of two segregated labour 
markets. 
Human capital theory focuses on individual choices and abilities, largely 
ignoring social structural influences and is thus an inadequate explanation of 
wage differentials of men and women in the same jobs and of the occupational 
segregation of women into low-paying jobs. 
Other neo-classical economists acknowledged the imperfections of the market 
and proposed theories of discrimination, originally to explain racial 
discrimination, and later applied to sexual discrimination. Bergmann's (1971) 
theory of 'crowding' is helpful in understanding women's position in the 
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labour market. Although in her model the oversupply of women and 
minorities into menial jobs causes the lowering of wages, it is the 
discriminatory demand of employers that restricts particular groups' access to 
certain jobs, thus highlighting the employers' role in shaping occupational 
segregation in the market place. 
Another group of neo-classical economists identified different shaped supply 
curves based upon the bargaining power of the parties (Bronfenbrenner, 1956; 
Madden, 1973; Marshall, 1976; Robinson, 1934). The bases of bargaining 
power varied in these theories from male trade unions, employers' 
requirements for applicants, family constraints of women, discrimination, to 
government agencies. Madden included a number of environmental features 
influencing racial employment patterns, which could be used in an analysis of 
women in the labour market. They included economic and labour market 
conditions, distribution of power in the larger community, industry structure 
and growth potential, labour market skills and education of the employees, 
labour requirements of various companies and industries, and operation of 
labour market institutions. 
Madden's theory, by incorporating institutional factors and building in the 
bargaining process between employers and workers, moved a long way from 
the original neo-classical economists' assumptions, but it still envisaged 
employers as one undifferentiated class. The most fundamental challenge to 
neo-classical economics turns upon this point; segmented labour market 
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theories locate the source of wage discrimination in the structure of the 
economy (Ornstein, 1982). 
The labour market segmentation theorists concentrated on jobs rather than 
individual workers or employers. One segmentation theory, the dual labour 
market theory of the economy, proposed two job markets. The characteristics 
of the workers in each of these two markets were of secondary importance, 
envisaged as a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy, given the type of work carried 
out in a particular sector and the expectations made of the workforce in it. 
The assumption of a homogeneous, perfectly competing labour market was cast 
aside as the dual market model proposed a primary (orcore) labour market 
complemented by a non-competing secondary (or peripheral) labour market. 
The primary sector consisted of stable, secure, higher paid, clearly 
differentiated jobs; a career path within an internal labour market; 
institutionalised procedures for dealing with conflict; in a technologically 
developing industry, very often unionised. In contrast, the secondary sector 
consisted of unstable, insecure, lower paid, undifferentiated jobs; no career 
development; arbitrary, personalised discipline; in a technologically stagnant 
industry, usually unorganised (Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck, 1990; 
Ornstein, 1982; Rubery, 1978). 
Labour market segmentation theorists (Averitt, 1968; Galbraith, 1973; Poire, 
1970) identified all positive developments in the primary market, the stability 
of which depended upon the flexibility of the secondary sector, for 
44 
subcontracting or temporary employment. Some economists in this school 
proposed a third sector, for example, O'Connor (1973) designated government, 
and Bluestone (1970) identified an 'irregular' sector, consisting of marginal 
and illegal activities. All, however, linked labour market behaviour with the 
wider economic structure and the development of technology. 
As women and minorities are usually in the secondary sector, the dual labour 
market theory does introduce a structural explanation for women's low wages. 
But it does not fully explain why women are in the secondary job market. 
The radical labour market segmentation economists modified the dual market 
model from a political economy perspective. Whereas the central notion of the 
segmentation theories is technology, the central notion for radical theorists is 
control, a theme prominent in the labour process debate. Gordon (1972) 
viewed his model as complementary to the other segmentation approaches. 
Technological developments are still seen as necessitating a stable workforce, 
but the capitalist need for control develops as factory production becomes more 
and more homogeneous and therefore more of a threat, in terms of solidarity 
and class action. The capitalists as a class are motivated to a 'divide and rule' 
strategy, achieved by imposing an artificial hierarchy on a fundamentally 
homogeneous workforce. Segmentation serves two purposes: the lower strata 
increases the status and status orientation of those in the higher strata; and 
workers in the higher strata are unlikely to identify with interests of those 
45 
lower down in the hierarchy, therefore lower wages can be paid to them 
without fear of class opposition (Rubery, 1978). 
This theory has a certain appeal since it fits well with the continuing 
development of human resource management and its concern with classification 
and pay systems, most of which are hierarchical and managerialist in their 
conception. But there are two main criticisms. The first is that there is a 
reification of the category 'capitalist, ' which prevents us from recognising the 
different strategies owners and managers of monopoly capital firms have 
adopted. For example, the increasing use of employee participation, whether 
inspired by quality of working life or total quality management ideas, even if 
for managerial purposes, does relinquish some control to the employees. It is 
debateable as to how much power is transferred or whether hierarchical wage 
structures are dismantled to any significant degree; nevertheless, management 
strategy is not always to strive for more control, and it is very doubtful if 
owners or managers are motivated by a desire to avoid class action. It may 
well be, at the highest level of abstraction, that a hierarchical workforce does 
prevent class opposition, but this functionalist view of segmentation is 
insufficient as an explanation of a sexually segmented labour force. 
The second main criticism (Rubery, 1978) is concerning the one-sidedness of 
the radical theorists' explanation of segregation in the labour market. The 
labour market structure is envisaged as the result of capitalist action, giving no 
room for working class agency. If capitalists have had to sacrifice 
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technological efficiency (Cockburn, 1983) or worker cooperation and 
motivation (Bowles and Gintis, 1975), "it is the limitations on capitalists rather 
than their ability to control that becomes the interesting question" (Rubery, 
1978, p. 23). 
Organised labour played a significant role in the -Structuring of labour markets, 
by unions' control of the supply of labour through the establishment of a 
family wage (Humphries, 1977), the ten-hour day campaign, restriction of 
immigrant labour, and, especially at the micro level - occupation, firm, or 
industry - where trade union development has been linked to the demarcation 
of skill (Rubery, 1978). As Rubery argued; "... the radicals have overstressed 
the control offered by the bureaucratic division of the labour force, and at the 
same time underestimated or ignored the benefits for the working class of a 
sheltered, secure, albeit stratified, labour market" (1978, p. 33). 
Moreover, these gains for organised labour as a whole were in turn losses for 
those excluded from union protection: women and minorities. 
Rubery's paper should not be seen as a refutation of the dual labour market 
and radical theories but as building upon them. 
She proposed a more complex explanation of stratification in the labour market 
by including organised labour in the historical process, leading to a more 
dynamic view of labour market structure and how it relates to the overall 
economy. Economic restructuring will lead to fewer higher paid jobs, and the 
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growth in the service sector has coincided with an expansion of 'women's 
work' in the secondary labour market. As Rubery pointed out, the effect of 
these trends will depend partly on the extension of unionised protection, to 
enhance workers' bargaining power. 
The expansion of the services sector, and subsequent retraction of government 
in an increasingly free market, recessionary economy, forms the background of 
a variant of the radical segmentation theory. Marchak (1987) argued that 
women have always been a reserve pool of labour, a theme which formed part 
of the domestic labour debate, and that this explains their segregation in the 
labour market. Their role in this flexible reserve of labour points to the 
rationality of the sexual segregation of labour, from the capitalists' perspective. 
As such, like the radical labour market segmentation theorists, she emphasised 
the advantages to capitalism of cheap, flexible, labour in a segregated 
workforce. However, her argument can be criticised along the same lines as 
the labour market segmentation approach: it rests upon functionalist 
explanations, and it does not account for gender specificity. 
The labour market theories help to understand part of the reason for the wage 
gap. Whether for reasons of control or flexibility, the employers in a capitalist 
economy clearly enjoy the advantages of divisions In the labour market, 
whether on the basis of gender, race, ethnicity or other differentiation.. 
Segmentation and radical theories in particular are useful to explain 
segregation, both industrial and occupational. But none of these theories fully 
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explain why it is that women, as opposed to men, are at the bottom of the job 
hierarchy. The only explanations are exogenous to the labour market - 
socialisation, stereotypical attitudes, discrimination, or the biological argument. 
The feminist/ historical theories focus upon the labour market as a gendered 
construction, integrating supply side with demand side factors, reproduction 
with production. The remainder of this chapter will examine 
feminist/historical explanations of the wage gap. 
Two recent papers written from a feminist perspective (Du Plessis Novitz and 
Jaber, 1990; Kessler-Harris, 1988) tackled the resurgence of neo-classical 
economists and their opposition to pay equity as interfering with 'free' market 
forces. Du Plessis Novitz and Jaber wrote in the context of the threatened 
repeal of pay equity legislation in New Zealand. Their argument for pay 
equity was based upon international empirical evidence which shows that the 
gender wage gap is smaller in countries where there is some government 
intervention in the labour market and a high proportion of women are members 
of nationally and regionally organised unions. Conversely, the wage gap is 
highest in those countries where there is minimal government intervention. 
showing clearly that market forces are not neutral and, left unregulated, will 
result in inequities in the labour market. 
Kessler-Harris provided a more theoretical argument which complements the 
empirical data in the Du Plessis Novitz and Jaber paper. She used the concept 
of the 'just wage, ' incorporated into wage determination since medieval 
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times, a variant of which was the concept of the 'family wage, ' to show that 
market forces have never been neutral. The just wage rested upon medieval 
conceptions of social hierarchy, just as the family wage rested upon the 
hierarchical, patriarchal relationships in society. Indeed, "the market, as it 
functions in the daily lives of people, is not independent of the values and 
customs of those who participate in it. Justice, equity and fairness have not 
been its natural outcomes" (Kessler-Harris, 1988, p. 239). For Kessler-Harris, 
the labour market is infused with traditional gender roles, and, because of this, 
comparable worth undermines the accepted view of equity. It challenges the 
status quo with a new idea of equity, "rooted, not in the moral economy of the 
male, but in the traditions, customs, and practices of women... " (1988, p. 
244). 
MacEwen Scott (1986) paralleled Kessler-Harris' view of the economy as 
gender-embedded, because of the links between the economy and other 
institutions that sustain gender inequality, and "because gender relations are 
interwoven with production relations at the level of the labour process itself. " 
As MacEwen Scott pointed out, the mechanism for segregation is the market, 
and although assumed to be neutral in its workings, it is a vehicle for social 
values and political pressure, which are normally invisible since they are 
incorporated into the market's pricing system and institutions. 
Human capital theorists, imbued with neo-classical assumptions, can also be 
criticised from a feminist perspective. The human capital variables are very 
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often disaggregated in an attempt to identify correlations with earnings levels. 
The category labelled 'gender' or 'discrimination' is usually calculated as 
residual, thus enabling arguments to be made that gender discrimination is such 
a small part of the wage gap that policies like equal value are not worth the 
expense (for example, Weiler, 1986). However, the other variables are 
gendered constructions, too, for example, education (Barrett, 1980; Crompton 
and Sanderson, 1990; Russell, 1987) and experience (this variable is linked 
closely with domestic ideology and the family wage). Weiler's erroneous 
assump tion that these human capital variables are non-gendered undermines his 
argument that comparable worth initiatives in the U. S. should be abandoned in 
favour of voluntary affinnative action. 
Without an appreciation of history, it is possible for the neo-classical 
assumptions about the free market to take hold, making it possible for policy- 
makers, legislators, New Right groups and ordinary women to propose that 
women's problems in the labour force are to do with personal 'choices. ' rather 
than social issues (Kessler-Harris, 1988). 
The feminist critique offers us the concept of patriarchy, with its interwoven 
material and ideological manifestations, monitored through an historical 
framework. The economy, like every other institution in society, has been, 
and is, infused with hierarchical patriarchal relationships, so it should be no 
surprise to find that organised labour, especially the early craft unions, played 
a significant role in the shaping of the sexual division of labour, at home and 
51 
at work. Men's historical ability to restrict competition by defining the scope 
of the labour market, increasing their bargaining power, thus gaining higher 
wages, and relegating women to lower skilled, lower wage occupations, is 
identified as a causal factor in the shaping of sexual segregation in a number of 
papers (Cockburn, 1983; Hartmann, 1976; Malveaux, 1984; Phillips and 
Taylor, 1980; Rubery, 1978; and Warskett, 1990). 
The discussion continues with a brief description of the development of 
women's work and domestic ideology in Canadian society generally, followed 
by a review of the historical evidence of organised labour's role, in 
conjunction with the state, in shaping the sexual division of labour, segregation 
of the labour market and concomitant low wages for women. Wherever 
possible, Canadian information will be used, but in some areas, for example, 
the debate over protective legislation for women, there is very little available 
and British and American material will be examined for their relevance to the 
Canadian situation. 
The Impact of Industrialisation Upon Women's Work 
Hartmann (1976) and the Armstrongs (1986) described a family industry 
system which eventually disappeared due to increasing competition in an 
expanding market, leading to technological development and factory 
production. Both Hartmann's and the Armstrongs' model of transition from 
pre-industrialism to capitalism assumes that capitalist relations of production 
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caused a separation between the private domestic role of women's work and 
the public domain of work for the market, now wage-labour outside the home, 
monopolised by men earning a breadwinner wage. This private/public split 
exacerbated the sexual division of labour, and the value of women's work 
declined. 
Cohen (1988), a Canadian historian of women's work in nineteenth century 
Ontario, challenged this taken-for-granted assumption that capitalism brought 
about domesticity as a result of a separation between the private and the 
public, arguing that it is based upon European, mainly British, evidence. On 
the contrary, she asserted, Canada was originally a subsistence-oriented, 
colonialist, staple-exporting economy which already featured patriarchal 
relations of production and a gendered division of labour. Unlike the British 
economy, Canada did not experience a large scale family industry phase. 
Rather than a withdrawal from market activities, Ontario women increased 
their participation as local markets expanded. 
Middleton (1979) also counterargued the proposal that women's oppression was 
the result of domesticity brought about by capitalist relations of production. 
He criticised a romanticism about women's roles in pre-capitalist societies. In 
reality, women in'the classical feudal mode of production (ie. payment of rent 
in kind, usually labour on the lord's property) were likely to experience a 
higher degree of sexual division of labour, and hence more of a 'housewifely" 
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role, than those whose peasant households were required to pay the landlord 
rent in cash, a practice closer to the newer capitalist social relations. 
Both Cohen's and Middleton's historical evidence undermined the premise of 
the 'domestic labour debate': that the economic workings of capitalism causes 
women's confinement to the home, and that unpaid domestic labour is 
necessary for the reproduction of the working classes and is therefore integral 
to capitalist relations of production. Criticisms of this latter approach to 
women's work included its economism, its functionalism, and the fact that it 
ignored women's wage labour (Hamilton, 1986; Kaluzynska, 1980; Molyneux, 
1979). 
Domestic Ideology and the Family Wage 
If we accept that the sexual division of labour, and domesticity, were not 
caused by industrialisation as such, an attempt should be made, at least at a 
theoretical level, to understand the relationship between capitalism and an 
evidently pre-existing gender, or domestic, ideology. It is in the context of 
this larger debate - capitalism/patriarchy or class/gender - that most of the 
evidence of a domestic ideology in Canadian society during industrialisation is 
to be found. In particular, the role of the trade unions became the subject of 
controversy, seen as vehicles for predominantly patriarchal or capitalist 
relations. The strength of domestic ideology was such that its effects upon the 
workplace were inevitable. Up until the 1950's, the female workforce was 
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made up of predominantly young single women. For most of these women, 
marriage meant an exit from the labour force; those few women who did 
continue working frequently moved in and out of paid work during early 
childbearing years, and usually finished as soon as children were old enough to 
supplement the family income (Frager, 1983). 
At the onset of industrialisation young women from slowly depopulating rural 
areas moved to the fast growing towns and cities, and were recruited into the 
labour force. They, along with large numbers of women immigrants, entered 
waged work in one of a few female occupations: domestic work, factory work 
(mostly in the textiles and garment industries) and, at the turn of the century, 
clerical work, teaching and nursing (Sangster, 1985). Yet it is important to 
realize that at the turn of the century women comprised only about 13 to 15 
percent of the paid workforce. Even while achieving a certain measure of 
independence, their working lives were dominated by the prevailing ideals of 
marriage and motherhood - and their role in the home. The following 
interpretation of women's position at that time highlights the link between 
gender ideology and women's work: 
the role of the working class homemaker, which has some 
recognized material importance, some social respect, and at least 
a measure of autonomy and self-regulation, was more attractive 
than the petty discipline and low status of women's jobs. Thus, 
a woman's desire to marry, a reaffirmation of dominant social 
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values, was reinforced by her experience of work. (Tentler, 
cited in Sangster, 1985, p. 65) 
Domestic ideology was especially strong in Quebec where the dominance of 
the clergy played a prominent part in erecting barriers to women's entry into 
the paid labour force, "fearing that such changes would undermine masculine 
authority and wreak havoc on the traditional family" (Frager, 1983, p. 48). 
The 'ideal' of the family wage was constantly promoted in Canada, 
reinforcing inequalities in the labour force (Kealey, 1986). Those few married 
women who ignored these pressures were commonly thought to be working for 
tpin money', so their wages were always low, and they gained little sympathy 
in any attempts to raise their wages. 
The degree of wage discrimination during this period is illustrated by a 
Toronto newspaper report in 1897 quoting a manufacturer of ready-made 
clothing: 
I don't treat the men bad, but I even up by taking advantage of 
the women. I have a girl who can do as much work, and as 
good work as a man; she gets $5 a week. The man who is 
standing next to her gets $11. The girls, however, average 
$3.50 a week, and some are as low as $2. (cited in Frager, 
1983, p. 4) 
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Agitation for higher wages was comparatively rare for women workers. 
Organisers in the trade unions recognized the power of the domestic ideology. 
A male labour organiser in 1885 explained women's lack of militancy in this 
way: 
... 
in too many cases [women workers] look to marriage as the 
door through which they will escape from toil, and not expecting 
to be permanently in the labour market, they do not insist on 
keeping it up to a high standard. (Frager, 1983, p. 49) 
Domestic ideology was interwoven with and was thereby reinforced by 
material factors during the mid to late 1800's. Employers very often hired 
women as cheap labour in highly competitive industries such as the garment 
industry, and were particularly intransigent with women workers. In addition, 
employers often used 'divide and rule' tactics by buying off male workers at 
the expense of the women. Employers thus gained from domestic ideology 
during the late 1800's because of the docility of the female workforce, the 
family wage, exploitation of 'supplementary' earnings, and competition 
between men and women (Kessler-Harris, 1975). Add to these disadvantages 
women's transiency in jobs, lack of skill, lack of experience in the workplace, 
the extra demands of household responsibilities, and isolation of work, and we 
have enormous barriers to union participation during this period (Frager, 
1983). 
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The ideology of 'a woman's place' was evident in male trade unionists in the 
United States, as described by Milkman (1980) and Hartmann (1976), and in 
the British labour movement by Barrett (1980). All comment on the link 
between the family wage as a component of the familial ideology, and its 
consequences for women's pay. 
Sometimes referred to as a 'living wage, ' the family wage is a male 
breadwinner wage sufficient to support a dependant wife and children. The 
concept of the family wage seriously underrnines the union route to equal pay 
for women. As Campbell cautioned: "The labour movement has managed to 
combine a commitment to equal pay with a commitment to the family wage. 
You can't have them both" (1982, p. 19). Clearly, privileged male wages 
parallel underpaid female wages, and union bargaining practices have 
traditionally been centred upon using the family wage as a bargaining tactic, to 
the disadvantage of women (McFarland, 1979), despite its largely mythical 
existence (Barrett and McIntosh, 1980; Land, 1980). 
Many male wage-earners do not have dependants and many of the unwaged do 
not have breadwinners. Many 'conventional' families have had increasingly to 
rely on two incomes. Between 1945 and 1970, women's participation in the 
Canadian work-force almost doubled (Sangster, 1985) and the highest 
participation rates were among women whose husbands earn the least (Parr, 
1985). In a study of a Nova Scotia fishing community, Connelly and 
MacDonald (1986) concluded that the family wage had never been a reality, 
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but that the ideal of the male breadwinner ideology survived despite the 
necessity of a complementary wage. This persistence of a traditional family 
model as an ideal, despite all pointers to the contrary, still survives in Canada, 
as a survey conducted in 1994 demonstrated (Most polled wanted traditional 
family). 
However, without a second income there would be a significant increase in the 
number of two-parent families below the poverty line in Canada. Estimates of 
this increase in poor families have risen from just over 50% about a decade 
ago (National Council on Welfare, 1979; Armstrong and Armstrong, 1984) to 
a level of 78% in 1990 (Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck, 1990). Westwood 
quoted one woman worker's view of the family wage in a study of a British 
hosiery factory; "Pin money, rubbish. I work for money and so do all the 
women. This nonsense about pin money, it's all rubbish, women have to work 
to keep the family going and that's been going on for years" (1984, p. 62). 
Thus, a family wage was not and is not a reality for most working class 
women. Families today are more complex than the male breadwinner concept 
model. Not accounting for class differences, whereas in 1961 65% of 
Canadian families fitted this traditional image, only 13% did in 1991 (Ontario 
Women's Directorate, undated). Pay equity policy represents a challenge to 
the traditional family wage concept, seeking to extend it to women 
breadwinners (Blum, 1991). 
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ExclusionM POlicies of Craft Unions 
The family wage, dominant in Canadian society during industrialisation and 
onward, shaped and buttressed systematic exclusion of women from the trade 
union movement. The Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) was the first viable 
Canadian central labour federation. It was dominated by international craft 
unions, whose headquarters were in the United States. Founded in 1886, in 
1956 it merged with the industrial union dominated federation, the Canadian 
Congress of Labour (CCL), to form the presently existing Canadian Labour 
Congress (CLC). The domination of the international craft unions held until 
the late 1940's, when the development of industrial unionism from the United 
States established a stronghold with the universalisation of factory production 
in Canada towards the end of the second world war. Bearing in mind the 
dominance of the TLC on the labour scene, it was not until 1914 that it 
changed its platform of principles which had previously called for the abolition 
of female labour (Sangster, 1985). And then the new policy only came about 
as the result of a labour shortage as men went off to war. 
The TLC was greatly influenced throughout its existence by its powerful 
counterpart in the United States, the American Federation of Labour (AFL), 
which was craft dominated and conservative. Since the AFL could exert 
enough power over the TLC to force the expulsion from the TLC of 
industrially based unions on three separate occasions (in 1902,1921, and 
1939), even despite initial resistance from the TLC, it is probable that AFL 
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policies and attitudes would prevail in the Canadian branch of the labour 
movement. Indeed, Frager makes a similar observation in her historical 
account of Canadian women workers' relationship with their unions: "... it is 
likely that the international unions pursued similar policies with respect to 
women on both sides of the border. After all, these unions tended to be quite 
centralized" (1983, p. 53). [Please note here that the Canadian usage of the 
term "quite" is roughly equivalent to the English qualifier "very"] 
Consequently, we can assume that historical evidence from the United States 
would be applicable to the Canadian case when attempting to illustrate ways in 
which the TLC's exclusionary platform was carried out in practice. 
Many male craft unionists in Canada sought to exclude women from the paid 
labour force in general and from their own trades in particular. Canadian 
printers, like their British counterparts, preserved their craft by restricting 
entry and vigorously defending apprenticeships (Kealey, 1980). In some cases, 
men unionists actually led strikes to force employers to dismiss women 
workers (Frager, 1983). 
Referring to the United States, Milkman (1980) described some direct methods 
of exclusion of women. Theoretically, women could become affiliated with 
craft unions in their trade, but there were some unions whose constitutions 
specifically barred women from membership, for example, the Barbers, the 
Engravers, the Switchmen, and the Molders. Moreover, the Molders imposed 
a fine on members of their union who taught women workers any aspect of the 
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molding trade, with the aim of reducing "the ftirther employment of women 
labour in union core rooms and foundries, and eventually the elimination of 
such labour in all foundries" (cited in Milkman, p. 116). Often, even when 
the national policies of the unions allowed the organising of women, the local 
officials disregarded these guidelines and prevented women from joining. 
Sometimes when women overcame many obstacles and succeeded in organising 
themselves upon being refused entry to the local craft union, they would apply 
to be chartered as an AFL union, only to be refused admission on the grounds 
of dual unionism. 
Less obvious ways of keeping women out were indirect mechanisms like high 
initiation fees and dues which women workers could not afford because on 
average they earned half of the men's rate. If a few unions did offer a cheaper 
fee structure for women, then in practice this exacerbated their unequal status 
within the work force and the union. Long apprenticeship requirements 
effectively excluded many women from the skilled trades. In some cases 
women had to pass special exams before they could become an apprentice. 
The National Women's Trade Union League, an American organisation 
operating in the early 20th century, lobbied the AFL to appoint more women 
organisers, and came into considerable conflict with the labour federation as a 
result. Turning to Canadian evidence for the same period, it appears that the 
few women leaders in existence were systematically excluded from policy 
discussions, even when the issue was of major concern to women. For 
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example, when the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council were discussing the 
eight-hour day, a minimum wage for women, and mother's pensions, they 
rejected a woman leader's proposal that women from various unions be 
included in the discussions (Frager, 1983). 
Systematic exclusion from craft unions in the early and middle stages of 
industrialization resulted in exclusion from the skilled trades, thus relegating 
women workers to the unskilled occupations. Unskilled work, whether in 
domestic service, the factories, or, later, in the clerical jobs, was poorly 
rewarded, both extrinsically and intrinsically. Low wages and monotonous 
work in often harsh working conditions already referred to in connection with 
the 'Prince Charming' syndrome set up a self-fulfilling prophecy. Her 
expected economic dependence/domestic responsibility shaped, and was shaped 
by, her denied opportunities at work and in the union. 
Trade union exclusionary policies clearly had a dramatic effect upon women's 
positions in the labour market. Explanations for these discriminatory actions 
fall broadly into two categories: those emphasising patriarchal ideology and 
those proposing material factors. Hartmann made a forceful argument for 
understanding the historical origins of the present sexual segregation of the 
workforce in terms of the role that the male worker "... ordinary men, men as 
men, men as workers. --" 
(1976, p. 139) have played in shaping structural 
inequalities. She accounted for the exclusion of women by referring to the 
patriarchal relations between men and women: "men wanted to assure that 
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women would continue to perform the appropriate tasks at home" (1976, p. 
155). 
Hartmann advocated a 'dual systems theory' where she envisaged patriarchy 
and capitalism as two interlocking systems, each modifying and 
accommodating to the other in various ways at differing phases in history. 
Even though her theory could help us to understand why the unions excluded 
women rather than organised them, her analysis of the process took little 
account of the logic of craft unionism. 
Although gender ideology undoubtedly played a large part in the exclusion of 
women from craft unions, Milkman (1980) recognised that the practice was 
also explained by the threat of wage competition from women. In the early 
stages of capitalism technological progress was rapid and the artisan 
experienced continual deskilling and job insecurity. Women were considered 
to be in direct competition with men for jobs, and their exclusion was part of 
an overall strategy to maintain the craft unions' strict control over the supply 
of skilled jobs, thus increasing the bargaining power of the male unionists. 
Hence, an Ontario labour organization in 1910 explained that "we think that 
women should not be allowed to work in the foundries, as it has a tendency to 
degrade them, to lower the wages of the men and to keep a number of young 
men out of work" (cited in Frager, 1983). Here, the economic justification is 
reinforced by an ideological one. Parr (1985), Kealey (1980) and Frager 
(1983) commented on the Canadian unions' fear of competition from women, 
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and described the intensification of this fear during World War I. In 1917 the 
TLC's Pronouncement of Organized Labour in Canada on War Problems 
protested "the unnecessary dilution of labour by the introduction of female 
labour before proper steps had been taken to utilize available skilled 
mechanics" (cited in Frager, 1983, p. 53). 
At the close of the war labour representatives once again called upon 
government to employ women only as a last resort, and suggested steps to 
ensure that female employment was restricted to occupations safe for women, 
considering their future role as mothers. At the same time, labour promoted 
equal pay for women. This could have been a genuine concern for the lower 
paid women in the workforce, but at least one commentator (Frager, 1983) has 
interpreted this move as an indirectly exclusionary one, since it is known that 
in a number of cases where a union had achieved equal pay the women had 
ended up losing their jobs because there was no longer any advantage to the 
employer. In fact, an English feminist had come to the same conclusion 
earlier on in the century, when she said that male union leaders will support 
equal pay as "an effective way of maintaining the exclusion of women while 
appearing as the champions of equality between the sexes" (Rathbone, 1904, 
cited in Hartmann, 1976, p. 157). 
In Britain, as in Canada and the US, the labour movement had adopted 
exclusionary policies against women when the craft unions were in their 
ascendency. Interpretation of the historical evidence again seems to either 
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emphasise the ideological or economic. The British equivalent of the 
Hartmann\Milkman difference in interpretation is the 'sex and class' debate 
between Barrett (1980), co-authors Brenner and Ramas (1984) and Lewis 
(1985). In this debate aimed at clarifying the causes of women's oppression, 
organised labour is judged according to a predominantly patriarchal 
(ideological) explanation or predominantly capitalist (economic). Barrett's 
explanation for organized labour's exclusion of women builds on Hartmann's 
dual systems theory within a stronger Marxist framework, but ultimately rests 
upon the power of a pre-existing gender ideology. The trade unions' role in 
fighting for protective legislation is a controversial one in this particular 
debate. 
While Barrett argued that the legislation was evidence of a gender ideology, 
Brenner and Ramas proposed that the legislation was part of a genuine attempt 
by the working class to reduce capitalist exploitation. They maintained that the 
demands originally included men but, whereas the capitalist class resisted 
restrictions for working class males, Victorian moral outrage at women 
working in a mixed workforce, particularly in the mines, fuelled a political 
opportunity for the unions to push successfully for protective legislation 
covering women, which they knew would in effect reduce the hours for men 
because most tasks were interdependent. Not surprisingly, whereas for Barrett 
exclusionary policies were explained ideologically, for Brenner and Ramas they 
were logical working class responses to women undercutting craftsmen's 
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wages, and therefore explicable at an economic level. Although not generally 
perceived as part of the 'sex and class' debate, Humphries (1977) defended 
the family wage, and therefore the exclusion of women which the notion 
justified, along the same lines as Brenner and Ramas: the working class was 
strengthened through their control over the (female) labour supply and through 
the nurturing of class consciousness in the working class family. 
In my view, Brenner and Ramas exaggerated the idealism of Barrett in their 
critique, and their work could be interpreted as developing the material 
dimensions of the gender ideology that Barrett saw as so powerful. Brenner 
and Ramas rejected Barrett's focus upon gender ideology, instead of perceiving 
their material analysis as complementary to her theory. Cheap competition 
from women was not only an economic aspect of social relations, but also an 
aspect of gender ideology: the reason women's wages were so low is that they 
were paid for women's work, undervalued because of domestic ideology and 
because of their unskilled status. Rather than theorising women's 
subordination, or the role of trade unions in the sexual division of labour, in 
terms of either an ideological or material level, these dimensions are so 
interwoven that explanation needs to integrate ideology and material factors at 
the level of institution, practice and interaction. Indeed, Lewis attempted a 
bridging of the two 'sides' of the debate by developing what she called a 
materialist theory of ideology, ' although in the end she built mainly upon 
Barrett's work. 
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Skill as a Gendered Construction 
The most compelling reason to analyse gender ideology as well as the 
economic rationality of the labour movement is that we can only understand 
the concept of skill by infusing it with an ideological construction. Women's 
labour was cheap, and it was cheap largely because of the impact of gender 
ideology upon their perceived worth as unskilled workers. Moreover, to 
complete the vicious circle, they could never break out of their unskilled status 
because of their systematic exclusion from the skilled trades. A nineteenth 
century feminist commented perceptively on union campaigns for equal pay 
when she argued that equal pay for equal work was a fraud for women, since 
having been prevented from developing equal skills their work was, in fact, not 
equal (Fawcett, 1892, cited in Hartmann, 1976, p. 157). 
Unskilled women workers, then, were excluded as a threat to skilled men's 
jobs in an era of technological change and uncertainty. Deskilling of craft 
union jobs was usually accompanied by displacement; often women took over 
deskilled work. Furthermore, women were often used as strikebreakers in 
Canada (Gaskell, 1986; Kealey, cited in Sangster, 1985). Evidence from the 
United States also points to women strikebreakers being used when skilled 
workers protested the introduction of new machinery (Milkman, 1980). Part 
of employers' 'divide and rule' strategy, these tactics served to reinforce 
union hostility towards working women. 
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That unskilled women workers were hired as strikebreakers to do skilled work 
is a cogent argument for a social, gendered construction of skill. A Canadian 
writer noted that this casual training on the job for skilled work undermined 
the notion of a formal apprenticeship, "the apprenticeship served to control the 
supply of labour and to mystify the skills involved as much as it served to 
teach skills" (Gaskell, 1986, p. 370). Skill designation was the result of a 
continual struggle by workers to retain existing power and recognition as 
skilled in the face of work reorganisation brought about by technological 
change. Gaskell concluded: 
This analysis suggests that 'skill' should not be seen as an 
independent variable, a fixed attribute of a job or a worker 
which will explain higher wages or unemployment .... The 
'skilled' label instead stands for a political process in which 
some workers have more economic power than others. 
(1986, p. 379) 
Warskett (1990) also referred to the political struggle between Canadian 
employers and organized labour whereby male workers were able to use their 
considerable bargaining power to retain skilled status and high wages even if 
the objective basis for their skill was disappearing. Phillips and Taylor (1980) 
pointed to the fight by men to preserve their skilled status in their paper on sex 
and class in the British clothing industry. Here, the men had been successful 
in a struggle to define machining done by men as skilled, whereas machining 
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done by women was classified as semi-skilled. Phillips and Taylor concluded 
from their research that "skill has become saturated with sex ... it is the sex of 
those who do the work, rather than its content, which leads to its identification 
as skilled or unskilled" (1980, p. 85). 
Cockburn's study of the British printers (1981) corroborated this historical 
explanation of the identification of skilled work with men's work and unskilled 
work with women's work. In the face of new technology, the printers 
managed to retain control over their craft through their bargaining power9 
resulting in their preserved position in the skill hierarchy. Cockburn described 
the printers' anxiety at the changes in their work, which now became similar to 
t 
women's work' and therefore unskilled, objectively, even though they 
retained their 'skilled 
9 
status and pay differentials. 
She interpreted this discomfort of the printers as indicating the deeply rooted 
association of masculinity with 'men's work, ' that is 'skilled' work, which 
equates physical superiority with skill superiority. The corollary of mens' 
work thus defined is women's work as unskilled, equated with dexterity. Not 
only is skill a gendered construction, but so is technology, since at each stage 
of new developments, the technology is monopolised by men by the exclusion 
of women, as unskilled workers, from the compositors' room. The printers 
were only able to achieve this control because of political power gained 
through a strong union, denied to unskilled women. Thus, Cockburn's 
explanation for women's unskilled status integrates a 'sex-gender' system with 
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employer-male unionists conflict, focusing upon not only the effect of gender 
ideology in the home but also upon a gender ideology which permeates 
definitions of skill and technology in the workplace. 
A similar association between male skilled workers and notions of manliness 
occurred in the Canadian labour movement (Frager, 1983; Kealey, 1980). 
Hence, in 1904 in Southern Ontario, skilled male workers denounced 
strikebreakers as those who "were prevailed upon to betray their manhood" 
(Heron and Palmer, 1977, cited in Frager, 1983). This gender identity 
extended to the union culture where the very notions of 'fraternity' and 
'brotherhood' acted to place women as outsiders. 
Much of the feminist writing on skill is built on the labour process material, 
based upon and in dialogue with Braverman's deskilling thesis (1974). 
Braverman asserted that the history of capitalism was one of continual 
deskilling of the traditional craftsmen for reasons of capitalist control over the 
working classes, and he suggested that skill was not just an objective notion, 
but that the skilled definition sometimes survived the deskilling process. In her 
critique of Braverman's work, Beechey (1982) identified three aspects of skill. 
First, the concept can refer to objective competencies: skilled labour can be 
objectively defined as labour which combines conception and execution and 
involves the possession of particular techniques. Second, skill can refer to 
control over the labour process. Third, the concept can refer to conventional 
definitions of occupational status. 
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Feminist development of the labour process material has focused on Beechey's 
second and third aspects of skill, with a tendency to gloss over or ignore the 
first aspect - the objective competencies. This reflects the emphasis in feminist 
literature upon gender ideology, but whereas in the earlier debate on sex and 
class the relationship of this ideology to the material level was contested, in the 
feminist analysis of skill, the objective dimension of skill seems largely left out 
of the discussion. Although the gendered construction of skill is a very 
powerful explanation of women's positions in the sexual segregation of labour, 
it seems as though we have 'thrown the baby out with the bath water. ' Most 
of the early work on the sexual segregation of labour identified women's work 
as being objectively less skilled, less fulfilling, and dead end in career terms. 
This is not to say that skilled status is only objective; indeed, as we have seen 
from Phillip's and Taylor's, Gaskell's, and Cockburn's work, the definition of 
skill is also derived from a long historical\political process. But it is also 
important to recognize that women have been systematically excluded from 
skilled work, some of which has an objective element. More (1982) defended 
the technological rationality of apprenticeship as providing training for skills 
actually needed in the engineering industry. Although recognizing the power 
of the trade unions in defining skill, Warskett (1990) acknowledged that on 
average women's skills are objectively lower than men's, because of their 
systematic exclusion from the training and membership provided by the craft 
unions. In the context of pay equity, she argued that because many women's 
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jobs are actually less skilled than men's, then comparing their jobs with men's 
will only serve to reinforce and ossify the existing job hierarchy. 
It is useful to conceptualize skill as made up of both objective and subjective 
elements. For example, it would be difficult to deny that a surgeon is more 
objectively skilled that an office cleaner. On the other hand, we know that the 
surgeon's skilled status is suffused with gender, especially when we consider 
the male monopoly of what were the traditional female pursuits of healing, and 
we examine the social construction of 'taken for granted' knowledge about 
women and their bodies. In any event, if we believe that skill is mainly a 
social construction, then equal value as a strategy is a meaningful and effective 
one, provided we can 'peel away' the layers and make visible the true nature 
and value of women's skills. However, we also have to admit that some 
women's work is going to be objectively less skilled than the men with whom 
she is compared; in this case equal value will be of no use in improving her 
pay and affirmative action and wage solidarity strategies will be more 
appropriate. 
ExclusionM Practices in Industrial Unionism 
Given the gendered construction of skill combine4 with exclusionary policies 
during the ascendency of craft unionism, it is useful to discover whether 
women fared any better when the American Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (CIO) began to organize Canadian workers in the 1930's. In 
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theory, the CIO stood for organizing all workers along industrial lines, 
whether skilled or unskilled, so it did not operate upon the basis of exclusion. 
Rather, its aim was strength and solidarity through as large a membership as 
possible. Once the wartime regulations were lifted, in the late 1940's and 
early 1950's the CIO were successful in gaining union recognition in some 
large industries, winning some significant disputes to achieve real gains for 
unskilled workers. However, despite the increase of women's union 
membership, their unequal position in the labour market did not change 
significantly. 
According to Millanan, the founders of CIO were in many ways "akin to the 
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pure and simple' unionism of the craft-dominated AFL" (1980, p. 126), and 
sex discrimination still existed within the ranks of the labour movement. One 
American picket banner in the 1930's read: 'Restore our Manhood: We 
Receive Girls' Wages' (Milkman, 1980). Although by the late 1930's in 
Canada more women were organized, even in CIO contracts unequal wages 
persisted and the division of the workplace into ýmen's jobs' and 'women's 
jobs' were not challenged by male trade unionists (Sangster, 1985). 
More women -were employed in non-traditional work during the second world 
war but this did not bring any dramatic advances towards equality in the 
workplace in the long term, even though it did provide new job opportunities, 
higher wages, and more economic independence. These advantages were 
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short-lived because at the war's end, women were channelled back into the 
home or pre-existing job ghettoes. 
While craft exclusionism had contributed towards the sex-typing of occupations 
in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century, industrial unions' failure 
to protect women's seniority consolidated the pre-existing sexual segregation of 
labour. It is reasonable to assume that American CIO policies and practices 
existed in international unions in Canada in the postwar years. Milkman 
(1980) described the seniority practices in CIO unions at this time, especially 
at a local level where often negotiated anti-discriminatory provisions were 
ignored, and there was collusion with management over job classifications 
favouring men. 
Milkman maintained that the industrial unions' exclusion of women was not a 
result of their organizing logic, but should be understood in its economic, 
political and ideological context: the massive economic upheaval after the war, 
high unemployment causing job insecurity; the gender ideological assumption 
that women's war work was just temporary; the attack upon organized labour 
following postwar militancy; and the internal political problems besetting the 
labour movement. However, she argued that the "the most basic reason it for 
the unions' failure to stand by women was that the bond between women and 
the unions had never been very strong, despite the dramatic increase in female 
membership during the war. 
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The State 
Patriarchal ideology and practices led to the systematic exclusion of women 
from skilled work, both objectively and socially constructed. This exclusion 
occurred through the medium and outcome of structural properties, manifested 
in interactions in all areas of life, including the economy, the family, and the 
state. 
The state provided (and still provides) the framework for patriarchal ideologies 
and practices. The role of the state has to be built in to any explanation of 
women's discriminatory wages. 
Historically, family laws constrained women's economic role (Kenrick, 1981). 
Property laws ensured that women could only be their husband's agent, even 
though they played a vital role in the family economy. The state's legal 
controls within the family encouraged the economic dependence of women, 
whatever their status. Kenrick also referred to the consistent reference in state 
policy to women as a separate group - apart from nobles, clergy and peasants - 
which would provide ideological justification of segregation and low wages. 
Moving forward to the beginning of the industrial revolution, women and 
children worked in the new factories. Overwork and hazardous conditions 
eventually posed a threat to the future working population, and this generated 
pressures upon the state to alleviate the excessive exploitation. Protective 
legislation was one consequence (evident in the UK, USA and Canada). This, 
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in combination with the family wage, channelled women back into the home 
and reinforced the domestic ideology, pervading the workplace to affect those 
few who remained at work. State policy at the end of both wars was to once 
again push women back into the home, or into the unskilled, low paid 
'women's jobs, ' In all three countries mentioned above, day care provision 
was dismantled, and, in Britain the state was instrumental in the development 
of an ideology after the second world war which made individual mothers 
responsible for their children (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990). Indeed, the 
welfare state in Britain was designed on the basis of women being based in the 
home, looking after the family, as shown by this extract from the Beveridge 
report: 
The attitude of the housewife to gainful employment outside the 
home is not and should not be the same as that of the single 
woman. She has other duties .... In the next thirty years 
housewives as mothers have vital work to do in ensuring the 
adequate continuance of the British Race and of British Ideals in 
the world. (cited in Crompton and Sanderson, 1990, p. 50) 
These social policies, initiated fifty years ago, are still one of the major ways 
in which gender inequalities are sustained (Land, 1983, cited in Crompton and 
Sanderson). The Canadian welfare state, like the British, encouraged women 
to continue to stay at home and raise healthy workers for the rapidly expanding 
economy (Burt, 1991). Current Canadian state policies regarding daycare, 
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pensions and income tax, particularly, are based on the male breadwinner 
family type (Kealey, 1986), to the detriment of women's income and 
opportunity to access the labour force. Thus, historically the state's policies 
reinforced and still perpetuates the domestic ideology, ultimately affecting the 
kind of work women do, definitions of their skill compared to men, the wages 
they are paid, and designating them to the bottom of the occupational and wage 
hierarchy. 
In conclusion, patriarchal ideology and practice should not be seen as 
exogenous to the workplace. Definitions of women's and men's work, and 
their skill, are gendered constructions (Cockburn, 1983; Phillips and Taylor 
1980; Westwood, 1984) and relations of production have to be analytically 
interwoven with relations of reproduction (Beechey, 1977 and 1983; 
Humphries and Rubery, 1984). As Beechey argued, occupational segregation 
has to be explained in terms of familial ideology and the construction of gender 
within the labour process itself, for example, union exclusion and the social 
construction of skill. 
Indeed, so pervasive is the effect of this powerful combination of domestic 
ideology/labour process that the more female-dominated an occupation is, the 
lower the wage levels (Shepela and Viviano, 1984; Treiman and Hartmann, 
1981). Moreover, all women's work, even if in a neutral or male-dominated 
occupation, tends to be undervalued (Shepela and Viviano, 1984), which 
underpins much vertical segregation (Crompton and Sanderson, 1990). And 
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even when individual women do make the same money as a comparable man, 
their power and control are not the same (Shepela and Viviano, 1984). 
Given the role played by organised labour in the historical development of a 
sexually segregated labour market, the next chapter considers the current and 
recent past effectiveness of Canadian unions in representing women's interests. 
Chapter III also provides a short overview of some current trends in Canadian 
public sector collective bargaining, and partnership as public policy, before 
moving on to a discussion of pay equity bargaining in Chapter IV. 
79 
CHAPTER III 
Women, Unions and Collective Bargaining in Canada 
The Canadian pay equity initiatives require joint implementation in unionised 
workplaces, and therefore rely heavily on the process of collective bargaining 
in these organisations. Since we know from the discussion in the last chapter 
that organised labour played a role in the development of the present structural 
inequalities in the labour market, it is instructive to examine the unions' more 
recent record in representing women's interests. This chapter aims to assess 
the effectiveness of Canadian unions so far in gaining equality for women 
through collective bargaining. After a brief review of women in the workforce 
and female union membership, the main section of the chapter will consider 
both the internal and external equality of unionised women. To place this 
discussion in context, and before moving on in Chapter IV to the debates and 
issues concerning pay equity bargaining, the final section of the chapter will 
examine public sector collective bargaining and partnership as public policy in 
Canada. 
The changing workforce in the post-war era brought a dramatic increase in the 
participation of Canadian women in the labour force: in 1941 less than I 
million women were in the workforce (less than 19%), but by 1991 that figure 
had jumped to 6 million (over 45 %) (White, 1993; all statistics in this section 
on women in Canadian unions are from her book, unless stated otherwise). 
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Women working outside the home are now no longer predominantly single, but 
continue working outside the home whatever their married status or the ages of 
their children. 
Sexual segregation of the workforce has persisted despite this increase in 
women's employment (McDermott, 1991; Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck, 
1990). In 1981 over one third of all employed women were in clerical jobs, 
while another quarter worked in administrative and professional positions. As 
clerical and administrative work for women has increased, their employment in 
personal service and manufacturing have declined significantly since 1941. 
The percentage of women unionised grew dramatically between 1962 and 1989 
from about 16% to 39%. In this period, whereas the number of men 
belonging to unions grew by 86%, the number of women joining unions grew 
by 510%. This pattern developed because of public sector unionisation 
between 1965 and 1975, which resulted in large numbers of women joining 
unions. The increase in women members was accompanied by a shift away 
from the predominance of international unions (with headquarters in the U. S. ) 
towards the increasing influence of the national unions (private sector unions 
with headquarters in Canada) and public sector unions (who have their 
headquarters in Canada as well). No longer is the typical union the craft or 
industrial, blue collar, male, international organisation of earlier decades. The 
third wave of unionisation in Canada has resulted in a labour movement 
comprised of more women, more public sector and service workers, and more 
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national unions. In 1989, the highest female membership was in the public 
sector unions (48%), in contrast with the international unions (25%). 
Potentially, then, women are members of the most influential unions in the 
Canadian labour movement, and of the unions which tend to be the most 
political. 
Given the increase in female union membership, once women are inside unions 
it becomes important to discover how well their interests are represented, both 
internally (governance) and externally (workplace bargaining). It would be 
reasonable to expect an improvement in unions' actions towards women's 
equality, once women members become more than just a "... small, powerless 
group... " (Baker and Robeson, 198 1). 
Internal Egualit 
To assess whether a number of women proportional to their percentage union 
membership are moving into leadership positions, we have to examine their 
representation on executive boards, as delegates, on staff, committees and 
collective bargaining teams. 
Canada-wide, although 39% of all union members were women in 1989, only 
25 % of the executive positions for all unions were held by women. This 
information can be broken down into 1% women executive members compared 
to 25 % female membership in international unions; 25 % women executive 
members compared to 46 % female membership in national unions; and 13 % 
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women executive members compared to 48% female membership in public 
sector unions. According to White's study (1993) women hold 28% of the 
executive seats at the labour centrals (national and provincial federations of 
labour, which cover the majority of union members in Canada), compared with 
the national female membership figure of 39 %. 41 % of these labour centrals' 
executive seats are affirmative action positions. 
In her study, White collected further information about thirteen unions: four 
international, three national and six public sector unions. Her results showed 
that only one union out of the thirteen had elected a woman to the top position; 
this was a nurses' union with 98% female membership. However, it should be 
noted that shortly after her data was collected, the Canadian Union of Public 
Employees (CUPE), the largest union in Canada, elected women to their two 
top positions, and that they had elected the first woman national president a 
decade before. Women were close to proportionally represented (within a 
margin of 10% difference) on only four union executives. Three of the four 
were public sector - United Nurses of Alberta [UNA] (3 % difference), CUPE 
(8% difference), and Newfoundland Association of Public Employees [NAPE] 
(10% difference); the other was the Canadian Auto Workers [CAW] (6% 
difference). The information above about women executive members in 
Canadian unions applies only to head office union executives. 
Moving to the local level, the number of unions with a proportional 
representation of women as presidents was low: only four of the thirteen 
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unions studied were close. The UNA, not surprisingly, were the closest with 
only 2% difference, and CUPE were reasonably close with a difference of 7%; 
the other two unions were private sector national unions: CAW and the United 
Steelworkers of America (USW). NAPE, a key player in the Newfoundland 
case study, showed a gap of 24% in local women presidents. There was some 
indication overall that women were presidents of smaller than usual locals. 
Regarding other executive posts, women were more likely to hold secretarial 
than other more influential positions. Corroborating this conclusion was a 
survey carried out in 1989 by the federation of provincial goverrunent unions, 
the National Union of Provincial Goverriment Employees (NUPGE, cited in 
White, 1993), two of whose unions bargained pay equity for public sector 
employees covered in this study. This survey showed that while the overall 
female membership was 56%, only one-third of the local presidents were 
women, but two-thirds of the secretaries were women. 
If we are interested in women having a proportional influence in their unions, 
we also have to look at the number of women delegates. Conference delegates 
elect executive officers, establish general policy and make constitutional and 
financial changes. A minority of labour centrals and unions sent a 
representative number of women to their most recent delegation. The closest 
representation was in a national union - CAW (2% difference). Another 
national union, the Communication Workers of Canada (CWQ was next (3 %) 
with the Ontario Secondary School Teachers Federation (OSSTF); then UNA 
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with 4% difference. The two unions who were key players in pay equity 
bargaining studied in this project had gaps in representation of 11 % (CUPE) 
and 15 % (NAPE). 
It would also be reasonable to expect that women on staff would increase the 
likelihood of women's equality issues being at the forefront of union activities; 
a staff representative gives advice in negotiations, helps with grievances, forms 
education and research programmes and acts as a general liaison with 
membership. However, women were under-represented on the staff of the 
majority of labour centrals and unions, particularly in the positions outside of 
head office. Only four unions had approached representation of women: two 
of these were unions with low percentages of women membership (CAW and 
USA), therefore few women staff were needed to achieve representation, but 
they had done this. The other two unions more or less achieving 
representation were public sector unions - the B. C. Government Employees 
Union (BCGEU) and OSSTF. CUPE and NAPE revealed a gap of 25 % and 
27 %, respectively. 
Membership of committees (especially as Chair) is often preparation for future 
advancement within the union and is recognised by the federation of provincial 
government unions (NUPGE) as an important step in developing future women 
leaders. In this organisation's survey (1989), of its ten component unions, 
while the joint female membership was 56 %, women formed 33 % of 
committee members and 30% of committee chairs. In line with the survey, 
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White's study suggested that in most cases women were under-represented on 
advisory committees, and most importantly, on the negotiation committees. 
It was a constant theme during White's research that the bargaining committees 
were a key route to upward movement in unions, both for higher elected 
positions and many of the staff positions, as negotiating experience is often 
considered essential. Barriers against women participating in collective 
bargaining committees are first of all the reasons given for women's lack of 
involvement in union activism generally. Chaison and Andiappan (1989) 
surveyed male and female officers of local unions in Canada and concluded 
that the most important barriers to women participating in union leadership 
were that women hold two jobs (at home and at work) and have no time for 
union activities; child care responsibilities prevent more participation in unions; 
and women underestimate their abilities and believe that male employees are 
better suited to union official positions. 
In connection with the last finding, it is rather discouraging to note that 
women's self confidence as potential leaders did not improve much over 
fourteen years. According to an earlier investigation in New York, U. S. 
(Wertheimer and Nelson, 1975) the women surveyed saw themselves as helpers 
rather than as union leaders, and lacked confidence in their own abilities. 
If the barriers listed above exist against participation in general, it is even 
more true for collective bargaining in its present form which involves long, 
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intensive hours of work, clashing with domestic responsibilities, often 
combined with extensive periods of travel away from home. Moreover, the 
confrontational process is difficult for some women to accept and some in 
White's study envisaged an alternative model, more rational and less 
aggressive. Related to this was the male culture of negotiation referred to by 
many women unionists during White's research, which was difficult to break 
into, even if women wanted to (see also Dickens and Colling, 1990). As 
White remarked, the culture "... suggests that you have to be tough and strong 
to handle negotiations, and that men are more likely to fulfil these 
requirements" (1993, p. 114). 
Internal equality initiatives can be one or a combination of the following: 
increasing the number of women in executive positions by affirmative action 
measures; and encouraging leadership development together with attention to 
equality issues by establishing women's committees, along with women's 
conferences. 
Between 1983 and 1987 all but three of the labour centrals introduced 
affirmative action in their executive bodies. The most extensive measure was 
in the British Columbia Federation of Labour, where there are thirteen seats 
designated within the existing executive board structure, rather than expanding 
the number of seats to accommodate the affirmative action seats. This is 
unusual (the federation in Manitoba is the only other central to designate 
existing seats) and addresses the concern that created seats may be 
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marginalised as "extras, " because the men's positions on the executive remain 
unaffected. 
Immediately equalising women's representation in union power structures 
would require the erosion of male privilege (Maroney, 1987). Indeed, Bail 
criticised the superficial nature of the affirmative action initiative in the 
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) along these lines. She alleged that when the 
women were "given" the chance to hold leadership positions, the men 
immediately reassumed control, closing rank along the lines of their "club. " 
Moreover, the seats were created in addition to the existing national executive 
seats, hence the existing group maintained their power, and "not one of the old 
boys' club relinquished their throne to a sister... " (1985, p. 9). 
Indeed, Nancy Riche (Executive Vice-President of the CLQ alluded to this 
male dominated culture and apparent, rather than actual, power when she 
warned that: "one of the problems with the extra seats approach is that we 
don't think beyond the extra seats... " (cited in Balkan, 1985, p. 5 1). Briskin 
(1990) listed the barriers women in affirmative action positions face: a fight for 
credibility; systematic exclusion from formal and informal decision-making 
processes; and gliettoisation in "women's issues" narrowly defined. 
Echoing Bail, Briskin pointed out that the achievement of affirmative action 
seats tends to divert attention from the really important political action: 
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to challenge the deeply-rooted male domination of union 
structures, strategies and ideologies .... Women in leadership 
positions are, more often than not, excluded from access to the 
power that should accrue to them by virtue of their position; 
they are marginalised and isolated by the structures and 
ideologies of male domination. They are caught between the 
reality of their power relative to the rank and file, and the 
absence of their power relative to male leaders. (1990, p. 39) 
Briskin stressed the importance of a feminist politic and process as an integral 
part of this challenge to the male hierarchy, and cautioned against the 
assumption behind affirmative action that all women will be committed to 
women9s equality and pursue a feminist politic. 
We should note at this juncture that the ma ority of unions in White's study (in 
contrast to the labour federations) had not taken even this limited step of 
affirmative action towards women's equality. NAPE, who initiated pay equity 
in Newfoundland, was the union who had undertaken the most affirmative 
action steps, increasing its Executive Board by six affirmative action seats, 
including one woman vice-president. NAPE had also established an 
affirmative action system in their committees so that each of them, including 
the bargaining committees, has equal men and women representation; also, of 
the staff members who service the committees, half must be women. 
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Women's committees also represent an internal mechanism for increasing the 
power and status of women in unions, and they should ultimately lead to 
improvements in women's external equality. They existed in every one of the 
twelve labour centrals and unions in White's study. All the public sector 
unions in the survey had established a women's committee by the end of 1981. 
As one unionist commented in White's study: "Everything that has evolved on 
women9s issues has come from the women's committee, including internal 
union policies and contract negotiation suggestions" (1993, p. 124). 
Apart from being the focus of developing alliances with the women's 
movement, encouraging a feminist analysis of the position of women in the 
union, the workplace and society in general, women's committees have also 
experimented with feminist process (Bail, 1988; Briskin, 1990; Edelson, 
1987). This has tended to focus on developing decision-making practices that 
rely on consensus, building skills, and sharing knowledge and responsibility. 
Feminist process encourages more responsive, hospitable, democratic, 
participatory and inclusive practices (Briskin, 1990). This collective leadership 
model is recognised as both a strength and weakness in the face of the typical 
individualistic, competitive, and exclusive male mode of leadership. But 
whatever the pressures experienced by women leaders following this process, 
Briskin (1990) argued that by increasing rank and file participation in unions 
and enhancing social unionism, it strengthens the Canadian labour movement 
by revitalising it (see also Milkman, 1985). 
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The emphasis on participation and consensus has extended in some unions to a 
feminist critique of the male-dominated bargaining style, as aggressive, 
competitive and elitist, and therefore alienating to women, apart from not 
always being effective in the union-management relationship. In some cases, 
collective leadership has meant consensus on strategy and tactics, and the 
rotation of the chief negotiator's position so that adversarial skills can be 
learned by everyone on the bargaining team (Little, 1989b). 
In other cases the push for feminist reform came from the grassroots, 
enhancing union democracy. There was also an insistence on more cooperative 
organising and negotiating. Women members of locals situated in small 
feminist-informed, collectively-oriented workplaces have, with the cooperation 
of their employers, reshaped the process of contract negotiations to mesh with 
a feminist setting (Pennell, 1990). What emerged was a new style of 
consensual bargaining which was incorporated into the collectives' preferred 
consensual decision making process. It is significant that these small 
workplaces - battered-women shelters -were organised in Canada and the 
United States by unions we know to be fairly progressive in women's equality, 
and have a sound history of equality structures. The Canadian women were 
organised by the provincial government unions (the record of these unions has 
been relatively good on women's equality - as described below). The 
American shelters were members of the United Auto Workers, a union the 
91 
Coalition of Labor Union Women rated as relatively progressive on women's 
issues (Martin, 1985). 
Structurally, most women's committees in White's study were advisory to the 
general union executive, often lobbying for controversial issues like funding or 
affirmative action. The outcome of such battles depends upon the political 
climate, including the influence of the committee. In some unions a backlash 
had developed so that it was becoming harder to obtain support for women's 
concerns. 
Like women's committees, women's conferences have become a regular part 
of union activity, organised by the majority of labour centrals and unions. 
Their role is usually educational and networking, rather than to recommend 
policy, although informal recommendations often arise as support and 
guidelines to women's committees. 
In the Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC), women 9s committees and the 
women's conference are not just advisory but contribute more directly to 
policy. Their regional women's committees are autonomous committees with a 
direct formal relationship with national head office and to the women's 
conference. The conference can send resolutions direct to the floor of the 
union's Triennial Convention. Formal structural links to decision-making 
bodies is important if women's equality structures are to make a real 
difference. White's study did not examine the links between these equality 
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structures and the negotiating structures, which is disappointing since it is 
argued here that an institutional link is also a crucial aspect of equality 
bargaining, particularly equal pay. 
However, she did consider the progress of three issues pursued by women's 
committees: child care and family responsibilities, sexual and personal 
harassment, and union education. The majority of centrals and unions in 
White's study did have some kind of child care policy. Most provided on-site 
child care for conventions and conferences. A number of problems had 
emerged with this solution, and on-site child care was mostly described as 
unpopular, used by few delegates, if any. Reimbursement was the more 
popular arrangement, but rarely covered the full cost of child care, and was 
rarely available at local level. 
Provision of child care does not deal with a more important barrier to women 
participating more - time and workload. The extensive demands on union 
activists' time makes it extremely difficult for a woman with family 
commitments. This is particularly a problem for visible minority women 
(Little, 1989a). In 1989 the Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux conducted 
a survey of women who were local presidents or higher union officials. These 
women often sat on women's committees, which were additional 
responsibilities. The conclusion was that their triple burden amounted to 
between 72 and 90 hours a week. In response to this problem, some unions 
have initiated studies to tackle high workloads and stress on union activists, but 
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as yet, White concluded that the commitment and creative thinking necessary 
to make changes does not exist in most unions. Crisis management does not 
lend itself to innovative thinking. There was also evidence that the male- 
dominated culture was a barrier to the development of this type of discourse. 
Based on White's findings, we can say that the labour movement has certainly 
taken up the problem of sexual harassment within the last decade. Union 
education has been extensive on the subject and unions are making a real 
attempt to tackle the problem both internally and in the workplace. Howeven, 
the issue is complex and there is difficulty in finding a policy that deals with 
all sides of it. Also, not all unions are committed to the issue, and there is 
often a gap between central policies and local/membership commitment. 
Progress in increasing women's participation in union education is 
encouraging, according to White's research. Overall, there is proportional 
representation on union courses, and new courses have been designed 
specifically for women, although there needs to be more women in certain 
areas, for example health and safety and collective bargaining. Bearing in 
mind the importance of developing negotiating skills in order to move on up to 
the top leadership positions, and the crucial need for more women negotiators 
to press for and participate in equality bargaining, it is particularly important 
to improve women's participation in collective bargaining courses. 
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External Equalit 
Central policies on women's equality in the workplace are fairly common in 
Canadian unions. The CLC's "Policy Paper on Women and Affirmative 
Action" (1984) gives a good indication of the Canadian labour movement's 
policy on women. 59% of unions are still affiliated with the CLC (Craig and 
Solomon, 1993). On the other hand, the CLC is loosely structured, not a 
powerful central organisation, and its influence over its provincial equivalents 
and affiliates is limited. However, as the main central labour federation in 
Canada, its policies will have some effect upon the affiliates, if only because 
power within the CLC is now in the hands of the public sector unions, among 
which are the three biggest unions in Canada, with large female memberships. 
Even bearing in mind the difficulty of predicting union action based on policy 
documents, and the lack of control the CLC has over its affiliates, a CLC 
policy on women is better than no policy at all. The 1984 policy paper defined 
affirmative action as a comprehensive program designed to overcome past and 
present discrimination, to include: non discriminatory hiring and promotion 
practices, equal pay for work of equal value, training opportunities, paid 
education leave, child care, parental leave, policies against sexual harassment, 
and accumulation of seniority during leaves. 
This was a comprehensive policy which went on to recommend both 
affirmative action and equal value legislation, making it mandatory for 
employers to negotiate with the union or employee representatives where there 
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was no union. Government agencies with the power to monitor, enforce and 
adjudicate disputes arising from the legislatively required programs were seen 
as essential. The policy document continued by listing some equality 
bargaining strategies, ideas for union education and structural reform. 
In 1985, the CLC's 5th Biennial National Women's Conference focused on 
affirmative action; as part of this campaign their Making Affirmative Action 
Work conference document was aimed ultimately at the affiliated unions. It 
was an educational and practical communication with guidelines on setting up 
union committees specifically responsible for developing, implementing and 
monitoring affirmative action programs; building up statistical descriptions of 
the status of men and women in the workplace; analysing existing collective 
agreements; and negotiating permanent and remedial measures for equality. 
Larkin and Pollark (1985) commented just before the Women's Conference 
that the affirmative action campaign would be weakened by its neglect of the 
central issue in the labour movement at that time: unemployment, including 
that caused by the displacement of many women's jobs by microtechnological 
development. They proposed that a broader strategy fighting for new jobs, 
reduced working time, and equality would be more winnable than affirmative 
action on its own. This observation points to a recurring theme in labour- 
feminist literature: the reconciliation of women's issues with the wider labour 
movement, the relationship between gender and class. 
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Turning to the policies of Canadian provincial federations and affiliated unions, 
Urkin and Pollock (1985) described the Ontario Federation of Labour's (OFL) 
Women's Committee as being notable for the initiation of affirmative action 
campaigns which recognised the need to reach the rank and file membership. 
At their 1982 Convention, the OFL adopted a policy statement of affirmative 
action. To seek support for its programme of legislated affirmative action, it 
arranged a series of public forums throughout the province. The end result 
was a lobbying document submitted to the provincial government (OFL, 1984), 
which recommended a long list of legislative initiatives, including equal pay 
for equal value. In 1988, the OFL Women's Committee published a small, 
concise and very effective handbook on pay equity. The short introduction 
included an explanation of the legislation's limitations by reference to the 
strong business lobbying against equal value in Ontario. 
One of OFL's affiliated unions, the Ontario Public Service Employees union 
(OPSEU) was the first union in Canada to appoint an Equal Opportunities 
Coordinator in 1978 (Field, 1983). OPSEU was a key player in the 
negotiations studied in this research. 
Both OPSEU and NAPE belong to the national federation NUPGE, which is 
the second largest union affiliated to the CLC. NUPGE published a booklet in 
1982 called. Bargaining for Equality designed to assist unions in the "fight for 
equality by promoting discussion and action" (Attenborough, 1982). In this 
document, NUPGE provided sample contract clauses for a variety of purposes 
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ranging from seniority, parental leave, sexual harassment, affirmative action, 
to personal duties and part-time employees. It also gave guidance on contract 
language and strategies; overall it was an excellent practical tool, and well 
presented for interest and comprehension. In fact, CUPE recommended it to 
their members in their May 1982 newsletter as "a useful handbook to prepare 
for negotiations" (Stinson, 1982, p. 15). 
NUPGE also published in the same series Sexual Harassment at Work and 
Equal Value, Equal Pay: A Pay Equi! y Handbook for Unionists. The latter 
was written in 1987 and was an effective educational tool, including 
explanations for the wage gap, information on policies to close it, guidelines 
on negotiating equal pay and gender neutral job evaluation systems, and 
refutation of arguments against equal pay. 
More women in the workforce, and an increasing rate of female unionisation 
compared to a decrease in male unionisation, has, at least at the central 
federation level and the central level of some large national and public sector 
unions, led to a stronger interest in issues concerning equality for women 
together with the encouragement of women's participation through a variety of 
equality structures. Moreover, in Canada there is pay equity legislation in half 
of the provinces and employment equity legislation in Ontario, both of which 
place legal obligations on unions as well as employers to participate in equality 
bargaining. Strong lobbying by labour in alliance with women groups was 
instrumental in gaining the legislation itself. In particular, the women's 
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committees in the provincial federations of labour and the public sector unions 
have been active in these labour-feminist alliances. 
All these factors have led to a progressive stance towards women's equality in 
the labour federations, large public sector unions and some national private 
sector unions. However, an assessment has to be made on the actual gains for 
women at the bargaining table. In her previous book on women and unions, 
White cautioned against placing too much faith in central policies, for they can 
be; "regulated, diluted or compromised by a myriad of factors, including the 
motivation of elected and paid staff, the wishes of union members, and 
conflicts between them, the strength of the employer and the type of industry 
and workplace... " (1993, p. 6 1). 
Indeed, the nature of collective bargaining has been argued as a major factor in 
Canadian unions' continued resistance to women's policies in the years leading 
up to 1981, and intraorganisational bargaining was recognised as the critical 
stage (Baker and Robeson, 1981). It is unfortunate that the OFL, in their 
paper Taking Stock and Moving Forward: Union Women in the 1990's, 
thought the problem was still such that "... in many workplaces, women's 
issues are still the first to be dropped at the bargaining table" (1990, p. 28). 
Despite the existence of equality structures and policies, the relationship 
between collective bargaining and the practical implementation of equality for 
women is still problematic (Acker, 1989; Collings and Dickens, 1989; Dickens 
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and Colling, 1990). Indeed, it may well be the crucial link between espoused 
policy and actual rank and file achievement of equality. 
In terms of collective bargaining achievements, the effect of unionisation on 
women9s pay is advantageous, but is also beneficial for men. Several 
Canadian studies have concluded that being in a union means an increase in 
wages of between 10 % and 25 % (for a summary of the results of nine studies 
between 1972 and 1985, see Gunderson and Riddell, 1988). In terms of 
gendered pay differentials, both Gunderson (1975) and White (1980) concluded 
that unionisation reduced the wage gap by as much half. In 1989, Canadian 
unionised women workers earned 84% of men's wages (full-time and full- 
year), while non-unionised women workers earned only 70% of men's wages 
(White, 1993). For women, this worked out as an average of $13.98 per hour 
for unionised workers, compared to $10.89 for non-unionised workers. 
However, as White pointed out, the disadvantage of this aggregate data is that 
it does not take into account factors other than unionisation which may affect 
wages, especially the impact of different occupations and industries. 
In a comparative review of union impact in Canada, Britain and the United 
States, Jain and Sloane (1981) concluded that unions had improved the position 
of Canadian women compared with men, although this was not the case in the 
United States, where there was a positive impact for blacks but not for women. 
A comparative study in nineteen industrialised countries concluded that 
women have made more progress towards wage equality in those countries 
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with strong union traditions. Interestingly, even in countries like the United 
States where union density is relatively low, this study found that relative 
earnings for unionised women were higher than for non-unionised women 
(Folbre, Bergmann, Agarwal and Floro, 1992; see also Du Plessis Novitz and 
Jaber, 1990; and Whitehouse, 1990, for more evidence that unionisation has a 
positive impact on the gender wage gap). Other studies have shown that 
unions reduce wage inequality in general (Gunderson and Riddell, 1985; 
Swidinsky and Kuperschmidt, 1991), so this in itself would have a positive 
impact on women since their jobs usually fall in the lower paid end of the pay 
scale, together with disproportionate numbers of racial minority groups. 
Apart from a general access to improved wages and benefits resulting from 
unionisation, there are negotiated items of particular interest to women. We 
need to be able to assess to what extent these issues have been negotiated by 
unions for women. 
Judging from Balkan's article (1985), most collective agreements at that time 
included, at the very minimum, a "no discrimination" clause. Balkan also 
pointed to inclusions of maternity leave in most collective agreements; child- 
care, sexual harassment, emergency leave, and health and safety hazards - 
specifically affecting women (for example, radiation from video-display 
terminals) were other issues that had "... been dealt with at the bargaining table 
with considerable success" (1985, p. 50). 
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In 1986 Labour Canada began collecting information on provisions in major 
collective agreements, covering over 200 workers in the federal jurisdiction, 
and over 500 workers elsewhere. In 1992, this comprised 1,235 collective 
agreements covering almost two and a half million workers. Based on this 
data set, as compiled by White (1993), Table 1 shows the percentage of 
workers covered by contract provisions on parental responsibility, and Table 2 
shows the percentage of workers covered by selected contract provisions of 
interest to women, both in January 1992. 
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Table 1: Percentage of Workers Covered by Contract Provisions on Parental 
Responsibilities, January 1992. 
Maternity Leave - Duration 78.5 
17 weeks or less 20.8 
18-25 weeks 24.0 
Over 25 weeks 26.7 
Extended Parental Leave 31.9 
Extended Paternity Leave 35.4 
Adoption Leave 63.9 
17 weeks or less 33.3 
18-26 weeks 22.2 
Over 26 weeks 4.6 
Paid Maternity Leave 49.1 
76-100% salary for 17 weeks 21.4 
Income beyond 17 weeks 16.4 
Paid Adoption Leave 22.9 
76-100% salary for 17 weeks 20.2 
Income beyond 17 weeks 0.1 
Family Illness Leave 39.8 
Paid Family Illness leave 29.4 
Personal Reasons Leave 58.0 
Paid Personal Reasons Leave 5.3 
Day Care Facilities 3.0 
Source: White, J. (1993). Sisters in Solidatily (compiled from Labour Canada, 
Bureau of Labour Agreement Data Base, January 1992. This data 
includes 2,434,055 workers in total, covered by 1,235 major collective 
agreements. ) 
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Table 2: Percentage of Workers Covered by Selected Contract Provisions of 
Interest to Women, January 1992. 
Anti-DiscruMnation 63.1 
Sexual Harassment 42.7 
Health and Safety - Video Display Terminals 
Additional Rest Period 6.1 
Special Eye Examination 6.1 
Reassignment (e. g., for pregnancy) 27.3 
Varying Hours 
Flextime 11.6 
Compressed Work Week 20.3 
Job Sharing 6.7 
Part-time Workers 
Vacation 40.3 
Holidays 39.0 
Sick Leave 39.4 
Seniority 36.8 
Health and Welfare 34.4 
Severance Pay 21.5 
Pensions 8.0 
Ratio of Part-time to Full-time 2.3 
Workers with Disabilities 
Right to Transfer/Training 3.4 
Employer Willingness to Transfer/Training 34.7 
Other (Includes Hiring Disabled Workers) 1.3 
Source: White, J. (1993). Sisters in Solidarity (compiled from Labour Canada, 
Bureau of Labour Information collective agreement data base, January 
1992. This data includes 2,434,055 workers in total, covered by 
1 235 major collective agreements. ) 
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From Table 1 we can see that although there has been some successful moves 
towards establishing parental and adoption leave, and maternity leave is 
provided in the majority of agreements, less than a quarter provide paid 
maternity leave of between 76-100% salary for 17 weeks. Under federal 
legislation, women are entitled to 15 weeks of benefit that cannot exceed 60% 
of her usual wages; there is also a waiting period of two weeks without 
benefit. Of course, it is harder to bargain paid leave than leave itself because 
of the direct cost to employers. It is suggested also that in some provinces, for 
example, Newfoundland, there is a strong strand of patriarchal ideology in the 
overall resistance to paid maternity leave, which is virtually unseen in any 
collective agreement in that province, even ones which would be considered 
progressive in other areas. Only 3% of the agreements in the table include 
child care clauses. This may reflect the controversy over the advantages and 
disadvantages of workplace child care, although several unions (mainly public 
sector unions) have been involved in establishing workplace child care 
programmes (White, 1993). 
Moving to Table 2, almost two-thirds of the contracts included an anti- 
discrimination clause. Most clauses included race and sex; the inclusion of 
sexual orientation as a prohibited ground is being increasingly lobbied for. 
There has been some movement on video display terminal protection and 
flexible working arrangements, although only a minority of workers are 
covered. Part-time workers are less often protected by seniority, health and 
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welfare arrangements or severance pay, and only 8% of agreements included 
part-time workers in pension plans. The provisions for the disabled are weak, 
with only 3% of agreements stipulating the right of the employee, as opposed 
to the willingness of the employer, to be considered for transfer of 
employment. 
Overall, it is clear that unions have taken some action in areas of specific 
interest to women, including racial minority women, disabled women and 
lesbians, and that there has been progress over time (White, 1993). However, 
some important provisions are not extensive, and need improvement. One 
trend that White identified in the Labour Canada data was that in each of the 
provisions covered in the Tables 1 and 2, the public sector unions had 
negotiated more of them for their membership than had the private sector 
unions. For example, whereas only 11 % of women in the private sector had 
paid maternity leave, 72% of public sector women had this benefit. 56% of 
public sector workers were covered by a sexual harassment clause, compared 
to only 20 % in the private sector. 43 % women in the public sector enjoyed 
the benefit of paid family illness leave, as opposed to only 7% of private sector 
workers. Of course, the percentage of women is higher in the public sector, 
therefore their unions would theoretically be more likely to bargain these 
provisions, but it may also be that the employers in this sector are less likely 
to oppose these proposals. 
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Central policies on affirmative action and equal pay are not easily translated 
into successes at the bargaining table (Balkan, 1985). In Ontario, Ministry of 
Labour data analysed by Chaykowski (1990) showed that between 1982 and 
1988 - before pay equity legislation -equal pay provisions (either equal work or 
equal value) were infrequent in the private sector and the public sector. 
Interestingly, CUPE, a key player in both provinces studied, was the union in 
the public sector most associated with contractual coverage of job 
classification, job evaluation, and equal pay for equal work. Labour Canada 
data covering employees in bargaining units of more than 500 for the same 
period showed that in all provinces very few collective agreements in any 
given year (in the order of 1 to 5) included equal pay for equal work 
provisions and typically even fewer included equal value provisions. 
In general, it is clear that more women in unions per se does not necessarily 
equate with internal or external equality, although more women members may 
well make it more likely that there will be action in these areas. Women need 
to be represented in governance structures in order to make a difference. 
Usually equality structures have to release the potential for women's influence 
to work through to leadership levels, allowing the reform of union practices 
and equality policies. Several writers in the field of women and unions have 
identified the essential nature of the link between internal and external equality 
(Adams and Griffin, 1983; Balkan, 1985; Briskin, 1990; Chaison and 
Andiappan, 1987 and 1989; Colling and Dickens, 1989; Dickens and Colling, 
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1990; Edelson, 1987; Heery and Kelly, 1988; Larkin and Pollock, 1985; 
Wierzbicki, 1988). There needs to be effective articulation between any 
equality structures established and negotiating structures if successful equality 
bargaining is to take place (Dickens and Colling, 1990). This is particularly so 
if central equality policies are to reach the local levels and actually achieve 
gains at the bargaining table, given the fragmented system of collective 
bargaining in Canada. 
Most importantly, affirmative action has to be combined with feminist analysis 
and feminist politic. But, a focus on labour-feminist politic and associated 
alliances should not ignore the vital nature of the mechanism that converts 
central policy to reality for women in the workplace - collective bargaining. If 
representation of women combined with a labour-feminist politic does not 
extend to the bargaining table, then, however progressive a union's policies 
are, patriarchal forces in the union will tend to subvert any change towards 
equality for women. 
Moreover, even if the bargaining agenda and team are informed with a labour- 
feminist politic, the union-management power relationship has to be examined. 
The role of the employer is important. In a political and economic climate of 
stringent cost containment, then however committed and determined the union 
is, equality will be elusive. As White remarked; "... if the employer is 
resisting the union at every step and feels that profits are threatened, the 
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negotiating team may be hard pressed to obtain even the most basic pay and 
benefits package" (1993, p. 97). 
Public Sector Collective Bargainin 
As illustrated by the above quotation, it is important to place pay equity 
bargaining in the context of current Canadian collective bargaining 
relationships, and, in terms of this research, public sector collective 
bargaining. What follows is a brief introduction to the Canadian system, 
before moving on to a discussion of current trends in public sector collective 
bargaining. For political and historical reasons, Canada's industrial relations 
system is extremely decentralised (Craig and Solomon, 1993). The country is 
a federal state with the central government exercising jurisdiction over only 
10% of the labour force and the provinces covering the remaining 90%. The 
role of government is crucial in the regulation of Canadian industrial relations. 
Both federal and provincial labour relations legislation covering the private 
sector date from the mid 1940's and are based on the US National Labour 
Relations Act (Wagner Act), but go further than the US in regulating collective 
bargaining (Blyton and Goodman, 1990). Although there are minor 
differences, common features of Canadian private. sector legislation are the 
prohibition of unfair labour practices; the creation of labour relations boards to 
approve certification and decertification, and the appropriateness of bargaining 
units; compulsory conciliation before a strike is legal; the prohibition of strikes 
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during a collective agreement; and the requirement of a minimum one year 
collective agreement. 
Reflecting the federalist state and the propensity of labour relations boards to 
adopt the "common interests" criterion for the designation of bargaining units, 
the Canadian collective bargaining structure is largely fragmented, especially in 
the private sector. The most common collective bargaining structure is single 
establishment and single union (Blyton and Goodman, 1990). In the private 
sector, multi-employer bargaining is unusual, although the construction 
industry has featured employer associations more than any other industry, and 
their role in general is more visible in Quebec and British Columbia than other 
provinces. Fragmentation in the public sector is lessened in some provinces 
(for example, Newfoundland) where a certain degree of province-wide 
bargaining has evolved. 
In Canada, the public sector is usually defined to include the federal civil 
service, the provincial civil services, municipalities, health care, education, 
and government enterprises. Public sector unionism has contributed greatly to 
the general growth of unionism in Canada. Three of the five largest unions 
are made up -of government employees. The level of collective bargaining in 
the public sector is much higher than in the private sector; it is estimated that 
well over 40% of all union members work in the public sector (Ponak and 
Thompson, 1989). 
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Public sector collective bargaining operates within a legislative framework 
established in the late 60's and early 70's. At this time, provincial 
governments extended bargaining rights to public sector employees after the 
federal government had set the precedent in 1967. In contrast to private sector 
legislation, public sector legislation is extremely diverse in Canada with regard 
to how specialised the legislative coverage is and the scope of collective 
bargaining allowed. For example, in Quebec one statute covers all employees, 
whether public or private, whereas at the other extreme, in Ontario virtually 
every public sector group is covered by a separate piece of legislation. Also, 
half the provinces permit their public sector workers to strike; the others do 
not (Ponak and Thompson, 1989). 
As employers, governments are subject to political as well as economic 
considerations. This gives rise to a different collective bargaining dynamic 
from the private sector. To begin with, there is a diffusion of management 
responsibility and authority resulting from funding arrangements, inbuilt checks 
and balances and political competition. This leads generally to difficult 
intraorganisational bargaining and "phantom" bargaining, where either 
decision-making power is not available at the table, or government policy is 
known by all parties and thus influences the bargaining taking place (Ponak 
and Thompson, 1989). 
Furthermore, democratically elected governments have sovereign powers to 
legislate, which tips the balance of power heavily in favour of the employer. 
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Indicators of the dominant power of the Canadian state are laws prohibiting 
public sector occupational groups from striking, or essential services 
regulations that erode the formal power to strike (Panitch and Swartz, 1988; 
McBride, 1987; Riddell, 1986), or when strikes are ended by legislative 
intervention (Russell, 1990). The issue of essential services has been a 
recurring subject of tension in public sector union-management relations over 
the last decade, with the federal and provincial governments being challenged 
by the unions over their use of essential services laws. According to Panitch 
and Swartz (1988), the federal civil servants' legal right to strike exists mainly 
on paper. A further use of legislation in union-management relations has been 
the cancelling out of previously negotiated clauses in signed collective 
agreements (Fryer, 1988). It has been argued by the President of the National 
Union of Provincial Government Employees (NUPGE) that governments' 
reliance upon legislative power constitutes the breakdown of public sector 
collective bargaining (Fryer, 1988; see also Carter, 1992,3, for the view that 
wage controls have "effectively crippled collective bargaining for [affected] 
public employees"). 
In Canada, a large part of the impetus behind this attack upon union rights and 
benefits has been an ideological move to the right. Post-war posterity and 
Keynesian economics with its minimum standard of economic welfare for 
everyone shifted during the late 1970's and during the 1980's to recession and 
free market economics - deregulation, privatisation and free trade. The notion 
112 
of government as interfering with market forces brought with it an ideological 
commitment to the retraction of the role of government. Jenson (et al, 1988) 
identified this retrenchment as part of a common capital reaction to the 
internationalisation of capital and competition in all of the seven countries 
studied in their project, and as part of the economic restructuring experienced 
in those countries (Britain, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Italy, Sweden and the United States). 
Retrenchment in the Canadian public sector emerged during the mid-eighties 
at both federal and provincial levels, leading to public sector cuts in jobs, 
wages and social programmes. In line with the trend identified by Jenson (et 
al), the Mulroney government elected in 1984 pursued spending cuts paralleled 
with a rejection of state intervention in the interests of developing the private 
market economy (Savage, 1992). 
An indicator of the new political economy at the federal level under the 
Mulroney government (in power until 1993) was the power shift represented 
by the Department of Finance taking over the making of social policy from 
Health and Welfare. From a position of influence under the direction of strong 
ministers, Health and Welfare became "increasingly isolated and ineffectual - 
... [and] ... social policy 
has become simply an instrument of economic policy. 
(Moscovitch, cited in York, A5,1992). In what has been described as a 
"social revolution" (York, 1992), the emphasis upon deficit control led to an 
abandonment of universality and long-awaited social initiatives, such as a 
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national day-care programme; the erosion by inflation of major social 
programmes; and the transfer of traditional federal responsibilities to the 
provinces, through drastic cuts in the federal transfer payments for medicare 
(equivalent to the national health system in the UK) and post-secondary 
education. Since the Conservatives' election, social spending has dropped to 
8.4% of gross domestic product from 10.4% (York, 1992). 
In this hostile political and economic environment it was not long before public 
sector unions were fighting to resist concessions demanded by their employers 
and/or facing restriction of bargaining rights, either through legislative wage 
freezes or cancellation of previously negotiated increases. During the latter 
half of the eighties to the present, contracting out or privatisation has been a 
common point of dispute in public sector union-management relations, and 
programme cuts have resulted in extensive loss of jobs. Governments' deficit 
budgeting has been consistently at the cost of public sector unions' membership 
- layoffs, cuts and rollbacks. Public service unions have combined to 
campaign against the cuts in public services across the country; for example, 
the national campaign "The Coalition to Keep Medicare Healthy" (Galt, 
1992b). The executive board report to the delegates of the Ontario Public 
Service Employees Union (OPSEU) remarked: "Ontario's public services are 
on the edge of collapse. The depression, free trade with the United 
States ... and the privatisation strategies of the 
Mulroney government have all 
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combined to make inevitable the disintegration of services across Canada" 
(Galt, 1992a, p. A8). 
In terms of this research, it is noteworthy that the major expense under 
scrutiny has been health care, with frequent media coverage focusing on the 
crisis in the health care system, whether we can still afford universal medicare, 
inefficiency and waste in the system, abuse of the system, and so on. A 
common strand in much of this literature is the high cost of medical services - 
despite Canadian expenditure on health care being about the same as other 
wealthy nations. In 1989, Canada spent 8.7% of GDP, compared to 8.7%, 
8.8%, 8.2%, and 8.3% in France, Sweden, Germany and the Netherlands, 
respectively (Rachlis and Kushner, 1992). However, health care represents 
one-third of provincial total spending. And costs have risen faster than the 
provinces' ability to pay, especially in the face of plummeting transfer 
payments. According to Rachlis and Kushner (1992), the recent erosion of 
funding to provinces (in the federal budgets since 1991) means that within a 
decade federal transfer payments for health care will have dried up. In this 
climate of crisis, severe provincial retrenchinent, even in the absence of 
ideological imperatives, has been the order of the day in Canadian health care. 
Partnership as Public Policy 
As part of a general strategy of increased cooperation with labour in the face 
of economic decline and increasing levels of labour relations conflict, public 
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policy in the 80's and early 90's has emphasised a new partnership between 
government, labour and business to jointly tackle economic development. This 
partnership has been attempted through the establishment of national, 
provincial and sectoral initiatives. Ad hoc bipartite sectoral Task Forces were 
established by the federal government for a consultative exercise as early as 
1978, and in the early 1990's the Department of Trade, Science and 
Technology set up permanent sectoral committees to provide business and 
labour input into policy (Canadian Labour Market Productivity Centre, 1992). 
In 1984 the federal goverment established at a national level the bipartite 
Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre, with a mandate to: 
11 promote dialogue between Canada's economic stake-holders on issues of 
broad social and economic concern. It also promotes the development of joint 
business/labour recommendations on approaches to improving the operation of 
the labour market and Canada's productivity performance" (1992, p. B2). 
As an offshoot of this body, the Canadian Labour Force Development Board 
was established in 1991. This latter body's executive included representatives 
of government and equity groups as well as business and labour in the 
development of a newly skilled labour force, and recommended the formation 
of provincial Labour Force Development Boards. The first provincial Labour 
Force Development Board was set up in Newfoundland in 1992, where the 
unemployment rate has been consistently much higher than the national 
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average, and where the fisheries crisis has meant that training is seen by the 
partners as a priority. 
Moreover, the federal government has encouraged the establishment of sectoral 
initiatives. In 1985, the Canadian Steel Trade and Employment Congress was 
established, with equal participation by the major steel companies and the 
United Steelworkers of America (USWA). Although the impetus for this first 
sectoral initiative was from the parties and the federal government's role was 
financial support, the government has played a more active role in bringing 
labour and business together in further bipartite sectoral bodies in the 
electrical/electronics industry and in the automotive sery. ices and repair 
industry. 
At a provincial level, some governments have coordinated with the federal 
government and sectoral partners to establish tripartite bodies for the 
development of human resources through specialised training, for example, the 
establishment in 1983 of the Centre for Aerospace Manpower Adjustment In 
Quebec (Labour Market Productivity Centre, 1992). Not only social 
democratic governments are incorporating the notion of labour-business 
partnership in their economic development policies. There have recently been 
some indications of a more cooperative relationship with public sector unions 
in response to the impact of economic restructuring, moving beyond the 
traditional adversarial collective bargaining relationships (Casselton, 1993). 
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Labour Canada, a federal government department, has complemented this 
national, provincial and sectoral policy with a strategy aimed at workplace 
developments in labour-management cooperation. In 1991 a Labour- 
Management Partnerships Program offered funding for joint labour- 
management initiatives. Funding priorities for 1992 were the promotion of 
productive, innovative workplaces; fair and equitable workplaces; and 
improved labour-management-government relations and understanding (Labour 
Canada, 1992). According to these priorities, although the third element 
would include any level of initiative, it is clear that the first two are aimed at 
improving labour-management relations at the organisational level. 
Underlying this overall policy of partnership is a hope that the different levels 
of institutionalised consensus-building in economic development will resonate 
throughout the system, and indirectly cause a generally more cooperative 
climate for union-management relations in the workplace. In the past, two 
main methods have been used in a direct attempt to increase workplace 
cooperation, the first more than the second: the human resources management 
approach with its emphasis on employee involvement, team-work, joint 
decision-making, and quality of working life; and the move away from the 
traditional adversarial bargaining towards a more cooperative model. 
The labour movement has often seen the first method as a subtle form of 
'union busting, 9 undermining its exclusive representation of employees and 
therefore eroding its power (Carter, 1992; Coates, 1992). Since this research 
118 
is focused on the interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay 
equity, the discussion will move straight on to an examination of the prominent 
literature dealing with the possibility of more cooperative bargaining. The 
classic work in this area was Walton and McKersie (1965), who differentiated 
between distributive and integrative bargaining. Integrative bargaining is joint 
decision making through problem solving: the identification of a problem, and 
the generation and evaluation of alternative solutions to find a solution with 
equal benefits for both parties. 
According to Walton and McKersie, it is possible where the parties' objectives 
can to some degree be integrated, where the objectives are not in fundamental 
conflict. This can happen when the task is centred upon a problem whose 
solution will allow gains for both parties, or at least where gains made by one 
party will not represent an equal sacrifice by the other. Distributive bargaining 
is in effect the traditional adversarial style of negotiating over an issue related 
to the direct allocation of economic (fixed) resources, where one party's gain is 
an equivalent loss for the other. 
Walton and McKersie acknowledged that what may seem an issue to the 
parties, generating distributive bargaining, may equally be defined as a 
problem open to integrative bargaining or it may contain some elements of a 
problem, enabling some integrative bargaining alongside distributive 
bargaining. The perception of the parties is dependent on the nature of the 
existing union-management relationship. Indeed, another subprocess of 
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collective bargaining is what the authors called " attitudinal structuring, " 
consisting of efforts the parties will make to influence their relationship with 
each other. A further subprocess which Walton and McKersie identified as 
enhancing or hindering the possibilities of integrative bargaining was 
" intraorganisational bargaining, " internal negotiations with the teams) 
constituents to reach consensus. The authors conceptualised these four 
subprocesses of collective bargaining as ongoing and simultaneous, recognising 
the dilemma of reconciling the distributive and integrative types of decision 
making processes. They later recommended differentiating the subprocesses 
by role, agenda and phase of negotiations (1991). 
Peterson and Tracy (1976) expanded on the link between integrative bargaining 
and the attitudinal. structuring between the parties. They proposed that 
longstanding personal contact and mutual acknowledgement of equal status, 
knowledge and skills tend the parties towards a more cooperative bargaining 
strategy. Conversely, discrimination against the other party, unfair behaviour 
and lack of personal contact would tend to lead to adversarial bargaining. 
Based on their overview of American initiatives in cooperative bargaining 
(1985), they concluded that, in practice, negotiators found it very difficult to 
differentiate between "issues" (resulting in distributive bargaining) and 
"problems" (resulting in integrative bargaining). For Peterson and Tracy, a 
key insight gained from their own and others' research was the vital 
importance of trust if problem solving is to be successful. 
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Building on Walton and McKersie, Lewicki and Litterer (1985) identified a 
number of preconditions of integrative bargaining, including shared goals; 
motivation and a commitment to work together; trust in the opposing 
negotiator; open and accurate information; and a belief in the validity and 
importance of the other's position. For Lewicki and Litterer, following 
Walton and McKersie, it was the goal structures which were the key to 
successftil integrative bargaining. A common goal could be one that the 
parties could not possibly attain unless they worked together, but it would have 
to include the goal to search for solutions which both parties will gain from. 
The most common cause of failure to use integrative strategies is the lack of 
recognition of (or search for) the integrative potential in a negotiating task. 
One example given in Walton and McKersie of a varying-sum problem with 
equal benefits to both parties that is amenable to integrative bargaining is the 
resolution of inequity through job evaluation. Lewicki and Litterer expanded 
the definition of common goal to include a situation where neither party can 
achieve a task on its own. Given this strand of thinking on a common goal as 
a precondition of integrative decision making and the overall push for a new 
and more cooperative industrial relations in the 80's, it is no surprise that 
government policy on pay equity (requiring union--management comparison of 
jobs) included an expectation that the process could (and should) be bargained 
in a more cooperative manner than conventional wage negotiations. 
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However, despite the usefulness of positing the two polar yet interdependent 
types of bargaining, the difficulty with the work inspired by Walton and 
McKersie on cooperative collective bargaining (Fisher and Ury, 1981; Pruitt, 
1981; Lewicki and Litterer, 1985; Lax and Sebenius, 1986; Cohen-Rosenthal 
and Burton, 1987) is that it is derived from a social action perspective, 
explaining collective bargaining dynamics by reference only to the interactions 
of the individuals involved, ignoring structural influences (Schienstock, 1981). 
In particular, this micro focus did not take account of gender, race and class 
which shape and are generally reinforced by interaction of the parties during 
the collective bargaining process. In pay equity bargaining the structural effect 
of gender is especially important. 
The next chapter discusses the major issues and debates in the literature 
dealing with pay equity bargaining, attempting to extend the early debates on 
the compatibility of pay equity with collective bargaining to include a 
consideration of the structural properties characterising the interrelationship 
between collective bargaining and pay equity. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Collective Bargaining and Pay Equity: 
Debates and Issues 
In this chapter, the current debates and issues relevant to the interrelationship 
between collective bargaining and pay equity are discussed. After a brief 
introduction referring to the positions taken by the parties on the role of 
collective bargaining in pay equity implementation in Canada, the chapter 
continues with a review of the debates over bargaining structure, style and 
power. The last section focuses on the importance of gender and class 
relations in explaining the processes and outcomes of pay equity bargaining, 
ending with a discussion of previous pay equity studies. 
All Canadian pay equity initiatives created a crucial role for collective 
bargaining in unionised workplaces, whether the policy was legislated or 
implemented proactively through collective bargaining. Pay equity legislation 
legally required employers to negotiate the whole implementation process with 
any bargaining agents present in an establishment (Coates, 1989). According 
to Todres (1987), the strength of the Ontario pay equity model is flexibility, 
and she cited the predominant role of collective bargaining in the development 
of a pay equity plan as the prime example of this principle. The reliance on 
the collective bargaining process for the achievement of pay equity raises a 
number of issues surrounding the interrelationship of collective bargaining and 
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pay equity. Perhaps it is worth noting here that the term "collective 
bargaining" is used in its widest sense in this discussion, not just the 
negotiation of the terms and conditions of a contract, but the general realm of 
union-management relationships, including intraorganisational bargaining. 
During the consultation phase of the pay equity legislation in Ontario, the 
kernel of the employers' position was that the proposed legislation was based 
upon an incorrect analysis of the problem, given that the wage gap was caused 
by occupational segregation, and pay equity would not address this. However, 
since the government had announced that it would introduce legislation, the 
employers' argued that coverage should be restricted to the public sector, and 
to employees not covered by collective agreements. If the government were 
going to include organised workplaces, then it should leave the parties to 
negotiate pay equity, without any bureaucratic intervention at all, without cross 
bargaining unit comparison, but with several exemptions (labour market 
shortages, bargaining power, merit, seniority, red circling, training 
assignments, and regional differentials), and with provision for the decrease as 
well the increase of wages (Gandz, 1987). 
Essentially, the employers were arguing for the status quo; pay equity would 
disrupt the existing collective bargaining process and this disruption would be 
minimised by leaving the parties free to negotiate equity, without regulation. 
Gandz summarised the unions' position by referring to the Ontario Federation 
of Labour (OFL) brief, which he saw as a consensus document. The list of 
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recommendations by the OFL was very similar to the demands of the Equal 
Pay Coalition, of which the OFL was a key member. 
Interestingly, the unions also argued for the negotiation of pay equity to be left 
to the parties in unionised workplaces. However, in contrast to the restricted 
coverage wanted by the employers, the OFL recommended comprehensive 
coverage of all employees, whether public or private sector, irrespective of 
size of enterprise. The only exemption should be seniority, cross bargaining 
unit comparisons should be allowed, there should be prohibition of wage 
reduction to achieve pay equity, separate pay equity negotiations together with 
a separate fund to avoid any trade offs with general wage monies, and 
compulsory information disclosure. Also, the unions wanted legislative back 
up in the form of an independent research\education and enforcement agency, 
together with an independent tribunal for dispute resolution (Gandz, 1987). 
Union presentations to the consultation panel emphasised how previous 
attempts to negotiate equal pay had been obstructed by the employer (Sarra, 
1986). For example, despite the Canadian Union of Public Employees' 
(CUPE) attempts to equalise the wages of male and female jobs, for example 
male cleaners and matrons, including strike action by male-dominated locals; 
there was still a significant wage gap. The union highlighted the urgency of 
introducing pay equity legislation. This point was echoed by CUPE locals 
throughout the province. Cornish (1986), a founder member of the Equal Pay 
Coalition and a labour lawyer, made the same point. Unions had attempted to 
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use collective bargaining to increase women's wages in provinces without 
equal value legislation: "[however] most employers in these provinces 
resist[ed] attempts to deal with the issue at the bargaining table when not 
compelled by law" (Cornish, 1986, p. 17). 
In analysing the reasons for the evident consensus position put forward by the 
OFL, Gandz pointed to the structural shift in the labour movement so that it 
was becoming increasingly influenced by the large public sector unions, which 
had large proportions of women members. This is so, but from my personal 
conversations with members of the labour-feminist alliance instrumental in 
obtaining the legislation in Ontario, one particular private sector union is 
particularly influential in the provincial labour movement, and the OFL: the 
United Steelworkers of America. In my view, that this male-dominated union 
(13 % women) has had a long standing practice of joint job evaluation 
incorporated into its general collective bargaining relationships made it easier 
to lobby the private sector unions and gain an agreement to a position which 
would not be on the face of it politically advantageous to unions with smaller 
proportions of women members. Moreover, the Canadian Auto Workers 
union, with only 20% female membership, and a prominent private sector 
union in Ontario and Canada generally (its charismatic ex-president is now 
president of the Canadian Labour Congress), received an affirmative action 
award from the Ontario Women's Directorate in 1987 (White, 1993). These 
trends in large influential male-dominated private sector unions would make it 
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more likely that there would be consensus over the need for legal intervention 
in the collective bargaining process to achieve equity. 
Bargaining Structure 
The two main areas of discussion over structure have been whether pay . equity 
should be negotiated separately from or integrated with conventional wage 
bargaining; and whether pay equity bargaining should be single-table or multi- 
table. Although neither the Manitoba nor the Ontario legislation required 
separate bargaining, Kelly (1988) pointed out that pay equity negotiation was 
"clearly designated as a separate process existing outside the parameters of 
conventional collective bargaining under labour relations statutes" (Kelly, 
1988, p. 35). The Manitoba Civil Service Commission published a report in 
1988 on Pay Egui1y IjUlementation in the Manitoba Civil Service. It is clear 
from this report that the joint committee set up to implement pay equity wanted 
pay equity negotiations to be "distinguished from general bargaining. The 
process was to be contained and focused. Issues which were not pay equity 
issues would not be permitted to impinge on or obstruct the process" 
(Manitoba Civil Service Commission, 1988, p. 12). 
In the early debate over the proposed pay equity legislation in Ontario the 
unions recognised that there were potential difficulties arising from both union- 
management and interunion tensions. To make the process viable, the OFL 
recommended that pay equity bargaining be separate from conventional 
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contractual negotiations (OFL, 1988; see also Cornish and Trachuk, 1988) and 
that a separate fund be put aside for pay equity adjustments. Both separate 
bargaining structures and separate monies would lower the possibility (and 
temptation) of trading off women's interests, especially if the reduction of 
wages in general were prohibited. 
Following its declared principle of flexibility, the Ontario government did not 
specify that pay equity be bargained separately, although other jurisdictions 
have done so. For example, the Atlantic provinces (Prince Edward Island, 
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick) who introduced legislation after Ontario 
required the separate negotiation of pay equity (Coates, 1989). The 
Newfoundland and Labrador government set up a separate Joint Steering 
Committee, and separate joint Job Evaluation Committees in their collective 
bargaining initiative (Pay Equity Agreement, 1988). In Ontario, although the 
parties are not legally required to form a separate structure for pay equity, the 
Pay Equity Commission have issued guidelines on the effective development of 
separate pay equity committees (1988). In addition, the Pay Equity 
Commissioner recommended separate bargaining when he spoke at a pay 
equity conference at the National Centre for Management Research and 
Development in 1988. 
Separate bargaining not only lessens the likelihood of pay equity being used as 
a negotiable item in the general package to be settled, it also avoids some of 
the potential overlap between the two systems of labour legislation. In the pay 
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equity conference previously mentioned, the then Pay Equity Commissioner 
clarified that if negotiations were separate then a dispute would be referred to 
the Pay Equity Commission, with no recourse to strike/lockout. On the other 
hand, if pay equity negotiations were combined with contractual bargaining 
then if an impasse occurred, the situation would not be so clear, and there 
would be the possibility of strike action, with regulation by the traditional 
labour relations legislation in the province. This possibility of jurisdictional 
overlap between the Pay Equity Commission and existing labour relations law, 
especially with regard to the decisions of interest arbitrators in the public 
sector, has been identified by a number of commentators (Cornish and 
Trachuk, 1988; Gandz, 1987; McDermott, 1991; McKenzie, 1988; and Robb, 
1988). 
The wording of the legislation (Section 9[11), and the guidelines issued by the 
Pay Equity Commission, 1988 (Implementation Series No. 14), make it clear 
that an employer is prohibited from reducing the compensation of any 
employee or of any job class in order to achieve pay equity. This, combined 
with the interpretation offered by the Pay Equity Commission, where they 
refer to the minimum amount of 1% "to be set aside" (Implementation Series 
No. 14,14.4), leads to an interpretation that there was an intention on the part 
of the legislators that pay equity monies should be kept in a separate fund. 
With regard to the composition of the negotiating unit, there is some evidence 
in Manitoba of a move towards a more centralised form of bargaining. 
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Although the Manitoba Pay Equity Act did not require that all bargaining 
agents and employee representatives negotiate simultaneously with the 
employer, the process evolved that way (Pay Equity Bureau, 1988b). For the 
first time in Canada, many unions were brought together at one table to 
negotiate an issue (Ellis-Grunfeld, 1987). For example, in the pay equity 
negotiations for the four universities, 16 different unions or associations were 
involved, with as many as eight at one institution, and single-table bargaining 
was used at each university. The health care facilities decided on industry- 
wide negotiations for. 23 employers, nine unions and two non-unionized 
employee representatives (Coates, 1989). The pattern for provincial bargaining 
was already present in the health care facilities, but the parties decided to 
bargain centrally for pay equity as well. 
Ontario's legislation allows centralized bargaining if the parties agree. Given 
the fragmented collective bargaining structures in Canada, in many cases 
women will not find male comparators in their own bargaining units and cross- 
bargaining unit comparison will be necessary. If bargaining units negotiate 
separately, then it is probable that different job evaluation schemes will be 
used, in which case comparisons will be very difficult, since the job collection 
instruments, sub-factors, evaluations and weightings will vary. For this 
reason, it would be less complicated and more consistent if a standardised job 
evaluation scheme were used throughout an establishment. A standardised job 
evaluation scheme would only be possible in an establishment with more than 
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one bargaining agent if the unions involved cooperated in a single-table set of 
negotiations. If recognised by the parties as important this would act as a 
pressure towards single-table bargaining. 
When the previous Pay Equity Commissioner was answering questions at a 
recent conference on pay equity, he suggested centralized bargaining as less 
complicated and less costly in the long term. In a discussion paper on pay 
equity in Manitoba (Pay Equity Bureau, 1988b), some advantages of 
centralized bargaining were mentioned: it is more efficient, especially in 
establishments with many bargaining units; it helps to share opinions on pay 
equity; and it should result in a sense of collective ownership for the 
implementation and the results. Lawyers Cornish and Truchak (1988) advised 
labour to pursue interunion cooperation to enhance their power at the 
bargaining table. Single-table bargaining would not only allow male 
comparators to be identified, but also provide the best protection for the male- 
dominated classes. 
However, both the Manitoba discussion paper and Coates (1989) pointed to the 
possibilities of one party holding out against agreement amongst all the parties, 
leading to strains and considerable delays, particularly if there is a history-of 
conflictual union-management relations, and if there is a need for unanimity in 
decision making. 
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Bargaining StIle 
The main point of disagreement in this debate has been over whether pay 
equity bargaining will be conflictual, if not actually incompatible with 
collective bargaining; or cooperative and therefore compatible with collective 
bargaining. A fairly influential view (in industrial relations circles) of the 
impact of pay equity on collective bargaining was published by an industrial 
relations university professor. In his report commissioned by the Ontario 
Women's Directorate, Gandz (1987) concluded that legislated pay equity would 
cause extreme conflict within and between unions, and between union and 
employer. The reasons for this were the technical difficulty of the required 
negotiations, cross bargaining unit and union\non-union comparisons, and the 
injection of uncertainty into well developed, constructive union-management 
relationships (see also Shamie, 1986, p. 18, who refers to "insurmountable 
difficulties" presented by pay equity regulations; and Robb, 1988, who foresaw 
extreme intraorganisational tensions arising from cross bargaining unit 
comparisons). 
Furthermore, Gandz argued that pay equity and collective bargaining are 
fundamentally incompatible, the former being the result of a purely 
administrative mechanism Oob evaluation) whereas the basis of the latter is 
economic power. He was particularly concerned that a male-dominated 
bargaining unit, having gained high wages through their willingness to take 
militant action, would be linked as male comparator to a female-dominated 
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bargaining unit whose past inaction had resulted in lower wages. Robb (1988) 
also expressed concern at this shift in the valuation of jobs from a function of 
power and strength to an administrative mechanism. However, Gandz was 
explicit in his recommendation of the settlement of wages through the 
interaction of power; it is significant that he recommended bargaining power as 
an exemption. He cautioned that if this exemption were not allowed the "... the 
fundamental basis of the distributive, power-based component of the collective 
bargaining process will be undermined" (Gandz, 1987, p. 39). 
Overall, Gandz' report illustrates the problems in a systems approach with an 
overriding concern with stability: pay equity is unacceptable because of the 
instability it causes, its threat to the status quo. Moreover, his prediction of 
extreme conflict rests upon a conflation of collective bargaining with a 
distributive mode of bargaining. This unidimensional concept of collective 
.g ignores 
the considerable literature on integrative, or mutual gains bargainin i 
bargaining (Cohen-Rosenthall and Burton, 1987; 1, ewicki and Linerer, 1985; 
Walton and McKersie, 1965). 
MacKenzie (1988) built on Gandz' work. Although acknowledging that 
collective bargaining, left to itself, had resulted in inequitable wages, the main 
theme in her paper was still the problem of instability as a consequence of pay 
equity. One conference presentation at about the same time concluded with a 
statement of the dire consequences for free collective bargaining of introducing 
pay equity legislation: "In my view we have taken a very large step toward 
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legislated compensation, perhaps the most significant step yet taken toward the 
phasing out of traditional collective bargaining processes" (Davies, 1988, p. D- 
23). 
However, at about the same time, Potts (1987, pp. 55 & 524) presented a 
more balanced view of the impact of pay equity on collective bargaining. He 
concluded: "Ontario's new Pay Equity Act introduces a number of formidable 
obstacles between employers and trade unions. As in normal collective 
bargaining, however, the two sides will have the opportunity to overcome their 
differences through negotiation. " Prominent labour lawyers who had been 
active in the labour-feminist alliance crucial to the introduction of the 
legislation added their comments to the debate. Their view confirmed that pay 
equity bargaining would involve much more latitude than most commentators 
had foreseen, and that the room for negotiation was considerable, even within 
the basic parameters of the Act. 
In 1988, a founding member of the Equal Pay Coalition, and her lawyer 
colleague described the Act as a minimum standard (Cornish and Trachuk), 
thus leaving open the possibility of enrichment if the parties agreed. On the 
other hand, they recognised that the legal requirements represented a restriction- 
of a union's scope of bargaining, especially since the legislation made it 
unlawful to bargain for or agree to discriminatory compensation practices. In 
contract bargaining, it was part of accepted practice to trade off the interests of 
some employees for others. But in pay equity bargaining, the union is: " ... no 
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longer free to trade off the interests of a certain group of employees for the 
collective good, but must in fact obtain pay equity for those lacking it" 
(Cornish and Trachuk, 1988, p. 30). 
Despite the establishment of a much needed minimum standard, Cornish and 
Trachuk proposed that there was a lot of room for argument in negotiating pay 
equity. In their opinion, the three most hotly contested areas were going to be 
the designation of gender predominant classes, the type of comparison scheme 
used, and the interpretation of exemptions. In parallel with the critical 
literature on job evaluation in general (Fudge and McDermott [ed], 1991; 
Remick [ed], 1984), the authors identified these apparently technical decisions 
as political with important consequences for the level of pay adjustments at the 
end of the process. 
Another feminist labour lawyer, legal advisor to the Ontario Public Service 
Union (OPSEU), commented that she saw the implementation of pay equity not 
as an objective, administrative mechanism in fundamental opposition to the 
collective bargaining process, but as an inherently political process. Section 6 
of the Act does establish a specific, precisely delineated target for the 
achievement of pay equity, and "... there is an aura of objectivity about both 
the goal and the process that suggests that the achievement of pay equity is 
simply an exercise in statutory interpretation and mathematics" (I-ennon- 
Shilton, 1989, p. G-1). However, this facade of objectivity quickly 
disappeared as soon as negotiations start: 
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It is clear that there are a wide variety of roads towards pay 
equity, and that the goal itself is not cut- and-dried. There are 
imaginative and complex approaches to pay equity and there are 
facile approaches. There are plans which will quickly and 
effectively close the wage gap between female and male 
employees, and plans that will maintain that gap through their 
definitions of job class, and their approaches to job evaluation. 
There are plans where the pay-out will be substantial and plans 
where the pay-out will be minimal. It is clear that bargaining 
agents and employers will have seriously conflicting interests 
about which approaches to pay equity should be taken in their 
workplace. (Lennon-Shilton 1989, p. G-2) 
Once pay equity is seen in this light, it does not sound so very different from 
business-as-usual collective bargaining; the power relationship between the 
parties is still the main driving force and will influence the process and 
outcome of the bargain. These publications by labour lawyers closely involved 
with pay equity bargaining have confirmed that the implementation of pay 
equity is not fundamentally incompatible with the power dynamic of 
conventional collective bargaining. On the contrary, it is a highly political 
process, an exercise of power and control over the form and content of pay 
equity negotiations (see also Fudge and McDermott [ed], 1991; Remick [ed], 
1984). 
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Running parallel with predictions of extremely high levels of confusion and 
conflict, if not fundamental incompatibility, was a strand of writing which, in 
contrast, emphasised not only the compatibility of collective bargaining and 
pay equity, but also the level of cooperation that could be achieved during pay 
equity bargaining. This work was based upon other jurisdictions' experience 
with pay equity. For example, the Manitoba legislation incorporated a strong 
participatory role for unions, and the Director of Negotiation Services at the 
Manitoba Civil Service Commission explained: "[collective bargaining] will 
bring a shared identification of the specific problems, perceived fairness in the 
process, creativity in the development of solutions, and commitment to the 
results" (cited in Ellis-Grunfeld, 1987, p. 229). 
This emphasis on bargaining was backed up in the Manitoba legislation by a 
stipulation that there was to be a disclosure of information relevant to the 
implementation of pay equity by the Civil Service Commission to the 
bargaining agent\employee representative. Ellis-Grunfeld, the then Pay Equity 
Commissioner for the Manitoba Civil Service, pointed out that the process 
advanced smoothly and successftilly, and "while negotiations were lengthy, and 
sometimes complex, the parties endeavoured to find constructive solutions to 
any problems which arose" (1987, p. 231). Moreover, she concluded that: 
"the level of cooperation which evolved between labour and management ... was 
extremely impressive and challenged the criticism that pay equity initiatives 
erode free collective bargaining" (Ellis-Gnmfeld, 1987, p. 231). 
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An important factor in the evident compatibility of pay equity with collective 
bargaining in Manitoba was the rejection of a wholesale transfer of job 
evaluation to the wage-setting arena in favour of rating results used as a base- 
line for negotiations. According to a report describing the implementation of 
pay equity in the Manitoba civil service, neither labour nor management 
wanted to adopt "a mechanical formula. " They preferred a methodology which 
"honoured the legislation and dealt fairly with the data but allowed negotiating 
room to minimize potential problems" (Manitoba Civil Service Commission, 
1988, p. 13). As Ellis-Grunfield explained: 
We had agreed that we were not involved in a mechanical or 
rigid "pay-for-points" exercise. There is no magic formula 
which can be fed into a computer to spit out solutions. Rather, 
we viewed the rating exercise as a means to give us the 
information on our gender-dominated classifications. That data 
then served as guidelines to the negotiating teams who bargained 
the adjustments. (Ellis-Grunfeld, 1987, cited in McDermott, 
1991, p. 132) 
There was also evidence of collective bargaining as a suitable vehicle for 
pursuing equal value from the Federal government's joint job evaluation study 
in the civil service, which started in 1985 in an effort to proactively comply 
with the federal jurisdiction's equal value legislation (incorporated into the 
Canadian Human Rights Act). Although the Act had been in place since 1978, 
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working on the basis of a complaints model, the federal government decided in 
1985 that they would initiate a study in cooperation with their thirteen unions, 
in order to identify any disparities. This policy was called the "Proactive 
Measure. " After two years meetings of joint, single-table meetings with all the 
unions involved, the parameters of the job evaluation study was established. 
According to Ouimet (1988), a civil servant in the federal Treasury Board, this 
was the first time that all thirteen unions had dealt with an issue together. The 
study (which was still ongoing at the time of her paper) demonstrated that pay 
equity could be tackled within the normal range of union-management 
relationships. The selection and adaption of a common job evaluation plan, 
identification of male and female dominated classes, size of sample for the 
questionnaire, communication strategy, and evaluation were all conducted 
jointly. All of these stages were described as less adversarial than 
conventional wage bargaining. 
In April 1988, the premier of Newfoundland and Labrador announced a 
proactive pay equity policy, to be implemented through a joint union- 
management process: 
... we intend to consult and work cooperatively with 
representatives of employee groups to achieve equal pay for 
work of equal value. We will be establishing joint 
management\union committees, which will agree upon the details 
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of and carry out the job evaluation process, and identify required 
pay adjustments. (Roome, 1989, p. 8) 
It was clear that the Newfoundland and Labrador provincial government 
believed in the compatibility of pay equity and collective bargaining, and 
furthermore, that the policy could be implemented with the cooperation of the 
labour movement. 
Likewise, there is evidence that the Ontario government anticipated a more 
cooperative style of bargaining in the implementation of pay equity. In its 
guidelines on Effective pay eguily committees (1988), published by the Pay 
Equity Commission, it is evident that there was an expectation that pay equity 
(and particularly the job evaluation component) would be handled in a 
different, less adversarial mode than conventional wage bargaining. The 
booklet draws upon literature in organisational behaviour on effective group 
decision making and teamwork, and upon industrial relations material 
describing the preconditions of integrative bargaining. 
For example, the recommendations included the importance of the committee 
members developing an atmosphere of trust and openness; the importance of 
continually monitoring process; consensus reaching techniques, as opposed to 
voting procedures or negotiating; problem solving through identifying the 
problem and evaluating alternative solutions; small group discussion; and the 
encouragement of active listening and equal participation. 
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Furthermore, the first Pay Equity Commissioner revealed a clear vision of 
cooperation during a presentation he made at a pay equity workshop at the 
National Centre for Management Research and Development, University of 
Western Ontario (1988), pointing to the Commission's statement of principles 
which included a strong commitment to the cooperation of those affected by 
the policy. 
These contradictory strands of the debate about the compatibility of pay equity 
and collective bargaining are not identifiable along simply union-employer 
lines. Governments as employers were not in alignment with private sector 
employers, partly explained by their different economic. and political 
circumstances. It was apparent that the governments of Manitoba, Ontario and 
Newfoundland were satisfied that pay equity could be implemented 
cooperatively through collective bargaining. Moreover, all the governments 
introducing pay equity legislation after Ontario (the Atlantic provinces of Nova 
Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island) required the joint 
implementation of pay equity in good faith, and to aid in the process obligated 
employers to disclose information relevant to the implementation of pay equity. 
It is important not to oversimplify this divide between public and private sector 
employers because, as mentioned above, one major industrial sector had been 
successfully pursuing wage setting through a joint classification and appeal 
process since the early 1970's. The United Steelworkers of America designed 
its own classification system, the Cooperative Wage Study Job Evaluation 
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System (CWS), which is applied jointly with the employer to assign wages to 
jobs (Chaykowski, 1990). The CWS plan is implemented through a joint 
evaluation committee which rates jobs according to the same four factors - 
skill, effort, working conditions and responsibility - as listed in all Canadian 
pay equity legislation. Over the years, rules of procedure have evolved for 
resolving impasses in the committee. For example, after jointly deciding the 
point scores for a number of subfactors (the CWS lists 12 specific criteria), 
weightings are negotiated, where trade-offs are allowed to reach a solution, 
including what Chaykowski called "sidebars. " This is where one side agrees 
to accept their opposites' factor score evaluation for one job class if their 
opposite agrees to accept their own position on another job-class 
(Chaykowksi). 
This largely successful experience of wage-setting using joint job evaluation 
was seemingly ignored by the opponents of pay equity predicting dire 
consequences as a result of its intrusion into wage determination. 
Bargaining Power 
The issue of power centres upon a shift in union-management, 
intraorganisational and interunion power relations. As Acker (1989, p. 20) 
pointed out, 11 every time a wage is set ... the fundamental relation of power 
between the worker and the employer is re-enacted, " and pay equity is right at 
the centre of this wage-setting process. Pay equity will also upset established 
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hierarchies of power and status, as well as of income. Ellis-Grunfeld, a Pay 
Equity Commissioner for Manitoba, recognised that their legislation made the 
assumption that existing relationships would be altered: "Of course the 
collective bargaining process will be altered - and so it should be. Power 
bargaining has been part of the equity problem" (1987, p. 229). 
Power relationships are changed both between the union and employer and 
intraorganisationally, especially within unions. Taking the union-employer 
relationship first, the positions taken in the debate during consultation is 
explained largely by both groups perceiving that pay equity legislation would 
change the power in existing arrangements, in favour of unions. Any 
apprehension in the Canadian labour movement about the emasculation of its 
role in wage-setting were allayed to a large degree by the legal requirement for 
union-management negotiation of the whole process. This obligatory input 
gives unions the opportunity to take some control over equality bargaining. 
It also enhances their power to bargain specific items in order to address wage 
discrimination, despite previous employer resistance, and especially in the 
absence of the strike weapon. In addition, unions cannot have overlooked the 
opportunity for organising on the strength of bargaining effective pay equity 
plans, in comparison to non-unionised workplaces. Doubts as to the equity of 
unorganised employers' pay equity plans, without union input, have been 
expressed by Burkart, 1990. A presentation and subsequent discussion at a pay 
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equity conference (Abbott, 1990) by a major non-union private sector company 
adds to these doubts. 
Unions' power is further increased because for the first time the bargaining 
agent has the legal right to information previously the prerogative of 
management. Job description, analysis and evaluation is taken out of 
management control; specialist knowledge is a strong power base. The Ontario 
legislation is the exception in not including an information disclosure clause but 
even in that province the Tribunal has ruled in favour of full and early 
information disclosure. 
Turning to intraorganisational union relationships, pay equity will undoubtedly 
alter the power relationships of particular bargaining units within a union, or 
between particular occupational groups in the same bargaining unit. It should 
also be noted that the power and status of different unions in the same 
establishment may well be affected, possibly increasing interunion rivalry. 
Mostly, the flow of power will be from the male-dominated, traditionally 
strongest with the most bargaining power, to the female-dominated, 
traditionally the weakest with the least bargaining power (Gandz, 1987; 
MacKenzie, 1988; Robb, 1988). 
While the latter authors saw this trend as causing instability and therefore 
basically undesirable, if pay equity is to redress wage discrimination it has to 
change these traditional power relationships, based as they are upon social 
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(gendered) constructions of women's work. Although the power dynamic 
within unions will change, causing tensions generally, in Ontario the 
maintenance phase is the fraught with problems in this regard. The Ontario 
Act is the only one with bargaining strength as an exemption after pay equity 
is achieved. 
Interpretation of this clause is unclear, but it does mean that potentially 
traditional relationships of hierarchy and status could reassert themselves after 
pay equity adjustments have been paid out. As McDermott (1991, p. 129) 
remarked: "What is strange about this provision is that past bargaining strength 
is essentially ignored by the Act, whereas future bargaining strength is 
honoured. " However, there is also a duty placed upon both parties to 
"establish and maintain" pay equity (section 8[2]) and, as Robb (1988) pointed 
out, unions should theoretically find it very difficult to justify wage increases 
subsequent to pay equity using these grounds since they work so clearly against 
the spirit of the Act. In any case, the bargaining strength exemption does 
seem at odds with the maintenance obligation. 
The difficulties with the Ontario exclusion seem similar in principle to those in 
the British debate over the it genuine material factors" defence against equal 
value, where employers have justified differential wages because separate 
groups of workers had different collective bargaining arrangements (Lodge, 
1987). In her criticism of British employers using collective bargaining 
arrangements to avoid equal value legislation, Gay (1989) argued that this 
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defence was unacceptable. Apart from the general point that the employer has 
agreed to do something which is unlawful - paid discriminatory wages - 
collective bargaining was based upon outdated ranking and differentials despite 
technological changes affecting the nature of jobs, and from a general 
unawareness of the importance of comparing jobs in any systematic or 
analytical way. Moreover, collective bargaining was based on a perception of 
job hierarchy derived from gendered concepts of skill and value of work in the 
enterprise (Gay, 1989). Indeed, a recent European Court of Justice decision 
declared the defence unacceptable, although it is still not certain that collective 
bargaining per se has been ruled out as an objective justification in all 
circumstances. 
Gender and Class Dimensions 
This section attempts to further the exploration of pay equity bargaining 
processes and outcomes by examining the gender and class power relations 
embedded in collective bargaining as well as job evaluation and pay 
determination. As proposed in Chapter 1, a full explanation of the 
interrelationship between pay equity and collective bargaining cannot be 
attempted without taking into account the structural properties of gender and 
class, manifested primarily in the form of a job hierarchy which forms the 
basis of collective bargaining. 
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The argument rejecting pay equity as interfering with the status quo ignores or 
downplays the historical class and gender dimensions of the present 
arrangements, whether these preferred existing arrangements are taken to be 
the "neutral" workings of the market, or widened to include power bargaining 
for wages. It is interesting to note that private sector employers' arguments 
for the status quo fit in with an historical trend of resistance to any regulation 
which benefits employees but increases costs, either directly or indirectly (for 
example, general employment standards, minimum wage, family allowances). 
As such there is a recognisable class interest, and ideological character, in 
arguments about leaving the labour market to set wages, or (accepting some 
level of interference in market forces) through leaving the collective bargaining 
process to operate as it has before. 
The gendered nature of collective bargaining is indicated partly by the 
historical role the parties played in the shaping of the sexually segregated 
labour market, as discussed in Chapter II. The resulting hierarchy of jobs and 
wages is reproduced and reinforced in the existing structure of collective 
bargaining relationships in Canada. Since bargaining takes place on an 
establishment basis and there is no industry-wide or national bargaining, 
bargaining structures are highly fragmented. As a result, wage differentials 
between both sectors and firms are firmly entrenched and reinforced by the 
bargaining structures (Fudge and McDermott, 1991). 
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Horizontal segregation is further reproduced in the bargaining unit structures 
within the establishments, which reinforces wage differentials. Determination 
of the appropriate bargaining unit during the certification process has been the 
primary influence in shaping the collective bargaining structure in Canada 
(Arthurs, 1981). Labour relations boards' criteria and jurisprudence focus 
upon a community of interests when drawing the boundaries of an appropriate 
bargaining unit. Historically, women in an enterprise have usually been part 
of a bargaining unit separate from men, defined upon largely occupational 
lines. The most common example would be a manufacturing concern where 
the office staff (women) are in one unit and the production workers (men) are 
in another unit. Each bargaining unit usually has separate pay structures. This 
emphasis upon homogeneous bargaining units has directly influenced job 
segregation and wage differentials (Robb, 1988). 
Once it is recognised that bargaining structures and the organisational practices 
of parties to collective bargaining reinforce discrimination against women, it 
should come as no surprise that relying on the status quo has not led to any 
significant improvement of women's position in the labour market. Gaining 
equality in Canada without proactive measures been largely unsuccessful 
(Burkart, 1990; Cadieux, 1984; Chaykowski, 1990; Cornish, 1986; 
MacKenzie, 1988; Robb, 1987; Sarra, 1986). 
Similarly, British studies have shown that, despite sexual discrimination 
legislation which put the onus on employers and unions to examine their 
148 
agreements together with their pay and organisational structures to ensure 
equality for women, most agreements studied did not contain any movement 
towards women's equality in the workplace (Colling and Dickens, 1989; 
Dickens and Colling, 1990; Dickens, Townley and Winchester, 1988). 
This lack of progress was explained in terms of a general conservatism in 
collective bargaining, taking for granted existing pay structures or job 
evaluation schemes which perpetuated low wages and job segregation, leading 
to a typically narrow bargaining agenda. It was concluded that lack of 
awareness of discriminatory mechanisms was linked to gendered notions of 
work and skill. Barriers to any progress in this area included the 
predominance of negotiators drawn from male-dominated groups in both 
parties, who were apparently untouched by any equal opportunity policies that 
may have been introduced since these equality structures often operated in 
isolation from negotiating structures. 
Unions' effectiveness in working towards women's equality in general and pay 
equity in particular turns upon two points. First, it is debateable whether 
unions are in practice capable of radical social change. As Hyman noted 
(1989), unions are unsuited to explicitly political activities of any kind; they do 
not usually challenge power and control in society. 
The general economism in the labour movement is enhanced in North 
American unions. 'Business unionism' became entrenched in the labour 
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movement during the Gompers era and the ascendency of the American 
Federation of Labour and its Canadian equivalent, the Trades and Labour 
Congress. However, Canadian unionism has always been less politically 
conservative than its United States counterpart. The historical and current 
tensions between national and international unions, and between craft and 
industriahpublic sector unions in Canada is largely explained by power 
struggles over political direction. 
Being slightly to the left of the American unions, Canadian unions have been 
more able to move from a purely economic stance, although any increased 
social and political awareness, especially on women's issues, has tended to be 
present in the public sector unions, which in the last decade have come to 
dominate Canadian unionism. One reason for the comparative success of the 
Canadian union movement compared to the American (union density had fallen 
to 16% in 1990 compared to the Canadian rate of 36%) is its strength derived 
from social and political strategies (Kumar, 1991). 
The second point to be considered is how far patriarchal forces evident in the 
labour movement will impact on progress on women's equality, given unions' 
role of representing women's interests in pay equity implementation. Briskin 
argued that a socialist feminist politic has made significant inroads into the 
Canadian labour movement as a whole during the last decade, compared to its 
British and American counterparts. She described this emergence as: "... a 
strong, organised, and relatively successful movement of union women, deeply 
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influenced by a socialist feminist politic G 99 1, P- 14). Socialist feminists' 
independence from the left, combined with a relative integration within the 
women9s movement, gives them a strength and an influence not possible for 
their counterparts in the UK or US. Canadian socialist feminists were able to 
take advantage of this political 'space' to develop a unique strategy of single 
issue coalition politics, through the recognition of the inter-connectedness of 
gender, class and race power relations. A central part of this strategy was to 
build alliances with the unions. 
In addition, feminist organising within the unions was made easier by an 
ambivalent relationship between the New Democratic Party (NDP) and the 
unions, in contrast with the long-established integration of the British Labour 
Party and the trade unions. The distance between the social democratic party 
and the Canadian unions was exacerbated by the failure of the NDP at federal 
level. Partly because of this ambivalence, the Canadian Labour Congress 
(CLC) has increasingly adopted social movement strategies somewhat 
independent of the NDP, emphasising alliance with local community groups to 
strengthen their power in influencing Canadian public policy (Smith, referred 
to in Briskin; and Galt, 1990). This points to a convergence with feminist 
organisational methods and may have helped to legitimise feminist strategy in 
the labour movement. Potential fragmentation of feminism has undermined 
unity but, as Barrett and Hamilton (1986) commented, Canadian feminists do 
at least talk to each other "across barriers of theory, analysis and politics that 
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in Britain, for example, would long since have created an angry truce of silent 
pluralism" (cited in Briskin, 1991, p. 24). The National Action Committee on 
the Status of Women (NAC), an umbrella organisation of women's groups 
ranging from the Business and Professional Women's Clubs, to women's 
committees of unions and independent socialist feminist groups, is credited 
with holding the Canadian women's movement together over the last twenty 
years. Since the publication of the report of the Royal Commission on the 
Status of Women in Canada (1970), NAC's chosen strategy for equal pay has 
progressively been the equal value approach (Warskett, 1991), reinforcing the 
political momentum for pay equity policies. 
Briskin's analysis suggests that Canadian unions, despite their history, have in 
the last decade been open to considerable changes in their policies and 
organisational strategies: 
In Canada the link between union and party women developed in 
the context of a strong movement of socialist feminist women 
outside of party structures committed to coalitions as a strategic 
orientation. Indeed, the pull from the autonomous women's 
movement, through such coalition structures as the Equal Pay 
Coalition, has helped to strengthen the organising of women 
inside the unions and the party, to build links between NDP and 
trade union women, and to win gains on policy issues in both 
arenas. (1991, p. 16) 
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In tracing the rise of Canadian working class feminism, Maroney credited the 
expansionary strategy of the women's movement, but also explained how the 
development of organised labour "-facilitated the entity and expression of 
feminist consciousness" (1987, p. 88). Her analysis focused upon the dramatic 
increase in women's unionisation during the decade from 1966 to 1976, largely 
due to the legislated formation of public sector unions, which became female- 
dominated. Increased rationalisation of government led to proletarianised 
working conditions for female-dominated professionals, such as nurses and 
teachers, establishing fertile ground for militancy and openness to women's 
demands. In the private sector, pressures of a shrinking membership base 
have resulted in organising drives of clerical and service workers. 
It is to be hoped that the increasing influence of a socialist feminist politic in 
Canadian unions will impact positively upon the pay equity process. Clearly, 
union commitment and expertise are needed for effective implementation. 
Canadian unions' record on equality policies for women and their translation to 
collective bargaining achievements (see Chapter III) leads to the conclusion 
that there has been some movement towards women's equality in general, but 
with room for improvement, for some unions more than others. 
Despite a proactive framework for the initial achievement of pay equity, the 
Ontario legislation relies on a voluntary model for maintenance of pay equity. 
Critics of the legislation are concerned that this method ignores the pressures 
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to reassert traditional and inequitable relativities, and the poor record of 
voluntary compliance (Burkart, 1990; McDermott, 1991; Skipton, 1991). 
The ability of the parties to move beyond the status quo is all the more 
important when it is realised that the Ontario Act has largely upheld the 
integrity of collective bargaining in that province (Burkart, 1990). Each stage 
has to be negotiated by the parties with no provision of enforcement of 
standards unless a complaint is made. Thus, unless an agreed pay equity plan 
is challenged by an employee, it is deemed approved. There is no need to file 
the plan with the Pay Equity Commission, although the Commission does have 
the power to monitor the progress of the legislation. This power has been 
largely unutilized, however (Interview with Review Officers, 1991). Indeed, 
the Pay Equity Commission described the intention of the Act as being to cause 
the least amount of disruption possible within the establishment (Burkart, 
1990). As Burkart noted: "There is an implicit assumption that these two 
parties can decide what is best for women without disrupting the existing 
labour management relationship" (1990, p. 34). It may well be that all the 
North American pay equity initiatives reflect a policy of the least possible 
disruption of existing collective bargaining relationships (Fudge and 
McDermott, 1991). 
To compound the pressure of reinforcing gender and class properties in pay 
equity implementation, the instrument used to measure equal value in most pay 
equity initiatives may well solidify the very discrimination the policy is 
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designed to redress. All Canadian models of pay equity incorporate job 
evaluation as a methodology, largely following the United States comparable 
worth models (Quaid, 1993). Other countries, too, have largely used this 
methodology. However, among women's advocates in North America a debate 
has emerged about the wisdom of using job evaluation to obtain equal pay. It 
has been argued that job evaluation is a management tool and that it was 
originally designed to establish and reinforce hierarchy, differences in wages 
and management's place (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1991; Brenner, 1987; 
Haignere, 1990; Remick, 1984; Treiman and Hartmann, 1981). Traditionally, 
unions have opposed job evaluation for the same reasons and their acceptance, 
where obtained, has been limited largely to the classification component as a 
framework within which to bargain (McDermott, 1991). 
The early job evaluation plans were designed for male-dominated workplaces, 
and so valued male-dominated work and rendered invisible, or undervalued, 
female-dominated work. Apart from being class-based, the hierarchy 
encapsulated in job evaluation is built upon a male standard. The job 
comparison required by equal value policies is a reflection of this male 
standard (Dickens, 1992). Traditional job evaluation inevitably reproduces 
patriarchal relations of power woven into the past and present logic and 
practices of the workplace (Acker, 1989; Blum, 1991; Evans and Nelson, 
1989; Warskett, 1990). For example, the assumptions and ideology behind the 
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family wage were built into the development of job evaluations systems in the 
1940's and 1950's (Steinberg, 1990). 
Nevertheless, some critics of traditional job evaluation claimed that evaluation 
schemes can be redesigned to capture and value previously undervalued or 
invisible female dominated work (Cornish, 1986; Equal Pay Coalition, 1988; 
Remick and Steinberg, 1984; Steinberg and Haignere, 1985). However, even 
if an apparently gender neutral job evaluation scheme were applied, it could 
not value some women's jobs (at the bottom of the hierarchy) as equal to 
men's because their work is, objectively, "worth" less than men's (at the top 
of the hierarchy), given the historical exclusion of women from skilled work. 
However, for some women's advocates, the political price of divisiveness 
caused by job evaluation - between men and women, and especially between 
women, is too high (Lewis, 1988; Warskett, 1990). Pay equity implemented 
through evaluation is seen as a strand of liberal discourse, as particularly 
dangerous because it masks value judgements in an apparently "scientific" and 
"objective" mathematical model. As Lewis argued: "... reducing wage 
discrimination to a technical problem essentially removes it from the realm of 
economic and political struggle" (1988, p. 87; see also Blum, 1991). In her 
case study of pay equity in a non-unionised environment, Quaid (1993) 
highlighted job evaluation as institutionalised "myth, " disguising a social 
construction of value. 
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The fear is that after pay equity implementation is completed, whether the 
wage gap is closed or not, whether the hierarchy of jobs is really changed or 
not, politicians and managers (and some unions) will use the exercise to justify 
the status quo, making any further political action on women's wage equality 
virtually impossible. Consequently, some Canadian equal pay advocates warn 
against pay equity as the only policy to redress discriminatory wages and 
recommend a political as well as (or rather than) technical route to equal pay, 
emphasising wage solidarity (Izwis, 1988; McDermott, 1991; Warskett, 
1988). 
Never-the-less, as Warskett pointed out (1991), even the fiercest critic (for 
example, Lewis, 1988) has had to concede that women must learn to use job 
evaluation to their advantage when faced with legislation or a policy initiative 
offering equity adjustments based on this methodology. After some experience 
of implementation in the Ontario public sector, some of the original critics of 
the job evaluation methodology have changed from rejection to guarded 
acceptance, alleging that a rigorous feminist critique and redesign of existi g 
schemes can offer potentially radical benefits to women workers covered by 
the legislation (Armstrong and Armstrong, 1991). 
So far, the discussion has touched upon both constraining and enabling facets 
of gender and class structural properties. Collective bargaining itself is only 
understandable if we build in the complex intertwining of gender and class, 
and the reinforcement of discrimination against women encapsulated in this 
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relationship. Pay equity bargaining introduces a potential challenge to the 
status quo, although it is argued that the Ontario legislation was designed to 
minimise disruption to existing collective bargaining relationships. Another 
part of the equation which bears upon the effectiveness of that challenge is the 
emergence of a socialist-feminist politic in the Canadian labour movement, and 
its possibilities for enhancing women's power to achieve equal pay. 
Studies of these complex relationships in pay equity bargaining are few, 
although the literature on pay equity is growing. The rest of this chapter will 
draw from the available studies of implementation of pay equity initiatives with 
the aim of further understanding the interrelationship between collective 
bargaining and pay equity. 
Previous Pay Eguity Studies 
The one Canadian study of pay equity implementation was based upon research 
conducted into the federal government's proactive policy in the civil service 
(Warskett, 1991). Although not presented from a labour relations perspective, 
the analysis of the case focused upon the power and control functions of job 
evaluation systems in a lib eral democracy, and in particular the Treasury 
Board's role in reasserting its power and control over the technical process. 
The Treasury Board did this by neutralising the Public Service Alliance of 
Canada's (PSAC) equal value complaints with an equal value study, and it used 
this study to contain costs and minimise change to the existing job hierarchy, 
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eventually acting unilaterally as employer to ensure its strategy was successful. 
This action by an influential wing of the bureaucracy acting on behalf of 
government as employer illustrates the potential power of the state in the 
implementation of pay equity. 
Bearing in mind the earlier reference to the same federal government initiative 
as an example of movement towards more cooperative bargaining, the 
difference between Warskett's and Ouimet's account should be noted. Part of 
the explanation lies in the different time frame. Ouimet's paper only dealt 
with an early phase of the Proactive Measure, when the mode of bargaining 
was apparently different from and more cooperative th4n usual. Warskett had 
the benefit of a longer study of the implementation and was therefore able to 
identify more conflictual union-employer relations towards the end of the 
study, when the Treasury Board unilaterally changed the results. A second 
factor in the different account of the process is the different theoretical 
framework. An appreciation of the structural properties of class and gender, 
and the role of the state as employer in reinforcing those power relations, 
enabled a fuller understanding of the implementation of equal value in the civil 
service. The provision in this theoretical framework of a clear link between 
technical disputes and political conflict also enabled a more revealing analysis 
of interactions between different evaluators involved in the project. 
Moving now to pay equity literature in the United States, there are three major 
studies of comparable worth, all based upon initiatives in the public sector. 
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None of these has labour relations as its theoretical perspective. Even so, 
some conclusions can be drawn about the interrelationship between collective 
bargaining and pay equity since it is clear upon reading the accounts and 
analyses of these case studies that the role of collective bargaining was 
important in understanding the process and outcomes. 
Two of the studies discussed the role of the employer, especially women 
bureaucrats, in implementation of comparable worth/pay equity. In the 
Minnesota study (Evans and Nelson, 1989), the state saw itself as a winner in 
comparable worth reform. The authors of the case study highlighted the 
importance of committed feminist leadership to the policy's success. The 
female Commissioner of Employee Relations was backed up by a committed 
Department of Employee Relations, whose expertise eased the difficult 
technical process. An indicator of employer commitment to comparable worth 
was an early agreement to a male wage line as the standard for all wages and a 
separate allocation of monies. This employer commitment at the state level, 
together with crucial public sector union commitment, was in contrast to the 
employer resistance and general lack of expertise in the localities, contributing 
to the flawed implementation of comparable worth in the decentralised process. 
In Blum's case study (1991) of two Californian cities, she pursued this issue of 
"elite women" and their contribution to achieving equal pay for women. 
Previous commentators (Flammang, 1987; Meuller, 1987) had proposed that 
the comparable worth contract in the city of San Jose would never have 
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occurred were it not for a network of elite women in leadership positions. 
Blum contested this conclusion based on her findings, noting that low-paid 
women questioned the feminist convictions of these officials upon realisation 
that elite women had their own conflicting agendas. 
In her other case study, Contra Costa, the differences between elite and low 
paid women were not so important as the very conservative and "blatantly 
sexist" men in county government (1991, p. 164). Nevertheless, Blum 
identified some tensions between women as a result of their class-based 
positions. She identified the conflicting pressures of women public sector 
officials in her case studies as being similar to that in Steinberg's description 
(1987) of the New York State initiative: an ambivalence leading to a 
redefinition of comparable worth, a minimising of its objectives, and 
implementation of a "reasonable" reform more palatable to the business 
community, the taxpayers, and the male officials with whom elite women must 
work. Indeed, even though Evans and Nelson acknowledged the important 
role of elite women they also pointed to the tendency of women managers 
towards containment and cost control, as representatives of the employer. 
The authors of both studies recognised the importance of union support for - 
women9s equal pay, but Evans and Nelson identified a paradox they called 
"redistributive justice in a declining economy. " It referred to the dilemma of 
advocates of comparable worth in having to mobilise support for the reform in 
the labour movement for it to succeed, whereas downward pressures on the 
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traditional male wage are likely to generate defensive hostility from their 
potential allies who see comparable worth as eroding their own already 
decreasing wages. The erosion of the male wage in real terms also led to a 
generally lower standard with which to compare equally valued jobs. 
The role of labour and the collective bargaining process in pay equity 
implementation is most interestingly analysed in Acker's study of comparable 
worth policy in the state of Oregon (1989). The author traced the gradual 
dilution of "true comparable worth" (a wage structure based upon evaluated 
points), to "poverty relief" (wage rises for the lowest paid classifications). 
This shift, a failure in comparable worth terms, was due to a complicated 
interweaving of class and gender properties, which she differentiated broadly 
into two categories: political processes and the embeddedness of gender/class 
properties in organisational and ideological processes. 
Based upon her research, she listed practices which overall repelled any efforts 
to change, despite the comparable worth project, and reinforced gender and 
class properties. These practices upheld the integrity of organisation 
hierarchy: hidden skills in women's work (or the active production of 
invisibility); opposition to redistribution of the wage (or the active production 
of wage inequality); struggles over authority and control (or the active 
production of marginality). All of these practices together comprised an 
organisational logic with a gendered substructure. 
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Of particular interest in the context of the case studies to follow in the next 
two chapters is what Acker called the active production of invisibility. This 
practice was best illuminated by the interactions evident in the job evaluation 
process. As in the Evans and Nelson and Blum studies, Acker's account 
located the continuing reinforcement of hierarchy and the devaluation of 
women's work in it, in the design and application of the job evaluation system. 
The unmodified Hay system included operational definitions, double entry, 
organisational charts and relationship between factors which all served to 
reproduce hierarchy - 
To compound this effect of the evaluation instrument itself, gender ideology 
incorporating gendered images of skill, work, technology and masculinity and 
femininity was discernible in the interactions of the committee members. 
Acker recorded long heated discussions between the feminists representing the 
clerical workers and the male blue-collar representatives where technical know- 
how and human relations skills were contested, but: "The women were 
dedicated to the comparable worth goal and argued their points fiercely. The 
men were equally adamant and, indeed, never gave in. Their concern was 
that, in comparison with females jobs, the male jobs would be undervalued. 
(1989, p. 95) 
Refening to Cockburn's study of British printers who fought to maintain the 
definition of skilled work despite technological deskilling which threatened 
their gender identities, she identified verbal strategies used by the men 
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evaluators to resist any devaluing at all of their skills, regardless of the impact 
on wages: "They were concerned with respect, getting their due. Admitting 
that certain female jobs might be worthy of a similar respect seemed to be 
demeaning to them" (1989, p. 102). 
It should be noted here that in her study Blum identified the objection of men 
to comparable worth as evidence of a similar phenomenon. A group of 
engineering technicians had by-passed the union by applying directly to the city 
administration for raises. She suggested that these men were suffering from 
"status anxiety" as a result of comparable worth gains for women. In support 
of this contention she cited Acker (1989) and Steinberg (1986) and their work 
linking skill with masculinity (see also Cockburn, 1983; and Phillips and 
Taylor, 1986). Not only the men's dominant status in a patriarchal society was 
under attack but also their gender identity. Thus, their defensive reactions may 
well have occurred regardless of the actual economic threat involved. 
Both the Acker and Blum studies showed the importance of gender identity 
derived from gendered notions of skill, work and value in understanding the 
pay equity bargaining process. But it is in Acker's consideration of the politics 
of conflicting- interests and unequal power that she places the labour relations 
system squarely within the context of a political process which tends to 
reproduce gender and class relations even as attempts are made to change 
them. She identified such high levels of union-management conflict and 
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interunion rivalry that women's interests were marginalised, forming a barrier 
to the change process. 
Union-management conflict in the comparable worth process, including 
management disbelief in the compatibility of collective bargaining with the 
achievement of pay equity, grew to such proportions that the project failed to 
meet its original objective (i. e.; "true comparable worth"). Combined with 
this and exacerbating the conflict was an inability of the unions to form a 
common front, so that the process was stalled, and the effort to raise women's 
wages was undercut: "Oregon labour could not get it together .... The resulting 
failure to achieve a united approach by labour created difficulties for the 
Oregon project and marginalised the interests of the women workers" (Acker, 
1989, p. 148). 
The union-management and interunion conflicts evident in the Oregon 
comparable worth initiative represented a struggle over power and control. 
The disputes were often about wage setting, but it was also about other issues - 
management rights to define and decide; unions preserving their rights against 
management; and unions differing irreconcilably over strategies. As Acker 
pointed out perceptively: 
These were class and bureaucratic issues, but they were not 
gender neutral. They were built upon a gendered organisation 
of what is most important, and, of course, the consequences 
were not gender neutral .... Marginalisation is not simply a 
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pushing to the side, a failure to pay attention, or carelessness, 
but an active process of creating what is most urgent, 
interesting, or significant. (1989, p. 217) 
Acker's insights extended to a location of the marginalisation of women's 
interests in the broader framework of the gendered nature of labour relations, 
including the notion of class-interests. The class and gender interests of men 
were so built into the very fabric of the labour relations system that: 
practical proposals to legislate improvements in women's relative 
situation appeared to undermine general working-class interests, 
such as the principle that trade unions must not allow lowering 
of members' wages or restricting of the right to bargain. 
Labour relations are structured in such a way that women's 
interests may appear as "only" gender interests, which are 
devalued and displaced. Men's interests, on the other hand, are 
often seen, and acted upon, as representing general class 
interests. (1989, p. 218) 
She recognised the dilemma facing women workers and feminist advocates of 
comparable worth in putting their faith in the labour movement for support and 
action on equal pay: 
The very strategy that seems to promise a solution to the historic 
undervaluing of women's work can be turned back on them to 
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become a way of undermining the strength and unity of unions 
that are necessary for the achievement of equity. (1989, p. 17) 
Acker's analysis provides crucial insights into the complex relationship 
between collective bargaining and pay equity, but the bind she presents in the 
quote immediately above is perhaps not so tightly woven in the Canadian pay 
equity context. First, pay equity legislation in Canada provides a central role 
for collective bargaining, and unions are considered jointly liable for any 
discriminatory wage bargaining. 
In Oregon, it was perhaps predictable that the unions' response was negative, 
triggering a defence of their hard-won rights to collectively bargain over 
wages. Although they were involved in the job evaluation process, advocates' 
proposals of "true comparable worth" did remove wage-setting from the arena 
of collective bargaining completely - wages were to be based purely on 
evaluation points, incorporated in legislation. From the perspective of one 
major union involved in the comparable worth effort, the Taskforce (the joint J 
group responsible for the comparable worth project in Oregon) was: 
of coming close to attacking collective bargaining, rather than sexual 
discrimination... " (1989, p. 137). This is not to say that the problems Acker 
pointed to will not happen in Canada, but to caution against too pessimistic a 
prognosis, given that the whole process is to be negotiated with unions in 
organised workplaces (and this applies to political policy as well as legislated 
pay equity) . 
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The second reason for limited optimism is that unions in Canada are more 
social and political than their American counterparts, as discussed earlier. 
Finally, at a theoretical level, although Acker does acknowledge that 
marginalisation of women's interests is not irreversible, this is passed over 
very quickly. In my view, her account does not give enough attention to the 
positive role of a labour-feminist alliance in achieving some redress for low 
paid undervalued women in the workplace. It may well be that the alliance 
broke down too early and too seriously for her to build it in as a significant 
force for change. Be that as it may, at a theoretical level there is almost a 
deterministic gloom about her analysis - too much emphasis upon the 
constraints of gender and class and a glossing over of the positive facets of 
grasping the opportunities located in the same structural properties. In Ontario 
there has been a successful labour-feminist alliance which was prominent in 
obtaining, monitoring and amending the legislation. Moreover, indications are 
that there has been some movement beyond the limiting effects of the structural 
properties of gender and class in the labour relations system in certain pay 
equity negotiations. 
The research reported in the next three chapters addresses the key debates 
indicated in this chapter, and attempts to further our understanding of pay 
equity bargaining by examining the complex intertwinings of gender and class, 
recognising that these structural properties incorporate both limitations and 
possibilities. 
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CHAPTER V 
Pay Equity Bargaining in Newfoundland: Health Care 
In this chapter, pay equity bargaining processes and structures in the 
Newfoundland health care sector are examined. The early part of the chapter 
places the province's pay equity bargaining in the economic, social and 
political context. After a brief review of Newfoundland's economy, 
information is provided on women in the labour force and equality policies, 
and public sector bargaining in the province. To aid analysis of complex 
processes and structures, the findings have been categorised into three separate 
stages. Functionally and structurally, these stages of negotiating pay equity are 
separate: the Pay Equity Agreement, the Pay Equity Steering Committee, and 
the Job Evaluation Committees. In reality, the Pay Equity Steering Committee 
and the Job Evaluation Committees ran concurrently for a period of time, and 
personnel overlapped between the Pay Equity Agreement and the Pay Equity 
Steering Committee stages. Finally, the gender and class dimensions of the 
structures and processes of pay equity bargaining in Newfoundland are 
examined. 
Newfoundland has a small population of 568,000.. The average income for 
Newfoundland 1986 census families, was considerably lower ($28,000) than 
the Canadian ($38,000) and Ontario ($42,000) levels. This low income is 
largely explained by the pattern of total income in Newfoundland. The 
169 
province's employment income figure (73 %) is lower than in Canada (79 %), 
and in Ontario (80%). Moreover, the figure for goverm-nent transfer payments 
(21 %, and representing unemployment insurance benefits (UI), social 
assistance, family allowances, pensions and old age security payments) is 
nearly double the national level (11 %) and over twice the Ontario figure (9 %) 
(Statistics Canada, 1986). The extent of the province's dependence on the UI 
programme is illustrated by a comparison of UI payments as a proportion of 
total personal income in 1988: 10% in Newfoundland, contrasted with 1% in 
Ontario (Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 1992). 
An examination of the economic indicators for the province shows 
Newfoundland's disadvantaged position in comparison to national levels of 
prosperity. From 1980 to 1990 the province's average per capita Earned 
Income and per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP), relative to the rest of 
Canada's, were low: only 60 % and 61 %, respectively. Moreover, during the 
same period, provincial unemployment levels averaged at 190% of Canada's 
rate of unemployment (calculated from Statistics Canada 13-213 and 71-201, 
1992; and Newfoundland Statistics Agency, 1994). Provincial government 
economists point to economic structure as the main problem. 
In 1990 the goods-producing sector accounted for only 29% of total GDP, 
while the services sector accounted for 71 % (Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, 1992). Manufacturing in Newfoundland is vulnerable, selling a 
limited number of goods in a limited number of markets. Industries are mostly 
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resource-based (fishing, logging and mining) and seasonal, struggling in a 
declining market, and faced with increasing shortage of natural resources. The 
complete failure of the groundfish stocks in 1992, causing the sudden 
unemployment of 25,000 fisherpeople, is a dramatic example of how fragile 
the resource base is. The services sector, overall, does not provide many 
export opportunities, although there is limited growth in tourism, and ocean 
and offshore-related research and development. 
Position of Women and Eguality PoliCies in Newfoundland 
Between 1966 and 1986, the province's female population increased by 18%, 
becoming slightly less than half of the total population. Family structure also 
changed. There were 47% more lone-parent families in 1986 than in 1976, 
and about 80% of these families in 1986 were headed by the mother. In 1986, 
these female headed lone-parent families accounted for 9% of all families in 
Newfoundland (1987, Women's Policy Office, Government of Newfoundland 
and Ubrador). 
There has also been a dramatic increase in the female participation in the 
provincial workforce, from 32% in 1976 to 44% in 1991 (1992, Women's 
Policy Office). Nationally, Statistics Canada called the number of women with 
children entering the workforce now "one of the most significant trends in the 
Canadian labour market in 20 years" (cited in MacDonald, 1993). Moreover, 
there has been a marked increase in the number of working women with young 
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children. Whereas in 1976, fewer than 32% of mothers with children under 
three years of age were in the workforce, by 1986,66% were working full- 
time (Labour Canada, 1988). 
Despite the growth in women's employment, and a legal requirement for equal 
pay for equal work in the provincial 1971 Human Rights Code, in 1990 there 
was still a substantial earnings gap between men and women working in 
Newfoundland (37%). Apart from the limited concept of equal pay and the 
inadequate complaints model incorporated into the human rights legislation, a 
significant reason for this discrepancy is the sexual segregation of the labour 
market in the province. In 1991,58% of Newfoundland women were still 
employed in the clerical, sales and service areas. Although the number of 
women in the managerial\professional field had increased from 27% in 1989 to 
33 % of all women in the labour force, the clerical field alone employed almost 
28 % of the female labour force, compared to less than 5% of the male labour 
force. The largest earnings differential was apparent in the sales field, where 
women earned less than 40% of men's wages in 1990 (Women's Policy Office, 
1992). 
Placing this in a national context, the average earnings of Canadian women in 
all occupational categories were markedly less than those of men in 1986,1987 
and 1988. In 1988, the smallest differential was in the clerical group, where 
women earned on average 71 % of men's average earnings, whereas the largest 
differentials were in transport equipment operation (46%), sales (49%) and 
172 
medicine and health (49%). In none of the ten highest paid occupations in 
1985 did women's average full-year full-time employment income exceed 
men's. For example, women in the judges and magistrates category (the 
second highest-paid occupation) averaged an employment income of $61,094 
compared with men's $78,402 (78%) The air pilots, navigators and flight 
engineers category had the greatest discrepancy between men's and women's 
average employment income - $27,436 compared with $57,337 for their male 
counterparts (Statistics Canada, 1991). This gap in occupational earnings can 
largely be explained by vertical segregation. Even in particular workforces 
dominated by women, they are under-represented in senior positions. For 
example, in 1989 women held about 72% of all full-time jobs in banking, but 
only 6% of upper-level management positions (Labour Force Development 
Board, 1994). 
In a study of the top 500 Canadian companies in 1991, only 6 had female 
chairpersons, and 3 of these were crown corporations (Leighton, 1993). 
According to the Conference of Canada, only 6% of Canada's corporate 
boards are women (Women at the Top, 1990; see also Lavigne, 1993, and 
Women not making corporate strides, 1992). 
This lack of female representation at the top of the corporate and legal 
structures is paralleled by a dearth of women in the political arena. 
Nationally, only 13% of political seats are occupied by women (Black, 1993; 
see also Uvigne, 1993). Although no Newfoundland figures were available 
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for previous years, in the 1994 provincial government House of Assembly, 
only 5% of the elected politicians were women, and only 7% of the cabinet. 
In the most senior civil service positions, 17% of the Deputy Ministers and 
16% of the Assistant Deputy Ministers were women (Robbins, Interview, 
1994). 
The province's education system shows a clear pattern of vertical segregation. 
In 1990, although 52% of school board employees were women, there were no 
female school superintendents (the most senior management position), and only 
9% of assistant superintendents were women. In the schools themselves, only 
22% of the school principals, and 25% of vice-principals were women. 
According to the Newfoundland Teachers Association, this province has the 
11 worst Canadian record" (cited in Top-heavy male, 1990, p. 3). 
Government recognition of this labour market inequality is reflected in the 
funding of policy advisory groups for women by both the federal and the 
provincial government. The federal government funds a national network of 
Status of Women's Councils and there are 7 regional Councils in the province. 
Affiliated to these bodies are regional Women's Centres (also funded 
federally), which provide a general service to women, including counselling, 
networking, and information. The provincial government funds a Provincial 
Advisory Council on the Status of Women. Despite strong commitment and 
leadership, in practice its influence is limited, given the inevitable tension 
between its mandate and its funding. 
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Other government-sponsored bodies in the province are those that aim to 
influence the labour market by encouraging women to enter non-traditional 
occupations (Women in Trades and Technology and Women in Science and 
Engineering), to support women entrepreneurs (Women's Enterprise Bureau), 
and to provide shelters for abused women and children. The Women's 
Institutes and Women's Network are volunteer organisations. 
Although there have been personal links developed between the women's 
groups in the province and the labour movement, overall, this relationship has 
been haphazard and, at times, strained. Compensating for this somewhat 
distant relationship is a relatively strong national labour-feminist alliance. 
However, labour's record on equality policies and action varies according to 
type and composition of union, and feminist analysis and process has 
percolated through national union networks with variable effectiveness. As a 
positive example, the Newfoundland provincial CUPE body is clearly 
influenced by the policies and practices of the national Director of Equal 
Opportunities, a feminist who has well-established connections with 
Newfoundland and subsequently sat on the Joint Pay Equity Steering 
Committee. 
Apart from funding external women's groups, a major plank of the provincial 
government's equality policy for women is the Women's Policy Office, 
established in 1985. It is an internal advisory body with monitoring, 
education, research, coordinating and networking responsibilities, and its goal 
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is to "achieve social and economic equality for all women in Newfoundland 
and Labrador" (Women's Policy Office, Undated). The unit has been subject 
to funding cuts and operates with an uncertain future, given the economic and 
political climate of the 1990's. 
In 1988, the provincial Department of Employment and Labour Relations 
introduced the Occupational Integration for Women Program, aimed at 
lessening the barriers against women entering non-traditional employment. 
The department also initiated a "Job Bridges" program which provided wage 
subsidies for an employer who employs women in a non-traditional occupation. 
In 1984 the Cabinet appointed a Task Force on Affirmative Action to review 
the systems in place within the public service and make specific 
recommendations to ensure equal opportunities for women, with a particular 
mandate to review the government's pay policies. A number of interest groups 
presented briefs to this Task Force, including various unions, the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour and the Provincial Advisory 
Council on the Status of Women. In 1985 all the recommendations made by 
the Task Force were accepted by the government, including the establishment 
of an Employment Equity Council, made up of representatives from the 
Treasury Board Secretariat, Public Service Commission, unions and women's 
groups. This Employment Equity Council has, however, been largely inactive, 
until very recently. 
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These provincial policies were complemented by a federal employment equity 
initiative. Legislation passed in 1986 required all organisations regulated by 
the federal government to implement employment equity. The following year 
the programme was extended to include federal contractors. Unfortunately, 
this initiative has proved to be limited in both its specific requirements, which 
amount to reports and plans rather than effective equitable employment, and its 
enforcement, which is weak. 
One recommendation of the Affirmative Action Task Force, and accepted by 
the provincial government, was the systematic comparison of the male and 
female dominated job classifications with a view to achi. eving a more equitable 
pay structure. This was the first step towards pay equity, but it was a public 
sector union who acted as a catalyst in 1986 in the achievement of a concrete 
policy. 
The pioneering pay equity legislation passed in Manitoba in 1985 set the scene 
for an increased sensitivity to the issue in the Canadian labour movement. In 
Newfoundland, the Newfoundland Association of Public Employees (NAPE) 
included pay equity as one of their demands during their hospital support 
workers' wage negotiations for 1986. They were particularly interested in 
equalising the wage rates for domestic and utility workers who did the same 
job. NAPE was unsuccessftil in obtainin any pay equity adjustments at that 
time but served notice on the government that the union's participation in the 
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next round of negotiations would be conditional upon the goverment's 
commitment to pay equity. 
Next round, pay equity was a precondition of negotiations for NAPE and when 
the government refused the union made pay equity a strike issue. The 
government responded by proposing a joint study of the whole issue and gained 
the support of four other public sector unions in the venture: the Canadian 
Union of Public Employees (CUPE), the Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' 
Union (NLNU), the Association of Allied Health Professionals (AAHP), and 
the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), who also 
happened to be negotiating their collective agreement with Newfoundland 
Hydro (the crown corporation producing electric power) at that time. NAPE 
did not want a joint study and proposed instead the joint negotiation of a pay 
equity agreement. The other unions agreed. All unions contributed towards a 
proposal submitted to the government, who accepted it and announced the 
implementation of pay equity through the collective bargaining process (Curtis, 
Interview, 1992). 
The history of public sector collective bargaining up until that time had not 
been smooth. The Progressive Conservative government had been the 
employer in one of the most dramatic and confrontational strikes in the 
province since the 1950's: the illegal civil service strike in 1986, involving the 
arrests of many strikers and a four month prison sentence for NAPE's 
president. In 1988, a year away from an election, the Premier wanted 
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reconciliation with labour. Joint implementation of pay equity, which also 
enhanced the image of the administration as progressive on women9s issues, 
met this political requirement. 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Ohnate 
Pay equity bargaining in the province was affected by the general labour 
relations climate in the public sector, both leading up to the Pay Equity 
Agreement and afterwards. It is important therefore to briefly examine 
collective bargaining in the provincial public sector before focusing on the pay 
equity negotiations. The public sector represents the largest employer in 
Newfoundland, and the high unionisation rate in the province is partly a 
reflection of this. At a 53% level of unionisation, Newfoundland has the 
highest number of people unionised as a proportion of the non-agricultural 
working population in North America (Payne, 1993). 
The Public Service Collective Bargaining Act, 1973, regulates public sector 
labour relations in the province, covering unfair labour practices, certification 
and decertification (including definition of the appropriate bargaining unit), 
notice to bargain on certification, conciliation, limitations on strikes and lock- 
outs, essential services, adjudication (interest disputes), grievances and 
arbitration (rights disputes). 
Collective bargaining has tended to be conflictual, during both the previous 
Progressive Conservative goverment and the current Liberal administration, 
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elected in 1989 and again in 1993. There are two very strong public sector 
unions, one of them fairly radical by Canadian standards. These two unions 
are the nucleus of a Coalition of Unions representing public sector employees, 
working against the current Liberal government which has determinedly 
pursued free market economic policy, focusing on deficit reduction. Actual 
and threatened lay-offs combined with a wage freeze in the public sector, 
extending to cancellation of previously agreed wage increases, including a 
substantial arbitration award, have led to accusations by the provincial labour 
movement of government suspension of collective bargaining rights, and a 
failure to abide by its own labour legislation. 
The height of union antagonism towards the Liberal government was after the 
wage freeze legislation (Bill 16) was passed in 1991; this Act also contained 
the cancellation of retroactive pay equity adjustments, which fuelled the anger 
of the already outraged public sector unionists. Concerted union action has 
included direct participation in the political arena. During the June 1993 
election all the unions campaigned against the provincial government. The 
then head of NAPE stood as an NDP candidate for the provincial House of 
Assembly. 
As a backcloth to this growing antagonism between public sector unions and 
the government, there has been an ongoing acrimonious dispute over essential 
services legislation which seemed resolved towards the end of the previous 
Progressive Conservative government, but has resurfaced in the current 
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administration. This continuing dispute has soured labour relations in the 
hospitals and nursing homes, whose employees' jobs were evaluated in the first 
phase of pay equity implementation. Parity between the same occupational 
groups in different bargaining units, and sensitivity to the concept of parity in 
general, is another important collective bargaining issue especially relevant to 
NAPE, since it was the main issue in their illegal strike of 1986. High levels 
of commitment to existing parity relationships has already had a negative 
impact on the settlement of pay equity adjustments in health care. 
A strike which occurred in 1990, deemed illegal by the government because of 
the lack of an essential services agreement, was in the hospital support 
component of Newfoundland and Labrador Association of Public Employees 
(NAPE), whose president was the original Co-Chair of the Joint Pay Equity 
Steering Committee and whose representative was a key player in the first Job 
Evaluation Committee. This was a bitter strike, involving court injunctions, 
back to work legislation, picket line arrests and fines of the union, its officers 
and the strikers. The fines against the strikers were eventually quashed by the 
government but the binding arbitration, part of the back to work legislation, 
awarded a 22.9% wage increase. A subsequent court appeal brought by the 
government against this arbitrator's award failed.. This was hailed as a victory 
by NAPE. It was a short-lived victory because the government legislated a 
wage freeze in its 1991 budget and cancelled the arbitrated award in the same 
Act (Bill 16). Legislating away interest arbitration awards was unheard of at 
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that time in labour relations circles and caused great bitterness in public sector 
labour relations, affecting long term labour relations in general and pay equity 
bargaining in particular. 
The Pay Eguity Agj: eement and The Parties 
The jointly negotiated Pay Equity Agreement was settled in June 1988, and 
was incorporated into all the participating unions' collective agreements. After 
nearly three years' pay equity bargaining, one group of health care employees,, 
hospital support workers, began receiving instalments of their pay equity 
adjustments in March 1991. Adjustments ranged from $0.09 to $1.94 an hour, 
and the average hourly adjustment was $1.05. Based on a work week of 37.5 
hours, annual pay equity adjustments ranged from $175.50 to $3783 for health 
care employees, and the average was $2047.50 (The Pay Equity Newsletter, 
1991). The other employees in health care covered by the Agreement, whose 
jobs were evaluated in a second committee, were still waiting for their wage 
adjustments at the time of writing this thesis. 
The Agreement required the gender neutral evaluation of female-dominated 
classes (defined as five or more employees, at least 60% of whom are female) 
in health care, public service and the broader public sector (for example, 
crown corporations, community colleges, public libraries). Recognising that 
traditional job evaluation systems are gender biased, the parties had included 
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the requirement that the system used must be gender neutral and thus able to 
effectively capture women's work. 
Comparison of the identified female-dominated jobs was with selected male- 
dominated classes (defined as five or more employees, at least 60% of whom 
are male). Evaluated male-dominated classes were calculated into a male wage 
line by plotting the value of the male-dominated jobs, as determined by the 
same gender neutral job evaluation system that was used to evaluate the 
female-dominated jobs, against the wages paid for that job class. In most 
workplaces, a female wage line appears below that of the male wage line, 
showing the wage gap between male- and female-dominated jobs of equal 
value, and in turn indicating the pay equity adjustments to be paid to close that 
gap. In the Newfoundland Agreement, women's jobs which were below the 
male wage line were to be brought up to the male wage line over a period of 
five years, with at least 1% of payroll paid out annually in wage adjustments. 
The use of a male wage line as opposed to a combination of male and female 
wage line, or a job to job comparison (as in Ontario), worked to the advantage 
of women, as did the deadline for closure of the wage gap by the fifth year. 
Moreover, the Agreement provided for the identification of male wage line 
jobs outside the preliminary grouping of employees if those inside that 
grouping were not of sufficiently high evaluation level for some female 
classifications. This was the result of hard bargaining by the nurses' and 
professionals' unions, and their jobs were in fact evaluated at a second Job 
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Evaluation Committee. Also included was a retroactivity clause for the major 
membership groups of the unions present at the Agreement negotiations. 
The Agreement set up a joint Pay Equity Steering Committee to monitor the 
implementation of pay equity. The Committee was to be at least 50% female 
with one female Co-Chair. It was to select a gender neutral job evaluation 
system; administer the components of the job evaluation system, including 
employee questionnaires to compile the job descriptions to be used in the 
evaluation stage; identify the female- and male-dominated classes; appoint 
members of the joint Job Evaluation Committees to evaluate both female- and 
male-dominated classes; calculate the male wage line and consequent pay 
equity adjustments; and be responsible for communication and training. All 
decisions in the Steering Committee and the Job Evaluation Committees were 
to be unanimous. 
Parties to the Agreement were the same unions who had submitted the joint 
proposal, the Newfoundland Hospital and Nursing Home Association 
(NHNHA) and Newfoundland Hydro as employers, and the provincial 
government. 
The NHNHA is the hospital employers's association, established in the 1970's 
to negotiate on behalf of the hospital boards. Newfoundland Hydro was the 
other employer in the Agreement negotiations. Their employees' union, the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), had asked to bargain 
for pay equity with the other unions to increase their bargaining power. 
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Government representatives were from the Personnel Policy and Classification 
and Pay divisions of the Treasury Board. Originally, only the Classification 
and Pay officials had been negotiating for the government, but after a 
relatively short period of bargaining, the unions' requested that the government 
negotiating team include the technical experts in pay equity. Their request was 
acceded to and from then on the female experts (and advocates) from 
Personnel Policy were at the bargaining table. 
Of the unions, NAPE and CUPE are the most powerful, and their alliance had 
been critical in obtaining government commitment to pay equity. NAPE is the 
largest union in the province, with a membership of 17,500. It is part of a 
federalist structure, made up of unions representing provincial government 
employees. While there are institutional links regarding policies and 
negotiating strategies, each provincial union is independent financially and in 
policy making. It is clear from speeches made in the 1991 Annual Convention 
that information and advice on pay equity was gained through this national 
structure because the sister unions in Manitoba and Ontario helped NAPE 
develop their negotiating positions on pay equity. 
The union membership is 54% female. In health care, it represents hospital 
support and laboratory and X Ray staff. Of the component members relevant 
to this research, Hospital Support is 74% female, Laboratory and X Ray is 
69 % female, and Waterford (a separate hospital bargaining unit) is 51 % 
female. Representation of women in leadership positions has improved 
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dramatically since an affirmative action resolution was passed at the 1991 
biennial convention. Although the executive is 17% female, the percentage of 
women on the board overall is 42% because of the six affirmative action seats. 
This is double the representation of women before the governance reform. 
Of the Employee Relations Officers on staff, 20% are women. However, 
female representation on the negotiating teams (1990 figures) was at least half: 
Hospital Support - 74% female membership and 50% female in negotiating 
team; Lab and X Ray - 69% female membership and 60% female in 
negotiating team; Waterford Hospital - 52% female membership and 60% 
female in negotiating team; and General Service - 54% membership and 57% 
female in negotiating team. At the local level (figures for June 1992) 35 % of 
Presidents and Acting Presidents were women; 32% of Vice Presidents; 75% 
of secretaries; 66% of Treasurers; 46% of Secretary\Treasurers; and 38% shop 
stewards. 
The union's affirmative action policy is considered progressive in the parent 
union. The successful governance resolution in the 1991 biennial convention 
was largely the result of effective educational and political work by NAPE's 
Women's Committee, helped by the active support of an ex Women's 
Committee Chair, now the Executive Vice-President of the Canadian Labour 
Congress (CLC). The union has sound policies on universal daycare, job- 
sharing and sexual harassment. 
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Converting equality policies to collective agreement clauses is aided by a 
Women's Committee member sitting on the national level negotiators' 
committee, which all NAPE's negotiators are members of. This national 
committee meets every few months to discuss new issues in the various 
provinces. The Chair of the NAPE Women's Committee is on the national 
women's committee, so issues overlap many times, ensuring dissemination 
through one route or another. 
That there is an effective conduit to negotiators is largely demonstrated by the 
hospital component chief negotiator's championship of pay equity. We can 
reasonably presume that his commitment to the issue was reinforced by the 
Chair of the first Women's Committee (now a Vice President at the CLQ. 
She is a contemporary of his and has been described as a critical force in 
spreading the word on women's issues in the union during the late seventies 
and early eighties. 
Feminist influence over the pay equity bargaining progress was also enhanced 
by the selection of the NAPE representative on the first job evaluation 
committee. This active socialist feminist had been the President of her local 
for about ten years and a provincial executive board member, the Chair of 
NFL's Women's Committee, and President of the St. John's and District 
Labour Council. Although her strong personality caused some tensions with 
some of the conservative members of the committee, her determination ensured 
that women's work was in fact valued, in the face of bitter opposition at times. 
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CUPE, formed in 1963, is the largest union in Canada, with a national 
membership of 377,000 in 1990 (Craig and Solomon, 1993), ranging from 
those working in municipalities, school boards, health care, public utilities, 
public transit services, together with the airline industry. In health care, 
CUPE represents hospital support staff. 
The provincial and national levels are coordinating bodies only; the locals are 
the certified bargaining agents and have complete autonomy. This loose 
structure means that different locals have different bylaws and central and 
provincial policies are recommendations only, leading to some variation in the 
uptake of progressive policies recommended by CUPE central. 
The Newfoundland region has a membership of 6,500, with a female 
membership of 52%. 22% of the Executive Board are women. At national 
level, the board is more representative at 50% women members of the 
Executive Board. More importantly, both top elected positions - the President 
and the Vice President - are women. As the National Director of Equal 
Opportunities commented (Wishart, Interview, 1992): "No other union can 
match that in Canada. 
There are no figures available for the Newfoundland locals. However, the 
Chair of CUPE Women's Committee estimated that the majority of the 
executives at local level were men. In 1992, most of the women were 
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secretaries, and most of the men were treasurers, although there were two 
women presidents, both of large, urban locals. 
Negotiating teams, at a provincial level, are made up of 20% women. 
Although the chief negotiator was male in 1993, for a number of years a 
woman was the chairperson of the team. This woman is now at the provincial 
office on staff and she was the CUPE delegate on the first health care job 
evaluation committee. This women's negotiating experience was 
complemented by the expertise of the then Chair of the Women's Committee, 
another member of the rating committee, and who was also a divisional 
representative on CUPE's National Women's Task Force, CUPE representative 
on the NFL Women's Committee, and CUPE representative on the provincial 
government joint Employment Equity Committee. 
No locals have staff representatives. At the provincial level there is one staff 
representative who is a woman (20%), and she is also First Vice President of 
the NFL, an affirmative action position. This woman is now on the new 
Steering Committee eventually established after a long impasse to monitor pay 
equity implementation in the civil service. 
CUPE is considered to be one of the most progressive unions in Canada on 
equality issues in general, and women's equality in particular (Briskin, 
Interview, 1991; Kumar, 1993). An indicator of CUPE's commitment to 
equality policies is the institutional structure established throughout Canada and 
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the relatively high level of resources provided to implement these policies 
through the work of the Department of Equal Opportunities together with the 
National Women's Task Force. 
Indication of the work of the Department is the impressive array of CUPE 
central policies, many buttressed by effective educational and practical 
materials. The union pioneered sexual harassment policy, introduced in 1987, 
and published excellent resource materials which were commended in the 
provincial media and by the Chair of the Employment Equity Council. 
Although there is some evidence that the progressive central policies do not 
always trickle down to the local level, this did not hinder CUPE's ability to 
negotiate a good Pay Equity Agreement in Newfoundland. This was because 
the pay equity negotiations were centralised within the province and the 
National Director of the Equal Opportunities Department sat on the Steering 
Committee as the CUPE representative and as a national advisor to the 
committee. She was therefore able to use her knowledge and expertise of pay 
equity, based on the union's experience throughout the country, and CUPE's 
long-standing expertise in job evaluation. Moreover, she was familiar with 
labour relations in the province, having been a CUPE health care coordinator 
for Newfoundland for a number of years previously, and as a further advantage 
was able to use the provincial feminist network which crossed union- 
management lines. 
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CUPE's policy on pay equity dates from 1985, before pay equity legislation in 
most provinces and when Manitoba legislation was at the proposal stage. 
CUPE had been involved in lengthy strikes in BC in 1981 to gain the 
equalisation of male and female rates in particular bargaining units. Their 
policy was two pronged: lobbying government and mobilising public opinion, 
as they had successfully done in Manitoba; and negotiating equal pay for work 
of equal value. 
Throughout Canada, CUPE locals were encouraged and assisted in their 
collective bargaining efforts for equal pay. Regional and local Women's Task 
Forces utilised a combination of education and mobilisation both within the 
union and outside, the latter in alliance with other groups in coalition politics 
to pressure government for effective equal value legislation where appropriate. 
The educational material on pay equity produced by CUPE is impressive, both 
in range and quality. 
The Equal Opportunities Department coordinated a country-wide pay equity 
strategy, assessing the best possible route to achieve it in each province. In 
Newfoundland, it was decided that they could get a better deal for women if 
they bargained for pay equity rather than lobbied for legislation. Their 
reasoning was that if they lobbied, then first, they would create a hierarchy of 
jobs to do it, like the Pay Equity Commission in Ontario and in other 
provinces; second, the legislation would be weakened by the concerted 
lobbying efforts of business interests, together with a government who was not 
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"... the government traditionally of labour's choice... " (Wishart, Interview, 
1992, p. 9); and third, it would take a long time to get pay equity (in Ontario 
it took 10-12 years of lobbying to get the legislation) whereas with bargaining 
it would take a few months to get a pay equity agreement. 
Moreover, with a bargained pay equity process, 'first, they knew the 
government had committed to staffing the process, rather than set up a Pay 
Equity Commission equivalent; second, they knew that there was political 
support (the Premier and Minister of Labour) and management support in the 
form of the two feminist bureaucrats (from the Personnel Policy Division) who 
eventually negotiated pay equity; third, they knew that the Newfoundland 
Hospital and Nursing Home Association (NHNHA) would not obstruct pay 
equity implementation; fourth, they knew that the CUPE\NAPE alliance was 
strong enough in a bargaining situation to get a good settlement; and fifth, if a 
union (or union coalition) is strong then they can bargain above and beyond the 
minimum. To cite CUPE's National Director: "We went the bargaining route 
because we knew the players on the other side of the table, we knew what we 
needed in a small province like NF ... we had a bargaining history and [would 
be] bargaining from a position of strength" (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 9). 
The third union involved in the Pay Equity Agreement negotiations was the 
NLNU, formed in 1974 from the collective bargaining wing of the Association 
of Registered Nurses of Newfoundland. In health care, all registered nurses 
are represented by the NLNU. Women form 98% of the membership and the 
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executive board is 93 % female; there is one male ex officio member, who is 
the Business Agent/Solicitor. In all locals, all the elected officials are women. 
The provincial negotiating team in 1990-1991 was 60% women. 
They have been out on strike twice in the 1970's. For a decade the nurses 
have been focusing on promoting a more professional image, in order to give 
more weight to their claim of being acutely underpaid. In 1990 they demanded 
a 32% salary increase, pleading 'a special case' to the government, and using 
arguments that stressed the value of nurses' work and the problem of many 
nurses leaving the province because the salaries were so low. The government 
listened. They were awarded a 25% increase over two years. 
The nurses' dramatic increase gained in 1990 triggered off a series of similar 
claims from other health care unions who said that they were 'a special case' 
too. NAPE went out on illegal strike that year to gain an equivalent increase,, 
and eventually won a substantial arbitration award of 22.9% for its hospital 
support workers. As mentioned elsewhere, this arbitration award was wiped 
out by Bill 16. This, combined with the building of a new image for nurses by 
the NLNU as dramatically undervalued, a special case, increased interunion 
tensions in the health care sector, particularly between NAPE and NLNU. 
The nurses' union is not affiliated to the NFL or CLC. It would not be 
described as a social or political union, its objectives focusing on the 
advancement of the "social, economic and general welfare of its members" 
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(NLNU pamphlet, Undated), together with an emphasis upon professional 
standards. 
Given their commitment to enhancing the value of nurses' work, pay equity 
has become an important policy for the union. From the information available, 
the union has no specific equality policies, and no women's committee. 
The fourth union is the AAHP, a small union of 385 health care professionals. 
It was founded in 1975 when some physiotherapists and social workers in 
NAPE broke away to form an independent bargaining unit for represen tation 
and political reasons. The union now includes EEG technologists, 
pharmacists, occupational therapists, psychologists, and dieticians. With an 
emphasis on professional standards and ethics, and an aversion to strikes, the 
union is conservative. It is female dominated with 75% women members, 
reflected in a 75% representation at executive board level, with 80% of the 
executive officers being women. There are no locals. There are no equality 
policies for women, and no women's committee. 
The fifth union is the IBEW, but as this union and the employer, 
Newfoundland Hydro, are not a direct part of this study, they will be 
mentioned as considered relevant but not discussed any further. 
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Pay Equity Bargaining 
The following analysis is divided into three stages of implementation: 
negotiating the Pay Equity Agreement, the work of the Steering Committee, 
and the work of the Job Evaluation Committees. The collective bargaining 
issues of structure, style and power will be discussed for each of the three 
stages. Finally, the gender and class dimensions will be considered for the 
different stages. It is important to point out that the separation of collective 
bargaining and gender and class issues is used merely as a tool of analysis. In 
reality, the interrelationship between collective bargaining and pay equity can 
only be understood if we conceptualise the structural properties of gender and 
class as saturating every interaction in our society, including labour relations. 
The manifestations of these structural properties can be identified in all three 
stages of pay equity implementation. 
Negotiating the pay eguity agreement 
The pay equity bargaining in Newfoundland was a clear departure in terms of 
bargaining structure. Although each of the health care unions had negotiated 
province wide with the NHNHA for over fifteen years, this was the first time 
all these public sector unions had sat at the same table. It is difficult to say 
whether the joint pay equity bargaining experience stimulated other joint 
initiatives, but one Steering Committee member noted that there had since been 
another successful multi union, multi employer set of negotiations in the public 
sector, and that was for the 1991 Labrador Benefits Agreement. A number of 
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the pay equity negotiators, employer\government and union, perceived the 
negotiations as different from anything that had gone on before, because it was 
single issue, multi-union and single table. Intraorganisational bargaining was 
more complicated than before, and developing a common union position was 
even more challenging, particularly when early on each union had its own 
proposal. They finally got to the point where a joint position was going across 
the table to the employer - "... that was new ... that was the 
first time that had 
ever happened" (Andrews, Interview, 1992, p. 5). 
An employer representative on the Steering Committee approved the all party 
approach because that way every party who contributed to the problem 
participated in its solution. For her this was much more preferable than 
legislated pay equity, which would be imposing a solution from above. 
Although not dramatically different from contract bargaining, the fact that 
negotiations were joint gave the style of bargaining a kind of problem solving 
flavour from the beginning. Moreover, this was a single issue and there was, 
on the whole, commitment on all sides. From a reading of all the transcripts, 
it seemed that the Classification and Pay representative did not share this level 
of commitment, but the political mandate was so strong at that time that their 
objections were lost in the general impetus towards obtaining a good 
Agreement. This momentum was largely created by the large number of 
committed women in the group negotiating it. 
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CUPE's negotiator (and their National Director of Equal Opportunities) saw as 
a vital part of her union's national strategy a recognition that pay equity should 
be less adversarial, based on a mutual union-management goal: 
CUPE took the position that when we came to dealing with the 
issue of pay equity whether it be under legislation or whether it 
be bargained at any particular bargaining table that there was a 
difference. That in traditional bargaining it tends to be at times 
adversarial, whereas with the issue of pay equity ... there was a 
sense that we were on the same side. We had the same goals 
and objectives which were to close the gap between men's and 
women's wages. (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 3) 
This view came across on the employer side, too. A negotiator for the 
Treasury Board thought the process was more cooperative "... because 
everyone was in agreement that the female dominated classes had been 
traditionally underpaid ... in relation to some male classes. So everyone was of 
the same mind in wanting to address the problem" (Horlick, Interview, 1992, 
p. 2). He acknowledged that everyone had their own constituencies, and 
even at this stage both the unions and the employer had concerns over the 
money involved. Even so, he gave a very interesting description of how they 
(the employers\government) kept drafting proposals only to find that the 
unions' proposals would be the same, or very similar. And in the end " ... we 
realised ... this 
is not classical negotiations or difficult adversarial negotiations, 
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we're trying to achieve the same thing" (1992, p. 2). Clearly, the goals of the 
three parties were much closer together than in conventional contract 
bargaining. 
It was apparent that the inclusion of known pay equity advocates on the 
government and employer side gave a loud signal to the unions that the 
government was serious about pay equity. This engendered a level of trust not 
normally present in other collective bargaining. The government's agreement 
to the unions' request that they be able to bargain with those behind the scenes 
instead of the conventional negotiators, who the unions thought were out of 
their depth, was also seen as symbolic of the government's commitment. 
The unions' bargaining power increased during the Pay Equity Agreement 
negotiations because of the joint bargaining structure; both the NAPE and 
CUPE negotiators argued that this helped them obtain a good Agreement. 
According to the Classification and Pay negotiator, the Treasury Board had 
wanted the wage line to be calculated on the basis of the male and female 
wages. That the Agreement requires only the use of the male wages to draw 
the line represents a very significant concession by the government. 
The political processes worked in the unions' favour too so that the 
government was taking a conciliatory approach. A union negotiator remarked 
twice in his interview that the government was "... desperate for an agreement" 
(Vivian, Interview, 1992, p. 5). 
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The Pay Eguity Steering Committee 
The bargaining structure was as defined in the Agreement, with one delegate 
and one alternate for each of the parties: the five public sector unions, the 
employers (Hydro and the NHNHA), and the government. As with the Pay 
Equity Agreement negotiations, the implementation was to be at a provincial 
level. The personnel, apart from one or two changes, were the same; certainly 
the key negotiators from the unions and the Treasury Board were now on the 
Steering Committee. 
According to general accounts, obtained from both union and management 
members, the bargaining style of the early work of the Committee stood out as 
being clearly cooperative. The Agreement required that all decisions were to 
be unanimous. This method ensured that all unions, no matter what their size, 
had an input into the decision making. It also reflected the consensual decision 
making model in the feminist process which was important to a significant 
number of the women on the negotiating team and now on the Steering 
Committee. 
Descriptions of the Steering Committee's work focused upon the lack of 
caucusing and the win\win atmosphere carried over from the Pay Equity 
Agreement negotiations. A union negotiator commented, "Any dysfunctional 
forces had been weeded out through the negotiated process" (Vivian, 
Interview, 1992, p. 14). And the President of the same union corroborated 
this view: "... we would sit around the table ... we never 
broke out into union 
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and management. Everybody just stayed at the table and hammered it out" 
(Andrews, Interview, 1992, p. 14). 
An employer representative saw the operations of the Committee as a new 
approach: 
What happened with this committee ... in about ninety percent of 
its work you couldn't tell who was management and who was 
union if you walked into the room. You really won't know 
because they worked towards a common end .... Every had 
valuable input to it and everybody was listened to and it was a 
cooperative group of up to twenty people working on this. 
(Janes, Interview, 1992, p. 2) 
Another employer member of the Committee identified the consensual mode of 
decision making as a key factor in the cooperative relations in the Steering 
Committee as it encouraged people to step outside their union-management 
roles. He remarked: 
It [consensus decision making] fostered a spirit of cooperation 
more so than you would have when you are regular 
bargaining .... 
To me the spirit and intent of that Steering 
Committee and the way it has worked has been a good example 
as far as I'm concerned .... 
I think the experience that has been 
gained from both sides has been beneficial to the process. 
(Peddle, Interview, 1992, p. 10) 
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Assessing the indicators used in this research, the most important factor in 
explaining the cooperative bargaining, especially evident before political 
constraints constrained, it was the convergence of goals. The government Co- 
Chair explained: "Everybody understood very clearly that they had to work 
towards a common understanding and a common resolution" (Roome, 
Interview, 1992, p. 8). 
A key union representative confirmed her belief in the possibility of the 
cooperative process of bargaining. She assessed that the Newfoundland 
experience would have been completely successful in this regard had it not 
been for the classification and pay specialist on the Steering Committee who 
she described as "... dragged kicking and screaming and who wanted to 
maintain the status quo... " (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 4). 
More importantly, she also identified the Head of the Treasury Board as being 
unsympathetic to the concept of pay equity. This man was not directly 
involved in negotiating but it is reasonable to assume that he played a part in 
the withdrawing of political and bureaucratic support from the project since he 
was described by an ex Treasury Board negotiator as an extremely powerful 
man, in constant communication with Cabinet. Another ex Treasury Board 
official, who had negotiated the Agreement at a very early stage, commented 
that the government negotiators (i. e.; Personnel Policy) were more committed 
than their principals. 
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The CUPE national advisor believed that the goals of the two male Treasury 
Board representatives were to maintain the existing male dominated hierarchy 
in the face of the pay equity challenge. This role of the Newfoundland 
Treasury Board is similar to that described by Warskett (1991) in her study of 
pay equity implementation in the federal civil service. Federal Treasury Board 
officials strived to retain control throughout the process, reasserting ownership 
and subverting the process. 
Moving on to another indicator of cooperation, information exchange was 
generally seen as no problem by Steering Committee members. From one 
union representative's perspective, any queries from the unions were dealt with 
and resolved satisfactorily. The management Co-Chair held a similar view, 
pointing out the requirement in the Pay Equity Agreement for necessary 
information to be given to the Steering Committee. 
Interestingly enough, another union delegate reported two incidents where it 
had been difficult to obtain information requested by the unions. One case was 
where her union wanted to look at the questionnaires so that evaluation of their 
jobs would be more effective; this request was denied. The other incident 
concerned a union who had requested some documentation to verify exactly 
what I% of payroll was. Apparently there was a lot of difficulty getting this 
and when it was eventually given to the Committee the information was 
presented in so complicated a way as to be virtually indecipherable. 
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The general view on all sides was that there was probably more trust than in 
conventional contract bargaining but that it would be naive to expect complete 
trust in a joint initiative. The management Co-Chair, however, felt that " ... In 
many of the other meetings [apart from those just after Bill 16] 1 think there 
was a very high level of trust... " (Roome, Interview, 1992, p- 8). And it is 
noteworthy that all union representatives clearly respected the Co-Chair's 
strong commitment to pay equity. As the male CUPE representative 
(alternate) on the Committee remarked, the unions could always depend on the 
government Co-Chair and the female employer delegate, even when things got 
difficult. 
There was a broad agreement on all sides that the Steering Committee, even 
after the height of cooperation had been adversely affected by the new 
government, was a good example of joint problem solving. An employer 
representative credited consensus decision making as enhancing the problem 
solving mode of this committee: 
What it did basically was force everybody involved in the 
process to ... be more cooperative or more 
inventive as to how to 
resolve problems .... 
It sort of forced everybody to ... rethink their 
traditional roles and say, well, this is the problem, how do we 
solve it? In many cases that is the sort of thinking and 
philosophy that existed on the Steering Committee, or exists 
203 
even still on the Steering Committee. (Peddle, Interview, 1992, 
12) 
However, he did not see this cooperation as just the result of pay equity as an 
issue but as part of a general trend in health care towards more cooperative 
bargaining. He referred specifically to some transition agreements he had been 
negotiating with some hospital unions recently that had moved a long way 
towards the problem solving approach. 
On the union side, the national advisor on the Steering Committee identified 
problem solving in the Committee's process: 
... we met a lot the first year ... there were constant reminders 
from people on all sides of the table that we were there to work 
in a collective fashion. So, we saw that grow and actually just 
prior to Bill 16 we worked very well together, we made all of 
the decisions jointly. If there were problems we worked them 
out together. (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 5) 
Overall, there was a measure of agreement on all sides that the Steering 
Committee had been an illustration of a new, cooperative, kind of bargaining. 
However, the positive effect of this new style of bargaining was outweighed by 
far in two of the unions' recall of what had happened in March 1991: NAPE 
and NLNU identified the legislation (Bill 16) cancelling retroactivity of pay 
equity adjustments as signifying the end of any cooperation occurring until 
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then, and indeed the end of any govermnent commitment to the issue at all. If 
the CUPE interview revealed a greater interest and appreciation of the new 
style of bargaining, this was because consensual decision making model was a 
particular interest of the National Director of Equal Opportunities, but even her 
transcript shows a bitter disappointment at the retroactivity legislation brought 
in by the then new government. 
It is apparent that the atmosphere leading up to the legislation was already 
showing signs of strain due to rumours of the budget to come and Bill 16. As 
one union member commented: "... when we started to get hints that this was 
going to be done, everything went to hell in a basket... " (Vivian, Interview, 
1992, p. 15). If this remark makes him sound overly flippant, he was not; a 
significant part of the joint interview with him and the union president was 
about how pay equity started out with such promise but ended so bitterly. 
Moreover, as soon as the new government had been elected, there had been a 
noticeable deterioration in general bureaucratic attitudes towards pay equity, 
and an accompanying reduction in available resources. Employer 
representatives on the Committee were understandably nervous about what 
might happen. When the legislation was passed, the CUPE national adviSOF 
explained: 
Everybody felt cheated. But what happened was the people who 
were representing government on that steering committee 
basically had to put forward the government line even though 
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they did not agree with it because they were employees of the 
government .... There 
had been a commitment from the previous 
government and it seemed like the Well's government was doing 
a complete turnaround. (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 5) 
All parties (except for the Classification and Pay- representative, who did not 
mention this at all) saw this legislation as causing a deterioration in the 
relationships developed in the Steering Committee. As described earlier, this 
legislation was part of a package which caused general bitterness and hostility 
in public sector labour relations in the province. According to the union Co- 
Chair, the average money lost per women in cancelled retroactive payments 
was $7,000; this translates into the total loss of $29 million dollars to women 
whose wage discrimination had already been identified (Vivian, Interview, 
1992, p. 16). 
As the union Co-Chair was at the time President of the Federation of Labour 
his political position was such that he could not afford to be seen cooperating 
with the government, especially over pay equity. Hence what the management 
Co-Chair described as "grandstanding" at the first sessions of the Committee 
after the legislation had passed; behaviour which she completely understood, 
she commented. She felt the legislation had come at the worst possible time, 
just when the results from the first health care job evaluation committee had 
reached the Steering Committee. However, she believed that the consensus 
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model had forced people to continue working for a solution at that difficult 
time. 
This view was echoed by the NHNHA representative, who thought that Bill 16 
undermined the group but did not split it. The other NHNHA representative 
observed a deterioration in the cooperative dynamic but that the unions were 
able to differentiate between the employers and the government, so not 
blaming the employers as a group. This perception was perhaps a 
rationalisation. In his interview the union Co-Chair accused the NHNHA of 
complaining to the Treasury Board that pay equity was going to cost them too 
much money and he therefore laid part of the blame at the hospital employers' 
door. 
It is significant that the management Co-Chair underplayed the effect of the 
legislation cancelling retroactivity, pointing out that nowhere else in Canada 
was retroactivity built into pay equity implementation. However, knowing that 
the model of bargaining incorporated into the Agreement largely relied upon 
having the time to implement a consensual process without the pressure of a 
deadline, my interpretation is that she was glossing over what to her must have 
been a very sensitive issue, particularly in view of the intraorganisational 
tensions present in the Treasury Board. 
In terms of bargaining power, the events in the case study so far point to the 
essence of public sector bargaining. Government as employer has legislative 
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power which tips the balance in its favour as soon as it chooses to wield this 
weapon. The bargaining power achieved by the CUPE and NAPE alliance 
worked initially with a government whose political agenda included pay equity. 
When the government changed to one which did not want pay equity, this joint 
strength evaporated in the face of legislative power to cancel out previously 
agreed upon retroactive adjustments, and a government reluctant to implement 
pay equity at all. 
Fortunately, hospital support workers' adjustments were settled in the Steering 
Committee not long after the legislation, and are now being paid out. Several 
unionists feared that the last adjustment, the lump sum closing whatever was 
left of the gap after the annual 1% payments, would not be paid out in year 
five (1995). Predictions are that the government will either legislate it away or 
spread out the payments for an indefinite period so that no-one will even 
realise that they had a pay equity adjustment. 
Employees whose jobs were evaluated in the second committee have not 
received any adjustments yet because the Steering Cornmittee have not been 
able to resolve the many disputed ratings referred to it by the job evaluation 
committee. Although everyone is reticent about this impasse because an 
arbitration is pending, the government appear to have succeeded in a divide 
and rule strategy, given the historical collective bargaining relationships of the 
unions concerned. 
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At the time of the main interviews (1992), the Steering Committee was in 
dispute over first, the second job evaluation committee's results (out in May 
1992), which circled as unresolved many nursing and lab x ray jobs; second, 
maintenance of pay equity; and third, the status and composition of the 
Steering Committee (this dispute was linked with maintenance and the 
Committee's monitoring role). Apart from the first subject of dispute, which 
was still ongoing in at the time of writing and conjures up a vision of the 
government sitting back waiting for the unions to sort out a very difficult 
situation (and in the meantime delighted to be saving their money), the second 
and third reveal a government dragging its feet over pay equity. 
With regard to the second dispute listed above, the government appeared 
uninterested in the maintenance of pay equity. The Agreement is somewhat 
ambiguous on this point, and the parties differ in their interpretation, the 
government apparently arguing that pay equity was just a one shot deal. The 
third dispute was largely the result of the government refusing to continue the 
existing Steering Committee to carry out the monitoring role as described by 
the Agreement. Maintenance was seen by the unions as a crucial part of this 
role, given that any closing of the gap had already been rewidened because of 
percentage wage increases before the wage freeze. Future widening of the gap 
is inevitable, too, given the trades Atlantic wage adjustment to come as soon as 
the freeze is over (Curtis, Interview, 1992). 
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Because of the dispute over status and composition, pay equity implementation 
which should have started in May 1992 in the civil service was considerably 
delayed. Only in November 1993 did the government advertise for a gender 
neutral job evaluation system. 
According to a union staff representative, in December 1993 the second phase 
of pay equity had slowly moved ahead, and this was because CUPE had made 
it a condition of their concessions on pension contributions during the 
government's cutbacks earlier that year (Budgell, Interview, 1994). 
Job Evaluation Committees 
The Job Evaluation Committees were required to evaluate the male-dominated 
and female-dominated classes identified by the Steering Committee, applying 
the job evaluation system selected by the Steering Committee. Committee 
members received a short period of training in the use of this evaluation 
system before starting to evaluate the jobs. Their role was to agree on a score 
for each job evaluated, made up of the skill, effort, responsibility and working 
conditions factors, as indicated in the selected job evaluation scheme. 
Officially, committee members did not know the weighting of these four 
factors. The final calculation of values incorporating weightings of the four 
factors was to be the task of the Steering Committee, who would then continue 
the process by calculating a male wage line and agree on the level and 
schedule of pay equity adjustments. 
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The two health care Job Evaluation Committees were referred to as health care 
1 (HC1) and health care 2 (HC2). The first committee (HC1) evaluated all the 
health care jobs represented by NAPE, CUPE, NLNU and AAHP. The 
parties represented were the health care unions (NAPE, CUPE, NLNU, and 
AAHP), the government (Treasury Board), and the employers (NHNHA). 
At the conclusion of HC1, with retroactivity still in place, NLNU, AAHP and 
NAPE (in their role as representative of laboratory and x ray employees) 
argued that their members' jobs had not been fairly evaluated because of the 
lack of highly paid comparable positions in health care, and because of 
difficulties experienced in the first evaluation committee, so they wanted a 
second evaluation committee struck. This option was in the Agreement and it 
was agreed in the Steering Committee that a new evaluation committee be 
made up (HC2) of representatives of these three unions, the government and 
employers. Comparable male jobs were to be from the provincial civil 
service. 
The structure of the committees reflected the jobs to be evaluated, and broadly 
followed the province-wide multi-union and multi-employer pattern of the 
Steering Committee. As required by the Agreement, the composition of the 
evaluation committees was one delegate and alternate from each of the parties 
represented, with at least 50% women. Of the ten delegates selected for HC1, 
90% were women, and the majority of alternates were women. HC2 was a 
smaller committee, with fewer unions represented and fewer jobs to evaluate. 
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Of the six delegates, 50% were women; and 66% of the six alternates were 
women. 
After interviewing the Steering Committee members, both delegates and 
alternates, it was clear that the hostility in the job evaluation committees 
(especially HC1) was such that the examination of indicators of cooperation 
became almost irrelevant. 
The important issue concerning bargaining style now was an examination of 
the extent, nature and causes of the conflict. People's experiences in the first 
committee (HC1) were very negative. The emotional responses that came over 
to me during the interviews revealed a hurtful experience for most of the 
participants. The NAPE delegate was evidently still very angry and resentful 
about what went on in the committee, over a year later: "I wouldn't want to go 
through it again for anything ... the process, it was just so horrific" (Vanta, 
Interview, 1992, p. 10). Her alternate had difficulty even speaking about it 
because she said she had blocked it out of her mind; she had apparently started 
smoking again after fifteen years during her membership on the job evaluation 
committee. 
An employer representative perceived very high levels of conflict; she even 
referred to being hit hard under the table at one point because of a comment 
she made in support of a nursing job (Interview, 1992, p. 7). A government 
representative also described a high level of conflict, so adversarial that she 
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perceived no difference in style from contract negotiations. She felt the job 
evaluation experience to be worse because at least in conventional bargaining 
everyone's agenda was upfront. Another employer representative of the 
committee commented: "There were times when we knew that there were 
outright lies being told about a particular job ... you don't know where it 
happens again" (Interview, 1992, p. 10). 
Conflict was both union-management and interunion. There was hostility 
between the hospital support unions bargaining together -NAPE and CUPE - 
and the government representative from Classification and Pay. There was 
also considerable acrimony between the NAPE and AAHP representatives. 
The committee soon divided into two camps: the government, employers and 
AAHP on one side; NAPE and CUPE on the other side, with the NLNU as 
more or less neutral. Each camp perceived the other as using negotiating 
tactics, which were not seen as consistent with pay equity; not understanding 
pay equity; stubborn and uncompromising; biased (and not open-minded); and 
as trying to use information in an unfair way. 
One government representative felt that the system was too broad in many 
respects and that the questionnaires were not good enough. She and others, on 
the employer side, thought that the training was completely inadequate for the 
job they had to do. The employer representatives' complaint was linked to a 
feeling of disadvantage compared to the hospital support unions, who, it was 
felt, were better prepared for pay equity and had more information than they 
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did on the jobs. According to the employer members, the unions continued to 
use this extra information in spite of the consultants instructing the committee 
to only evaluate on the strength of the job descriptions in front of them. 
A major source of conflict was the perception that the other faction were 
negotiating, rather than evaluating the jobs in an objective, rational way, as the 
committee had been instructed to do. Clearly, this use of negotiating strategy 
and tactics departed from the more problem solving style of bargaining 
expected by the consultants and most HRM participants in the evaluation 
process. For example an HCl government representative described the 
process: 
Let's say I spoke first and ... my position was a five and this was 
a position that they wanted up. Then they would immediately 
move to ... a seven ... rather than going where the job should be. 
You could see them putting numbers there to create what I 
considered to be a negotiating position.... (Interview, 1992, p. 
2) 
The representatives in the one camp accused NAPE and CUPE in the other 
camp of negotiating in alliance, and they blamed this behaviour of the hospital 
unions for the conflict. The employer and government representatives in 
particular saw this negotiating of the hospital unions to be a ftindamental flaw 
in the process. However, the NAPE representative accused the male 
government representative of negotiating so that the value of the male 
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dominated jobs was inflated and the female dominated jobs were downgraded; 
he in turn accused her of hard negotiating to downgrade the male dominated 
jobs, while pushing up the female-dominated jobs. 
The other government representative on HC1 commented: 
I just don't think it can be negotiated. These people are pushing 
to get the money; they are not looking at what the job is. It is 
difficult for any group, if you are in the position where there is 
potential money on the table for your members ... to sit back and 
to look at this in a totally objective rational manner without 
seeing the dollar signs. And it is very difficult. from a 
management perspective to sit there knowing what potential 
payouts could be. (Interview, 1992, p. 9) 
Even if negotiating between various parties both along traditional union- 
management lines and between unions in HC1 did occur, it nevertheless did 
not prevent the eventual resolution of the outstanding ratings. 
The second committee (HC2) had received some group dynamics training and 
members were, in some cases, chosen more carefully. NAPE, however, stuck 
to the same strategy and put in a seasoned negotiator with a strong personality. 
The AAHP representative was more experienced in union matters, having 
pursued her own grievance, and she did not identify with management as the 
other representative did in HCL She was also a social worker and, she said, 
215 
could handle the conflict without becoming personally or emotionally involved. 
This time, there was nobody from Treasury Board, and of the two government 
representatives one was in the Adult Probation Division, a woman active in 
feminist organisations, and familiar with the consensual decision making mode. 
The other government representative was an Employee Relations Officer in the 
Department of Works and Services. The employer's representative was much 
less conservative in terms of class and gender, and was sympathetic towards 
the political situation of the union representatives who were involved in the 
conflict. 
Despite their extra training and better suited backgrounds and personalities, the 
level of conflict in HC2 was such that most committee members started talking 
about the divisions virtually as soon as the interviews began. However, 
relationships were not so acrimonious at such a personal and emotional level. 
People who had clashed in the morning went out to lunch together; this event 
cut across union-management lines. Both government representatives saw this 
as an indicator that conflict levels were not so high. 
The main conflict was between NAPE and NLNU, with AAHP on the 
sidelines, forming shifting alliances. In the end, they were unable to resolve 
the impasse in the ratings of about half of the jobs they were evaluating. 
Moreover, the Steering Committee also found it impossible to resolve the 
disputed rankings, and pay equity for this phase has stalled. 
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As the then Vice President of NAPE (also union Co-Chair of the Steering 
Committee) remarked, the conflict over parity between the nurses (NLNU) and 
lab x ray workers (NAPE) caused ". .. nightmares... " (Curtis, Interview, 1992, 
p. 26). He pointed out that parity between the two groups has been long 
established through strikes, three different arbitration boards, and two 
conciliation boards, and is a very important issue for the membership. His 
prediction was that parity would be a major stumbling block for the next phase 
of pay equity, probably precipitating a strike if existing relationships were 
changed. 
The hospital support unions in alliance enjoyed a degree of bargaining power 
sufficient to countervail the resistance of the other faction on the first 
committee. Supported by strong, well-informed unions, their representatives 
were able to use resources available to them which other unions did not have 
access to, and the employer evaluators did not look for. This effective use of 
information to control the direction of the committee was complemented by the 
negotiating skills of the hospital support evaluators, combined with an 
understanding of the pay equity concept and the importance of making visible 
previously undervalued or unvalued women's work. 
The HC2 committee revealed a different power dynamic. NAPE was on its 
own, and became embroiled in a bitter interunion hostility that played into the 
hands of the government representatives, who may not have deliberately used a 
217 
divide and rule strategy at the committee level, but found themselves 
nevertheless able to take advantage of this erosion of union solidarity. 
Bill 16 was passed just as this second committee was forming. The wage 
freeze meant that the stakes were higher, and the unions were under increased 
pressure from their membership to maintain or increase differentials, making 
any lasting interunion alliance difficult. 
The expectation that the committee members would work together in a 
cooperative and objective way is to ignore the political nature of decisions 
which on the face of it are merely technical (Acker, 1989; Blum, 1991; Lewis, 
1991; Warskett, 1991). The managerialist concept that pay equity can be 
implemented in an objective, joint problem solving manner between parties 
who have the same goal - to redress discriminatory wages - ignores the 
structural properties of class and gender embedded in the established wage and 
job hierarchies and informing the actions of negotiators. To a certain extent 
these structural properties can be revealed in the notion of goals, but it is a 
weak explanatory tool compared to an analysis of the dynamics of class and 
gender which underlay the conflict in both job evaluation committees. Indeed, 
the nature of the bargaining revealed in both the Pay Equity Agreement and the 
Steering Committee, although notably more cooperative, can be further 
understood by examining the complex gender and class dynamics. 
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Gender and Class Dftnensions 
In this section, gender and class dimensions of pay equity bargaining are 
examined, considering the Pay Equity Agreement, the Steering Committee and 
the Job Evaluation Committees in turn. A continuing theme in the following 
analysis is the development of a labour-feminist politic and its potential and 
limitations. 
The Pay Eguity Agreement: Labour-feminist alliance 
The move towards increased cooperation during the Pay Equity Agreement 
negotiations and the progressive nature of the pay equity model contained in it 
was due not only to the increased power of the unions' joint position and the 
political will at the table. It was also derived from a union-management 
convergence of goals. What occurred was an alliance of feminists across 
traditional class lines. The concept of pay equity itself raises issues concerning 
the fair valuation of women's work, which touches upon women in both unions 
and management. Feminisation of the bargaining process in terms of 
participants brought a different style of bargaining, especially because the key 
women negotiators had adopted a feminist politic which included pay equity 
expertise and emphasised participation and consensus in the implementation of 
it. 
This feminist politic was incorporated into the Agreement in terms of content 
and process. Significantly, the consensual model of decision making resonated 
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with a current interest of at least two male negotiators at the table, who were 
pursuing more cooperative models of collective bargaining in their own 
workplace, and this made it easier for acceptance by all parties. 
As an illustration of the feminist alliance during the negotiations, it was all the 
women negotiators who argued for the committee structure being of least 50% 
female, including the chairing of the Steering Committee which was to be one 
each from the employer's and unions' teams, and one woman and one man. In 
addition, all the women argued against traditional industrial relations-style male 
dominated arbitration as the dispute resolution procedure: 
We found that the male negotiators on both sides were opting for 
the traditional arbitration route because that was known in labour 
relations work. Whereas the women were saying ... they are not 
trained on the issue of pay equity. So they don't have the 
expertise to deal with the issue. (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 
3) 
It is interesting to note that this latter argument was not won by the women, 
although the committee structure they advocated ended up in the Agreement. 
But the most dramatic influence of the women in the negotiations of the 
Agreement was in the last few hours, when the CUPE negotiator arranged a 
women's caucus in the women's washroom to overcome the last obstacles to 
the settlement. As she says: 
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... so we agreed to work towards meeting both the unions' and 
the government and management goals. We did that in the 
washroom and that, in fact, was the settlement. And that is the 
first time that I've seen it done where women as feminists and 
committed to pay equity crossed over and united, and it is 
something that we talk about now and laugh about. But it was 
very important at that time. (Wishart, Interview, 1992, p. 3) 
The Personnel Policy representative also referred to this event with some pride 
and she linked it with a feminisation of the bargaining process that made it 
different and better. Her colleague on the Steering Committee with her 
thought that informal discussions amongst the women in all parties "... lent a 
lot to getting the agreement finalised and recognising that this was an issue that- 
had to be handled ultimately in some kind of different form" (Holden, 1992, p. 
2). 
Along with this feminist alliance during the pay equity negotiations was an 
increased number of women involved behind the scenes working on 
background issues for the negotiators, compared to normal collective 
bargaining. The CUPE negotiator, also the National Director of Equal 
Opportunities in her union, saw this opportunity as a chance to develop 
women for leadership positions. Seeing an issue crucial to women's economic 
equality moving to the forefront of the union agenda has encouraged these 
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newly participating women to become more concerned with other equality 
issues like sexual harassment and employment equity - 
The Steering Committee: Success and IU*M*tations of the labour- 
feminist alliance 
During the early work of the Steering committee, this feminist alliance 
continued, made up of the women who had been critical in obtaining the Pay 
Equity Agreement - the two Personnel Policy Analysts; CUPE's National 
Director of Equal Opportunities; and one of the employers' representatives, the 
Executive Director of St. Clare's Hospital in St. John's. The union Co-Chair, 
a man, was also very supportive of pay equity; the initiative itself was 
triggered from the hospital support negotiations he had conducted with the 
government in 1988. The male hospital employer representative who had 
endorsed the new cooperative mode stayed with the project, but the Hydro 
representative changed to a classification and pay specialist. As noted, the 
effectiveness of the Committee was undermined considerably upon the change 
of government and the withdrawal of political will. Faced with an ideological 
commitment to retrenchment and a withdrawal of support for pay equity, the 
alliance was fractured. 
However, even before the government blatantly pursued cost containment, the 
union Co-Chair felt that the cooperative mode of the Committee was fragile. 
He strongly resisted a concept of joint interest, stressing that there was a 
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fundamental difference of interest. For him that difference was symbolised by 
money. NAPE's alternate on the Committee echoed this view: "The union is 
trying to get the most for workers and the employers are trying to save as 
much money as they can. And once you lose sight of that it's possible that 
you can end up, not meaning to, but you could end up selling out your 
workers" (Furlong, Interview, 1992, p. 2). Looking at the employer side, she 
remarked that even the people the most committed to pay equity on the 
government side had to change their position after Bill 16: "Now your feminist 
philosophy is great but it doesn't put bread on the table ... you've got to be 
realistic about this" (Furlong, Interview, 1992, p. 3). 
The professional unions - NLNU and AAHP - both referred to the tendency of 
monetary issues to reestablish the traditional union-management lines. The 
NLNU's president was very critical of what she saw as the bottom-line 
mentality of the Wells government: 
But what we saw happening very clearly ... was that pay equity 
from the government's perspective, we felt, was no longer the 
issue. What was the issue was money. If a woman was not 
paid the same as a man for doing the same job, they were more 
concerned about how much money it would cost them, and how 
long they could put off the process of paying us .... I thought that 
the process became pitiful at the end and that it was clearly a 
monetary type of process; it wasn't anything to do with the 
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underlying principles of pay equity. (Aylward, Interview, 1992, 
p. 3) 
The NLNU Business Agent, her alternate on the Committee, talked about the 
goverm-nent in recognisably class terms, putting pay equity in a broader 
context: "Labour is very, very irrelevant. Today in this province we are being 
attacked on every front. In our case, when the government sanctifies breaking 
collective agreements because 'they have no choice, ' the message passes on 
down the line" (Vivian, Interview, 1992, p. 12). 
In effect, for him and other unionists in the province the government reneging 
on a part of the Pay Equity Agreement was part of a more general attack on 
labour. Recent unilateral amendments to the labour relations legislation which 
will make it harder for unions to organise are seen as part of the same 
strategy. Ironically, a central plank of the government's economic 
development strategy is cooperation with organised labour. 
Gendered commitment, gendered jobs and hierarchy 
Although the resistance of the government could be characterised as just about 
money, a part of the cost containment of an ideologically driven government, 
the evidence indicates additional influences. Pay equity is a women's equality 
issue and as such it is not simply a question of budgeting and economic cost. 
It threatens gendered workplace relationships and challenges established 
classification and pay systems underpinning those relationships. 
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An important factor influencing early cooperation was the convergence of 
goals. However, upon closer analysis, this convergence revealed a gendered 
pattern. We know that all the women on the Committee were committed to 
pay equity, and a key male delegate, the union Co-Chair, was in a strong 
alliance with CUPE's representative. However, several unionists questioned 
the real commitment and understanding of certain male members of the 
Committee (interviews with Curtis, Furlong, Wishart, Holden, Vincent, King, 
1992), and the union Co-Chair commented that political correctness was 
perhaps the reason for their acquiescence, rather than conviction. 
There were two men on the Committee who were consistently described as not 
committed to pay equity. (Sometimes these individuals were not named but I 
was able to establish their identity through a process of elimination combined 
with my interview data, informal conversation with my informants, and a 
telling sexist comment to me just before an interview). These men were 
classification and pay specialists. Both of them seemed to be protecting the 
status quo, probably based on personal and professional ownership and 
justification of the systems already in place. Their interviews revealed a 
strong disapproval of how pay equity had changed the current pay 
relationships, and were focused on the illogicality of the new wage structure, 
particularly compression and inversion. 
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The perceived irrationality of new pay relationships resulting in more wages 
for women can also be explained by a gender ideology buttressing existing 
structures which appear 'natural', but which in fact reflect gendered notions of 
skill and work. If the nature of such concepts are not recognised as gendered, 
then the established pay differentials are seen as 'logical' and reflecting some 
'ob ective' worth. Moreover, any challenges to this status quo, with the 
possibility that women will earn more than men, will be seen as 'irrational. 
Gender ideology apparently blinded the two classification and pay specialists to 
the possibility of women earning the money as merited by the pay equity job 
evaluation results. Interviews with them both confirmed the judgements of the 
unionist informants. This gender ideology was revealed in their comments. 
For example, one question was asked at the very end of the pay equity 
process: "You mean to tell me that this type of clerk has to get this type of 
money? " One Personnel Policy representative placed it in the context of more 
training needed in gender stereotyping and in the general concept of pay 
equity: "It is critical. It can't be stressed enough. The people who look and 
sound like they understand gender bias and who look like and sound like they 
understand why traditional relationships cannot exist any longer in fact do not 
understand those issues... " (Holden, Interview, 1992, p. 22). 
One classification and pay specialist who took over from the labour relations 
specialist in his organisation once the Steering Committee was set up still 
argued with the final results and asserted that the evaluation must have been 
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done wrongly. He just could not accept that the women in the office were as 
valuable as some of the men who worked outside. 
It is no coincidence that the organisation this man represented (Hydro) started 
an overall reclassification not long after the pay equity adjustments were paid 
out to their office workers, using their own job evaluation system. The 
justification for this exercise was that it would redress inequities between 
women caused by pay equity. In other words it would reestablish the 
hierarchy of women's jobs. His big complaint about the women's jobs was 
compression - did he see a threat to his own position in the hierarchy by the 
flattening of it? 
Here the class-based concern of management's that the compression of the 
workplace hierarchy will affect their own differential between management and 
non-management intertwines and overlaps with a gender-based concern with 
the relationships between the women's and men's pay structure. For example, 
he also maintained this reclassification would ensure a "... more appropriate 
relationship [than that caused by pay equity], not only to each other, but also 
to the operations group that they were originally compared with" (Janes, 
Interview, 1992, p. 9). 
Feminist process 
It is clear that part of the bitter disappointment at the cancellation of 
retroactivity was the realisation that the consensual decision making model so 
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carefully built into the implementation of pay equity by the feminist alliance 
would now be severely undermined. Not being under pressure to settle had 
meant that time could be taken to reach consensus throughout the process. 
Now that was impossible, the CUPE National Advisor made it clear that 
intentions had been focused upon process as well as the content of the 
Agreement: 
I guess the frustrating thing was that [consensus building] had 
been on our agenda from day one, was to have that closer to a 
feminist approach, and when the government came and told us 
they were bringing in Bill 16, that with one swoop of the 
legislative plan they were going to eliminate retroactivity, we 
felt cheated. Everybody felt cheated. (Wishart, Interview, 
1992, p. 5) 
Unanimity was a CUPE proposal, reflecting a consensus bargaining strategy as 
part of a feminist process advocated by the Equal Opportunities Department, 
and encouraged by the two women leaders of CUPE national (Interviews with 
Wishart, 1992 and Harris, 1992). 
The female NHNHA delegate's model of consensus decision making was 
consistent with a feminist view of process; she referred to the "naming" of 
problematic issues (like hard negotiating instead of joint problem solving) and 
taking up "space" and was a strong advocate of joint decision making as better 
practically and philosophically. 
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As it happens, unanimity enabled the unions on the Steering Committee to 
work together effectively since it forced everyone to consider the views of 
even the smallest union, according to the union Co-Chair. This opinion of 
consensus was consistent with the government and employer representatives. 
Overall, at the Steering Committee level at least, feminist process gelled with 
unions' class interests and management interests in a problem solving mode of 
bargaining wherever possible. 
An indication of the complexity of the gender and class dynamic is that the 
feminist process which was an enabling factor in the pursuit of pay equity 
proved also to be a constraint working against its continued implementation. 
Part of the government's resistance to pay equity was the identification of the 
cooperative workings of the Steering Committee with "... that women's 
crowd ...... to quote the government 
Co-Chair's discussion of this tension inside 
the Treasury Board. 
This cooperative (feminist) process was not given any recognition by other 
divisions in the Treasury Board, according to the Personnel Policy 
representatives. On the contrary, the work of these two women was 
marginalised. Comments were made that categorised the pay equity bargainin 
as easy or made easy by the management Co-Chair never disagreeing with the 
unions. 
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The head of the Personnel Policy Division was particularly disappointed that 
this new model of collective bargaining was trivialised, as she saw cooperation 
as essential for the future success of organisations in the nineties. She 
identified this undermining of the validity of a new process as a"... significant 
error in judgement and a significant cost to both sides" (Holden, Interview, 
1992, p. 7). Moreover, she was angry that the Co-Chair had not been given 
credit for the strategic and tactical skills to make consensus bargaining work: 
the informal meetings, careful preparation of agenda items, trying to avert 
future problems by frequent meetings with the union Co-Chair. 
This downplaying of the achievement of a new process in the Steering 
Committee emanated from the Collective Bargaining Division who had their 
own way of doing things. But, a good number of the Committee were not 
experienced negotiators steeped in the old adversarial ways of bargaining. And 
this was highlighted as a strength of the Committee by the Personnel Policy 
representatives and the employer representative specialising in labour relations 
(and, interestingly, a long-time negotiator). 
During the transition phase of the Steering Committee between the disputed 
results of the second job evaluation committee and the start up of the civil 
service pay equity'implementation, the Personnel Policy representative was 
removed from the Co-Chair position and the Director of Collective Bargaining 
took her place. It was upon her arrival that the relationships on the Committee 
turned from strained (due to the disputed evaluations) to conflictual. Her style 
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was, apparently, immediately confrontational and she told the unions that 
It you are not going to get away with now what you got away with before 11 
(Grimes, Interview, 1992, p. 2). She was seen as a major stumbling block by 
both NAPE and CUPE, both of whom were very critical of her open 
declaration against the idea of pay equity and her confrontational style of 
bargaining. 
Pay equity implementation and the success of the Steering Committee were 
subsumed under the disparaging category of "that women's crowd. " However, 
as one government representative pointed out: 
... it 
is interesting that if it were severance pay policy or if it 
were a new group insurance plan ... everybody would understand 
that it is government's policy. You bring in something like pay 
equity, all of a sudden it is that women's crowd .... It 
is not. 
People forget that this is part of a collective agreement. It is 
part of government's commitment, it is part of government's 
policy.... (Roome, Interview, 1992, p. 24) 
This convergence of undermining cooperative process and women's equality is 
an interesting development. It may well be that it is partly explained by a 
marginalisation of anything that is female dominated. A number of studies 
show us that women's work is undervalued because it is work done by women 
(summarised in Shepela and Viviano, 1984). We could only speculate about a 
different reaction had the cooperative initiative been dominated by men, as 
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usual. Women moving into what is traditionally a male territory - labour 
relations - and, moreover, changing the process from a traditionally adversarial 
to a more cooperative mode of bargaining would naturally make this 
marginalisation (a form of resistance? ) even more likely. Findlay (1991) used 
Mahon's notion of "unequal structure of representation" in her discussion of 
the limitations faced by women bureaucrats; the term "that women's crowd" 
would be a manifestation of this structural inequality. 
The resistance to both the concept and process of pay equity can be understood 
as resistance to change of the male dominated status-quo, the male dominated 
job and wage hierarchy. When analysis moves to the health care job 
evaluation committees we can see that the established hierarchy was uppermost 
in the committee members' minds when evaluating jobs in health care. 
Job Evaluation Committees: Challenging hierarchy while 
maintaining differentials and containing cost 
The conflict in these committees was not just about personalities, as some 
observers supposed, but it also derived from the interplay of structural 
properties, manifested in both union-management and interunion conflict. 
In term. s of union-management conflict, we know from union and management 
members of the first committee that the hospital unions were attempting to 
raise the value of women's jobs, while the government Classification and Pay 
evaluator was resisting this and pushing the scores down. The NAPE and 
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CUPE representatives also worked in alliance to keep down the value of men's 
jobs in the face of the government evaluator's determined efforts to upgrade 
them. 
After an examination of how the wage line works in the Newfoundland model 
of pay equity, it became clear that this pattern of bargaining was directly 
linked to the level of the adjustments paid out at the end, and that the 
government representative was trying to control the cost. The higher the value 
of the men's jobs that make up the wage line, the more the wage line moves to 
the right of the graph used to calculate the adjustments, and the lower the 
actual adjustments are for any given female dominated job, point for point. 
The employer representative on the committee saw that the hospital support 
unions recognised this and were negotiating in response to the Classification 
and Pay representative's tactics, and thought that this explained their 
antagonism towards the government delegate. 
During his interview, this government evaluator identified with the objective, 
joint problem solving model and accused the hospital support unions of going 
in with an agenda of raising the value of all women's jobs and lowering the 
value of all men's jobs. He particularly objected to their negotiating tactics to 
achieve this aim and accused the hospital support unions of "stacking" the 
committee with experienced negotiators (Osmond, Interview, 1992, p. 37). He 
was clearly annoyed that this had given the unions an unfair advantage since 
they were much better prepared and better skilled at establishing and 
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negotiating their position. In his list of recommended changes to the 
operations of job evaluation committees, most of them were a means to gain 
more power versus the unions, as he clearly felt they had too much influence 
over the proceedings, and this had resulted in flawed results. Not only did he 
want control over costs, but he also wanted to retain control over what 
happened in the committee, and was thwarted in his attempts. 
Throughout the interview he revealed a prejudice against the hospital unions. 
After the interview ended he called the hospital support union representatives 
on the committee "... a bunch of yahoos... " (Osmond, informal conversation 
after Interview, 1992, p. 42). The vocabulary used in the employer 
representatives' accounts of HC1 also indicated how different unions were 
viewed. One kept referring to "the union people" in a rather disapproving 
way, and was shocked at the negotiating stance of NAPE and CUPE (who she 
meant by the term "union people"). Everyone apart from the NLNU 
representative seemed to lump both NAPE and CUPE together as one hospital 
support union. AAHP was not seen as a union, nor was the NLNU; in fact 
the title NLNU was rarely used -they were referred to as "the nurses. " This 
use of terminology symbolising the status of certain groups in the workplace 
reflected a clear sense of hierarchy and differential status evident in hospital 
employee relations - 
The female government representative and an employer representative pointed 
out that the public sector labour relations climate in the province was very 
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poor at the time the committee was struck. This would have enhanced any 
tensions present, and the likelihood of any anti-union sentiments coming 
through. Towards the end of the committee's work, strong rumours of wage 
freeze legislation and civil service lay-offs caused a further deterioration of 
labour relations . 
However, to further understand this union-management hostility in the 
committee we have to note the gender implications of the interactions. The 
NLNU representative, described by both camps as mostly a neutral participant, 
indicated the male Classification and Pay representative was upgrading the 
men's jobs for more than just monetary reasons. The description of this man's 
behaviour in the committee fits well with conclusions drawn by Cockburn 
(1983) on men's responses to threats to their gendered identity, and was 
identified by Acker (1989) and Blum (1991) in their pay equity case studies. 
Earlier in this discussion the gendered resistance of the male classification and 
pay specialists on the Steering Committee was pointed out, as was the 
resistance of the most senior Treasury Board bureaucrat. One of these 
Steering Committee representatives was in the Treasury Board Classification 
and Pay division and the HCI government evaluator's superior. Attempts to 
retain control of the existing pay structure thus reached down to the job 
evaluation level, and extended upwards to the most senior position of the 
Treasury Board . 
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Turning to the union's role, the consistent raising of the value of the women's 
jobs by the NAPE representative, backed up by the CUPE representative, was 
not just a matter of getting more money for her union membership. (A fairly 
consistent criticism of unions heard during field work was that pay equity was 
not an important issue for them but that they were just using it to get more 
money for their members. The criticism was often used to place unionists' 
demands for maintenance in the context of whipsawing the employer). 
The NAPE evaluator understood very well the underlying assumption of pay 
equity - that the skills in predominantly female jobs had historically been 
undervalued or ignored completely in the traditional male dominated job 
evaluation processes. Her determination to ensure that previously undervalued 
and invisible skills in women's work were fairly valued caused conflict in the 
committee because of resistance to her efforts. 
In the context of this criticism of the hospital unions, and accusations of hard 
negotiating in the committee, she stated NAPE's objective as: 
... 
We were sent in there to rectify the discrimination that was 
brought against women ... [to] do 
it fairly, and we weren't sent in 
there to take as much as we can for our people and get out 
without considering this [fairness]. (Vanta, Interview, 1992, p. 
2) 
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Indeed, it was her perception that when she resisted the government and/or 
employer representatives' position, they immediately accused NAPE of 
negotiating. She gave an example of the difficulty she had in convincing the 
committee of the value of women's work in her union: 
And they call a nine which means that the team must then go, 
but the initial call would go into the switchboard operator, and 
the switchboard operator has to react, and react calmly and 
swiftly and make sure that everything, the information is 
relayed. You can't say the nine is on 3A when it is on 3D or 
somebody dies. But there is no way that these professionals, 
being allied heath, and nurses, would credit any amount of 
stress. That was not stress, that was part of your job. But ... no 
matter how you look at it there was an amount of stress. 
(Vanta, Interview, 1992, p. 3) 
As well as illustrating Newfoundland Association of Public Employees 
(NAPE's) efforts to make visible aspects of women's work and the resistance 
on the part of the committee, the above extract signals the shift in their 
delegate's account from union-management conflict to interunion conflict. 
Indeed, a large part of her interview revealed a strong resentment against the 
Association of Allied Health Professionals (AAEP). 
There was a lot of hostility between these two union representatives on HC 19 
as identified by other informants on the committee, and on the Steering 
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Committee. One of the employer representatives highlighted this antagonism 
between NAPE (together with the Canadian Union of Public Employees 
[CUPE]) and AAHP: "Our hospital support unions, both NAPE and CUPE, 
seemed to have a lot of conflict with our AAHP and it was two unions that 
really battled it out... " (Interview, 1992, p. 3). Here, the "two unions" 
referred to in the "battle" are AAHP on the one side, and the hospital support 
unions in alliance on the other. 
It is also clear from the transcripts that AAHP allied with the government and 
employer representatives. The Classification and Pay evaluator confirmed this: 
if we had a very close working relationship with AAHP" (Osmond, 
Interview, 1992, p. 38). The AAHP representative revealed this in her 
interview, where she began by talking about the two sub-committees and 
finding herself in the "wrong" group i. e.; union rather than management 
(Butler, Interview, 1992, p. 1) We also know from AAHP's Business Agent 
(and Steering Committee alternate) that the union membership is conservative 
and tends to identify with management in the hospitals, to the extent that there 
is strong resistance to pursuing legitimate grievances. 
Did this tension between NAPE, the militant hospital support union, and 
AAHP, the conservative "professional" union reflect a clash of working class 
and middle class union ideologies? The discourse used by the committee is 
significant in this respect. We have already noted that government and 
employer representatives, and the AAHP representative, consistently used the 
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term "union people" and sometimes "those union people" in a disapproving 
context. In addition, the term "professional" paused so much argument that it 
was eventually banned during sessions of this committee. Part of the NAPE 
and AAHP resentment of each other can probably be traced to the historical 
breakaway of the 'professionals' away from NAPE because it was seen as not 
representing the interests of professional staff and was too militant. Reading 
the transcripts, I was struck by a sense of a superior attitude, a condescension 
towards the hospital support unions, particularly on the part of at least one 
employer representative, the government representative and the AAHP 
representative. 
The use of the word 'professional' in HC1 is a good example of the 
intertwining of class and gender properties. It was symbolic of certain, highly 
valued skills, which the hospital workers were seen by most people on the 
committee as not having. And it was used in an attempt to resist 
acknowledging the skills that were being brought to light by the hospital 
support unions for evaluation. That the word was banned signifies the strength 
and determination of the NAPE representative who found the word so 
offensive. 
According to this NAPE evaluator, the concept of professionals versus support 
workers "... hindered the process terribly... " (Vanta, Interview, 1992, p. 4) 
She elaborated: 
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... constantly throughout the whole process what you had was 
these 'professionals' and they kept calling themselves that ... and 
we were non-professionals ... this type of demeaning attitude 
towards women's jobs ... and they were constantly belittling the 
jobs that were within the health care. There is no way that you 
could have any amount of authority or any amount of decision- 
making because you were simply not a professional.... 
(Interview, 1992, p. 4) 
The AAHP representative saw a general fair and open-mindedness, and 
objectivity, on the part of herself and the employer and government 
representatives, while the hospital support unions were the cause of all the 
biases and problems. On the 'professionals' issue, she conceded that the use 
of the word may come over as a bit snobbish, but describes her understanding 
of the term: "[it] denotes a certain level of thinking and problem solving and 
problem identification, and that kind of abstract thinking whereas when I relate 
to a non-professional person ... I relate less of that kind of thinking to their 
work" (Butler, Interview, 1992, p. 4). 
This conflictual theme of 'professionals' was interwoven with secondary 
themes. One was the continued undervaluing of certain female dominated 
jobs, not in the actual rating of factors but in the validity of one person's 
contribution. According to the NAPE representative, a constant comment from 
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the AAHP representative was: "You're just a secretary, how could you 
know? " (Vanta, Interview, 1992, p. 15). Apart from gender biased 
assumptions about the work of a secretary, this remark ignored the union 
activism of the NAPE evaluator and her expertise. 
Another secondary theme, linked with the former, was that of the difference 
between formal education requirements for professional jobs versus hospital 
support jobs. Apparently, the predominant feeling in the committee (apart 
from NAPE and CUPE) was that unless a job demanded a degree then it was 
not worth much. The hospital support unions accused the facilitator, a woman, 
of being biased in favour of the AAHP, government and employer camp over 
this issue (they explained this by her similar educational background). I was 
not sure that this was significant until the government evaluator admitted 
during his interview that the facilitator was reluctant to intervene but she "gave 
management some leeway" (Osmond, Interview, 1992, p. 38). 
In the second job evaluation committee, interunion rivalry moved up through 
the hospital hierarchy and focused upon the highest levels of unionised 
employees, with NAPE this time representing female dominated laboratory and 
x ray technicians. The employer's representative described the interunion- 
rivalry like this: 
... there was a 
lot of friction at the table between unions but it 
wasn't between unions and management ... [It was] between, say, 
nursing and lab x ray, these two unions would probably be at a 
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loggerhead 
... one didn't want the other one to get more than the 
other, and you had the Allied Health, who felt that they ... maybe 
even should be above the other two. (White, Interview, 1992, 
p. 3) 
A union member of the committee provided a more graphic account: 
... union people fighting against union people. Everybody had 
their own agenda and their own preconceived notion of where 
certain groups should be and how certain jobs should stack up 
against other jobs. And war just about broke out over, you 
know, a point ... it was almost as if every point that they gave 
away or let go or agreed on, to another group it was like 
someone was taking money out of their pocket. And they fought 
tooth and nail not to let it go. (Interview, 1992, p. 17) 
It is evident from these and other descriptions that each union was jockeying 
determinedly for a particular position in the hospital hierarchy that is so 
ingrained in health care culture. This mindset was so strong that in the 
employer's representative's opinion, "... I think they found that management 
actually was probably fairer than their co-workers in the unions were... 
(White, Interview, 1992, p. 6). 
From an analysis of all the transcripts it is apparent that NAPE wanted to keep 
parity of lab and x ray with the nurses, although NLNU wanted to change this 
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long-standing relationship. Also, AAHP wanted to widen their differential 
with NLNU, and, although impossible to absolutely verify from the data, it is 
highly probable from reading both NAPE and AABP transcripts that they cut a 
deal with NAPE along these lines with regard to the rating of a nursing job(s). 
The NAPE representative was the only job evaluation committee member 
(from either committee) to analyse all the biases that people brought to the 
proceedings and include himself in that analysis. He made no secret of the 
fact that his agenda was to ensure parity with the nurses for the lab and x ray 
workers, from which component he came and for whom he had negotiated for 
many years. His objective when going into the committee was apparent from 
this extract: 
[Because of the wage freeze] ... the lab and x-ray people fell 5% 
behind nurses, and I was not prepared to sit down and have 
nurses being evaluated higher than a lab technologist .... Because 
if I spent 25 years as a lab technologist, and you spent 25 years 
as a nurse, and we've been equal all through, and I see you as 
no better than me, no better or no worse, and someone turns 
around and says that you're entitled to be on the scales from one 
to ten, an eight, and I'm only a six, it is not going to wash. 
(Hogan, Interview, 1992, p. 2) 
This fierce defence of parity defies any managerialist concept of joint problem 
solving, especially when the collective bargaining relationship has been so hard 
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won: 11 ... we spent hours and days and months on the street trying to win what 
we think is right" (Hogan, Interview, 1992, p. 3). 
Although AAHP do not stand to gain much (they are not happy with the 
outcome for their members) the nurses do because according to the provisional 
results that are still in dispute, nurses do emerge as the top of the new 
hierarchy compared to NAPE's lab and x ray workers. Even more difficult for 
NAPE is that their internal parity relationships have been disrupted. The lab 
and x ray workers have traditionally been paid equally, and now pay equity has 
introduced a differential. 
Given the strength of union alliance that enabled the Pay Equity Agreement, 
union solidarity was not much in evidence during the workings of either this 
committee or the previous one. Indeed one government representative on HC2 
referred to "a divide and conquer affair... " (Interview, 1992, p. 45). The 
NLNU were particularly upset about what they perceived as an attack against 
the nurses by the other unions, a further illustration of how far removed the 
unions were from solidarity. The ex president of the nurses' union raised this 
issue as a specific item she wanted to cover just before we had to end our 
interview: - 
It has just been really disappointing to us, as nurses, that people, 
other unions, have fought so hard against our group .... There 
were more times when we had management people arguing that 
244 
nurses' responsibilities were such and such than we did have 
workers.... (Interview, 1992, p. 18) 
Although it could be observed that the existing job and wage hierarchy so 
clearly underlying the interaction of the HC2 committee members is not 
gendered because the conflict was over the relative position of female 
dominated jobs, we know that the very concept and structure of hierarchy is in 
fact gendered (Acker, 1989; Evans and Nelson, 1989; and Blum, 1991). Also, 
there were some gendered aspects of the process at a lower level of 
abstraction. The lab and x ray workers comprised a female dominated class, 
but there were a few small male dominated groups within it. In addition, the 
lab and x-ray job class was originally a male dominated class and had 
gradually changed to female dominated. That the lab and x ray job class was 
female dominated came as a surprise to me when I checked the gender 
dominance of this class because the kind of resistance to higher valuation of 
nursing jobs by the NAPE representative had a strong tone of gender ideology. 
During my interview with him, he caricatured nursing work, stereotyping 
nurses as Florence Nightingales, and trivialising the nursing model of holistic 
care. Given the jurisprudence emerging from the Ontario Pay Equity 
Hearings Tribunal about the importance of capturing previously invisible 
nursing skills, my impression is that the nursing jobs were not rated as highly 
as they should have been, and that prejudice against a traditionally female 
dominated job was largely to blame. 
245 
The evidence for gender identity being threatened in the behaviour of the HC2 
evaluator is even stronger than in the case of the Classification and Pay 
evaluator in HCL The appropriateness of this interpretation of these men's 
behaviour is substantiated by an interesting observation on gender bias made by 
a member of the Steering Committee (I think it is significant that it was the 
Business Agent\Solicitor for the NLNU). He sat on a job evaluation 
committee at the pilot testing of the instrument, and commented: 
... if there was any male job being evaluated, every male in the 
room whether he had anything to do with the job or not, had 
some absurd connection with this job that warranted giving it 
this or giving it that. Not only would the females not argue 
against what was often very, very aggressive behaviour at the 
table, when it came to a female job, of course you would not see 
the same type of aggressive behaviour from them, in terms of 
fighting for those extra points. (Vivian, Interview, 1992, p. 21) 
Breaking through the barriers of gender bias and identity was clearly a problem 
in this pilot committee and the other two job evaluation committees. The 
NLNU Steering Committee members raised serious concerns about the general 
undervaluing of nurses' work, drawing upon similar arguments to those 
contained in the Ontario Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal jurisprudence. They 
argued that job evaluation members especially undervalued the responsibility 
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and decision making skills of nurses but pointed Out that this attitude was not 
so much in evidence in the leadership of the relevant unions. 
Most participants in the pay equity exercise saw the acute conflict in HC2 as 
historical collective bargaining relationships "interfering" with the 
implementation of pay equity. But how can pay equity be implemented 
through collective bargaining if the importance of differentials is ignored? 
Differentials encapsulated in a hierarchical pay structure are manifestations of 
the complex intertwining of class and gender. One employers' delegate on the 
Steering Committee, saw hierarchy as a formidable barrier to equity. She saw 
this organisational pattern as deeply ingrained in our society generally, and 
remarked that health care was the most hierarchical sector she had ever worked 
in. 
Another member of the Steering Committee, the Director of Personnel Policy, 
also pointed to the problems of established job hierarchy. Indeed, she pointed 
out that most of the criticisms of pay equity have been about threats to this 
hierarchy - about compression and inversion. For example: 
When push comes to shove in job evaluation situations 
or ... about putting money on the table, many people will say 
'but we can't, we couldn't possibly have this. This will cause 
the men in my bargaining unit to be terribly upset. This will 
cause untold upheaval in the whole system if in fact, if this 
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group is now paid the same as or more than that group 
(Holden, Interview, 1992, p. 22) 
But, as she argued, this effect of pay equity merely highlights the illogicality 
of the existing hierarchy, which is the real problem, and which pay equity set 
out to change. 
In Chapter VI, pay equity bargaining in the Ontario civil service is examined 
with the intention of further understanding the complexities of the 
interrelationship of collective bargaining and pay equity. 
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CHAPTER VI 
Pay Equity Bargahung in Ontario: The Public Service ii 
In this chapter, pay equity bargaining within the legal parameters required by 
the Ontario legislation is examined. The case study focuses on the 
implementation of pay equity in the provincial government's civil service. The 
first part of the chapter places the civil service negotiations within economic, 
social and political context. Following a brief review of the province's 
economy, is a description of women's position in the labour force and equality 
policies for women, leading to a short account of public sector collective 
bargaining in Ontario. Then the information on pay equity bargaining in the 
civil service is presented, considering in turn bargaining structure, style and 
power, before moving on to an exploration of the gender and class dimensions 
of the negotiations. 
Ontario has the highest population in Canada of 9,102,000. Historically, it has 
always been the richest province in Canada. A study of economic indicators 
from 1980 - 1990 reveal an economy with average per capita Earned Income 
and per capita GDP levels higher than Canada's: 112% and 105%, 
respectively. In contrast to Newfoundland, Ontario's unemployment levels 
over the last decade have averaged at a lower rate than national trends, at only 
79% of the Canadian rate (calculated from Statistics Canada 13-213 and 71- 
201,1992; and Newfoundland Statistics Agency, 1994). 
249 
However, although the Ontario economy has a larger, more diversified 
manufacturing base and larger, more accessible markets than Newfoundland, 
economic restructuring overlaid with recession caused a slowing down of 
economic growth during the period from 1989 to 1993. Indeed, in relative 
terms it has been argued that the province suffered the most of all provinces, 
accounting for almost three-quarters of all job losses in the country between 
1990 and 1991 (Freeman, 1991). 
Position of Women and Egualily Policies in Ontario 
In 1986 the Ontario population was made up of 51 % women of 15 years and 
over. 13.7 % of all families were lone-mother families with children under age 
18, and 55 % of these families headed by women lived in poverty. 4 in 10 
lone-mother families were poor compared to only I in 10 led by men (Ontario 
Women's Directorate, 1990). 
Participation in the provincial workforce has increased from 49% of women 
over 15 years of age in 1975 to 61 % in 199 1. Despite this increase, the 
earnings differential for men and women in 1989 was still on average 33%, for 
full-time, full-year work (Ontario Women's Directorate, 1991 - also the source 
for all the following information on women, unless otherwise stated). 
As in Newfoundland, Ontario women work in a limited range of occupations 
compared to men; women are concentrated in half as many occupations as men 
are. Over 80% of women in 1989 were concentrated in the service sector, 
250 
which includes services and public administration, trade, finance and 
transportation and communications. Men, however, were more evenly 
distributed throughout industries, with only 58% in the service sector. 
Vertical segregation within occupations characterises the Ontario workforce as 
in the Newfoundland profile, adding a further layer to wage discrimination, 
since women tend to be found in the lower-paid jobs within any occupational 
category. For example, according to 1986 Ontario statistics, in the 
management, administration and clerical category women predominated in the 
clerical jobs, making up 78% of that occupation, whereas men accounted for 
67 % of the management and administration jobs. Eveq in occupations where 
women predominated, like nursing or stenography and typing, men's average 
earnings were still higher than women's. 
In the political sphere, women comprise 21 % of the provincial legislature, 
41 % of the Cabinet, and 29% of the top civil servant positions at Deputy 
Minister level (Ontario Women's Directorate and Cabinet Office, Ontario 
Provincial Government, Interviews, 1994). These higher than (ýational) 
average representation figures are due to the mandate of the Ontario NDP 
leadership to include as many women as possible in its selected candidates and 
government. Figures were not available for previous governments, but it is 
generally acknowledged that the current number of women in top political 
positions is the highest so far. No figures were available for the education 
sector. 
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As in Newfoundland, the federal government sponsors a network of regional 
Status of Women's Councils, which are the provincial equivalents of the 
national Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. The Ontario 
Advisory Council on Women's Issues was established as an arms-length body 
to advise the provincial government on policy and to promote women's 
equality in general. There is also an Association of Women's Centres funded 
by the provincial government, as are the ninety shelters in Ontario (Sule, 
Interview, 1994). 
In the late 1970's and through the mid-eighties, the women's movement 
nationally were attempting to broaden their appeal from the predominantly 
middle-class membership. One of the primary routes to this objective was seen 
to be alliance with the trade union movement. A socialist-feminist group in 
Toronto, the International Women's Day Committee, formed strong alliances 
with the women's committees in various unions, the Ontario Federation of 
Labour, and the Ontario New Democratic Party, and Organized Working 
Women (OWW). This latter organisation was a group of women trade 
unionists founded in 1976 specifically to take feminism into the labour 
movement. One result of this labour-feminist alliance was the strong show of 
support by the feminist community in Ontario during a number of significant 
strikes during this period (Adamson, Briskin and McPhail, 1988). 
It was during this period that the first Canadian Labour Congress Women's 
Conference was held in 1976 and the first full-time equal opportunity 
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coordinator was appointed (in the Ontario Public Service Employees Union 
[OPSEU]). The labour-feminist alliance was to become "one link in the chain 
that has increased active trade-union support for issues such as day-care, 
abortion and equal pay. Today we have come to take this alliance with the 
union movement for granted" (Adamson, Briskin and McPhail, 1988, p. 79). 
The existence of such a strong coalition in Ontario enhanced the probability of 
a joint effort to lobby for pay equity legislation, and explains the overall 
strength and success of the Equal Pay Coalition, together with the feminist- 
informed pay equity bargaining in certain public sector negotiations, most 
notably in the public service. 
With regard to employment equality government policy, the Ontario Women's 
Directorate was established in 1983 with a mandate to achieve economic and 
social equality for women in the province. It is an internal advisory body to 
provincial government in developing equality policies for women. Its influence 
was enhanced by the requirement that every submission to Cabinet for policy 
and legislative change has to include a statement of impact on women. Part of 
its function is to liaise with other governments, the Ontario Advisory Council 
on Women's Issues, women's organisations, business, labour and community 
groups in order to promote equality for women. In 1985, in response to the 
UN monitoring of its Convention 100, the Directorate made narrowing the 
earnings gap between men and women a priority and subsequently pursued a 
number of initiatives. 
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These included an extension of the affirmative action program started in 1974 
in the Ontario Public Service to the broader public sector; encouragement of 
the private sector to adopt employment equity, including Ontario Equal 
Opportunity Achievement Awards; research into and development of strategies 
on women and new technology; and promotion of women's entry into non- 
traditional occupations. 
Ontario set the lead in provincial equal pay legislation, passing its Ontario 
Female Employees Fair Remuneration Act in 1951, which required equal pay 
for the same or similar work (Kovach and Millspaugh, 1990). The Ontario 
Employment Standards Act, 1981, prohibited gender-based wage 
discrimination, requiring equal pay for "substantially the same kind of work" 
but adding the qualifier "the performance of which requires substantially the 
same skill, effort and responsibility and which is performed under similar 
working conditions" (Part IX). However, the complaints model incorporated 
into both pieces of legislation led to very little change. 
The proactive pay equity legislation passed in 1988 was the result of effective 
coalition politics, and an opportune political moment. In 1985, the election had 
resulted in a minority Liberal government who signed a political Accord with 
the New Democrafic Party (NDP) so that between them they could achieve a 
majority in the provincial House of Assembly. The NDP's support of the 
Liberals in the House was conditional- upon the Liberals introducing certain 
social reforms, one of which was pay equity legislation. 
254 
The coalition of interests focused on pay equity was a strong labour-feminist 
alliance with close connections to the NDP. This coalition had been lobbying 
for a decade to obtain pay equity through legislation. The key organisational 
players in this Equal Pay Coalition were the Ontario Federation of Labour 
(OFL)'s Women's Committee; individual unions, especially CUPE and 
OPSEU; and the New Democratic Party [NDP] (Beal, Interview, 1991). 
The OFL Women's Committee influence derived from both its structural 
advantages and political hard work, and they had successfully built bridges 
with the women's groups in the province. The Committee was one of the 
founding members of both the Coalition for Better Day Care and the Equal Pay 
Coalition (Sceviour, Interview, 1991). 
CUPE's progressive equality policies are nationally acknowledged in the 
labour-feminist community, including their expertise in job evaluation and pay 
equity. OPSEU was also of primary importance in the coalition. The first 
proposed pay equity legislation covered only the public service, which affected 
OPSEU more than any other union since its largest bargaining unit contained 
virtually all the civil servants. 
It was during the legislative committee stage of the first pay equity Bill that 
OPSEU presented its brief "Meeting the Challenge, " which rejected the job 
evaluation model of pay equity. This document was drawn up by a feminist 
inside OPSEU, subsequently the key pay equity negotiator for the public 
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service, with technical and legal input from leading members of the EPC. The 
model was re ected as heretical at the time, by the NDP and the Liberals. The 
latter criticised the proposal for "just throwing money at the problem. 
OPSEU's response was "Yes, just give us the money ... 1) " which later became 
the title of a book published in British Columbia (Lewis, 1988) where the pay 
equity debate included a strong questioning of the use of job evaluation to 
achieve pay equity (Peters, Interview, 1991). 
There were also some key, high profile individuals representing the various 
groups in the EPC which increased its influence - labour and human rights 
lawyers, business and professional women, unionists, feminists, and 
academics. For example, one influential feminist union leader was a senior 
negotiator with OPSEU, both for contractual negotiations and in the early days 
of pay equity bargaining. She was very active in the NDP, participated in 
consultative talks with the Liberal-Democratic Accord government in 1985 and 
later became the Minister of Health in the 1990 NDP government. Another 
member of the EPC was prominent in the OFL and later became the NDP 
leader's campaign strategist. And a number of prominent feminist labour 
lawyers were active members of the EPC (McDermott, Interview, 1991). 
The wide range of political views represented in the EPC was both a strength 
and a weakness. It was because of this broad base that the EPC was such an 
effective lobbying vehicle. The extent of its power is indicated by the shift 
from lobbying to consultative status. By the time the Act was introduced, the 
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EPC had become recognised as the labour-ferninist voice on pay equity and 
was seen as a I'monitor" of government proposals for the new legislation. The 
Attorney-General briefed the EPC on the basic parameters of the Act before it 
was tabled the next day. Moreover, when the Commission was set up, the 
EPC was consulted over staffmg; when the Chair of the Hearings Tribunal was 
appointed, they were. consulted again on suitable individuals for the Tribunal 
panels. 
On the other hand, the political diversity of the EPC led to tensions over the 
extent of public criticism of the second proposed pay equity law, which 
covered the private sector and broader public sector as. well as the public 
service, replacing the first which had covered only the public service. OPSEU 
in particular had always had a fairly radical view of pay equity, advocating a 
non job evaluation model of pay equity, and rejecting the first pay equity bill 
as jeopardising their collective bargaining structure. When the second Bill 
came down most members of the EPC felt that they should not delay the 
legislative process because the Accord was coming to an end and it was feared 
that the Liberal government, released from the conditions of the Accord, would 
renege on its commitment to pay equity legislation (McDermott, Interview, 
1991; Cuneo, 1990). 
OPSEU and a minority of the EPC took the position that the second Bill should 
be strongly criticised as well for its non definition of gender neutrality (with no 
regulations to interpret this important concept to follow), the inadequate 
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methodology to establish equal value Oob to job comparison and the limiting 
requirement to identify the lowest male comparator in a job class in order to 
calculate adjustments), and the exclusion of women in small workplaces. This 
dissenting view was that the EPC should strive to obtain a law that would give 
a true, or at least a better, model of equal value. 
However, because of the extreme opposition in Ontario to any pay equity 
legislation at all it is perhaps understandable why the EPC chose to smooth 
over this disagreement over strategy. Moreover, this stage of the political 
process was very stressful for everybody concerned, particularly after two 
years of exhausting and complex critical work of the previous Bill and now the 
new one introduced with so little of the political window of opportunity left 
(Cuneo, 1990). These factors made unlikely that a strong stand would be 
taken against the second Bill, which was eventually passed in 1988. 
Overall, the significance and strength of this Ontario labour-feminist alliance in 
achieving pay equity legislation was confirmed in a number of the interviews 
conducted (McDermott, 1991; Beal, 1991; Peters, 1991; Harris, 1991; and 
Cornish, 1991), and in Cuneo's book (1990). As in Newfoundland, the 
labour-feminist network reached into the bureaucracy. Although the civil 
servant concerned was not officially a member of the Equal Pay Coalition, she 
was a determined advocate of pay equity and her effectiveness in managing the 
legislative process was increased by the convergence of many voices into one 
labour-feminist position. OPSEU's pay equity expert and key negotiator 
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acknowledged the feat of this woman in managing the views of all the interest 
groups and steering the legislation through to the end despite strong opposition 
from conservative business and women's groups (Peters, Interview, 1991). 
This senior bureaucrat was in the Ministry responsible for women, and later 
went on to head the division responsible for implementing pay equity in the 
public service. Her role in the lobbying and consultative stages of the 
legislation and the successful public service negotiations was crucial. 
The Pay Eguity Act 1988 
The Ontario Pay Equity Act applied to all public sector employers, and all 
private sector employers with ten or more employees. Employers covered by 
the Act were required to identify systemic gender discrimination in 
compensation by it undertaking comparisons between each female job class in 
an establishment and the male job classes in the establishment in terms of 
compensation and in terms of the value of the work performed" (Section 4, 
No. 2). Value was to be measured as a composite of skill, effort, 
responsibility, and working conditions, using a gender neutral job comparison 
scheme. Under the Act, pay equity is achieved "when the job rate for the 
female job class that is the subject of the comparison is at least equal to the job 
rate for a male job class in the same establishment where the work performed 
in the two job classes is of equal or comparable value" (Section 6, No. 1). 
This means that, unlike the Newfoundland pay equity model, the Ontario 
methodology requires a job to job comparison instead of a male wage line as 
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the basis for pay equity adjustments. Moreover, the legislation allows pay 
equity adjustments to be calculated based on the lowest waged male comparator 
job provided it falls in the equal and comparable male job class. 
The Act allowed exemptions to the employers' liability for pay equity so that 
pay differences between male- and female-dominated jobs which are equal or 
comparable are permitted in certain circumstances. Allowable exceptions were 
listed as a formal seniority system, temporary employee training or 
assignment, a merit compensation plan (provided these practices were not 
discriminatory), red-circling (where the wages for a downgraded position are 
frozen), and skills shortage. A further exemption unique to Canadian pay 
equity legislation was the recognition of differences in bargaining strength once 
pay equity was achieved. 
All public sector employers, and private sector employers with 100 or more 
employees, were required to produce and post "pay equity plans" for 
employees' approval, providing the following information: the job comparison 
system to be used; the results of the evaluation itself; identification of any 
exemptions, with reasons; description of how pay equity would be achieved; 
and a schedule for the adjustments and eventual achievement of pay equity. 
Plans were to be'negotiated with unions in unionised workplaces. The 
employer alone was responsible for implementing pay equity in non-unionized 
organizations, subject to the employees' agreement with the final pay equity 
plan. 
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Deadlines were according to sector and size (Table 3). The public sector 
(which includes the civil service, Crown corporations, health care facilities, 
universities and colleges, several external agencies, school boards and 
municipalities) had to post pay equity plans by January 1,1990, begin wage 
adjustments on the same date, and complete pay equity adjustments five years' 
later. 
dule 
Employers Pay equity adjustments 
must begin 
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Pay equity adjustments 
must be complete 
Pay equity plans 
must be posted 
Pubk sectorl I January LOW I January 1990 
Private SeCtor2 
with 5W+ employees I January 1990 1 January 1991 
Private sector 
with 100-499 employees I January 1991 1 January 1992 
Private sector 
with 50-99 employees 
who post plans I January 1992 
Private sector 
with 1049 employees 
who post plans I January 1993 
Private sector3 
with 50-99 employees 
who do not post pkns 
Private sector 
with 1049 employees 
who do xot post plans 
I 
2 
3 
31 December 1995 
No mandatory deadline; at 
least I per cent of the 
previous year's payroll must 
be used for pay equity 
adjustments each year, until 
pay equity is achieved. 
I January 1993 
1 January 1994 
1 January 1993 1 January 1993 
1 January L994 I January L994 
Public sector employers must begin pay equity adjustments on their mandatory posting date -I January 1990. The 
adjustments must be completed no later than 31 December 1995. 
In the private sector, adjustments may take several years to bring the compensation of female job classes up to that of 
their ma)e comparators using I per cent of the employer's previous year's payroll each year. Some employers may wish 
to complete their adjustments more rapidly, using more than I per cent of the previous year's payroll each year. 
Nvate sector employers with between ten and 99 employees may prepare and post pay equity plans. If they choose nd 
to do so, they nnw be in compliance - that is, their compensation prac6ces must provide for pay equity - on their mandatory 
adjustment date. 
Source: Compfled from Ny Equity Commission, Pay Equity Affects You and Ny Equity Commission, Pay Equity ImPlewnfatiON 
Series, No. 14,198& 
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The Act established a Pay Equity Commission consisting of a Pay Equity 
Office and a Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal. The Pay Equity Office is 
responsible for research and education, monitoring pay equity implementation 
and conflict resolution. The latter two roles were to be played by Review 
Officers, although emphasis proved to be on dispute resolution, rather than 
monitoring, or investigation. Under the Act, the Review Officers were given 
considerable powers of investigation, including the right to enter any place at 
any time to obtain documents and question persons about a complaint. The 
Review Officers can make orders of a wide ranging nature to bring about 
compliance with the Act. Parties dissatisfied with an order made by a Review 
Officer can appeal to the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, which can conduct a 
full and formal hearing and make its own decision. 
The Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal has administrative and enforcement powers 
in its own right. It is entitled to make a number of orders concerning the 
implementation of the Act, including ordering the Review Officer to design a 
pay equity plan if an employer has failed to post one; ordering the 
reinstatement with compensation of an employee wrongfully dismissed because 
of pay equity matters; ordering pay adjustments to female employees who were 
not accorded pay equity; and ordering the revision of pay equity plans. It may 
make general remedial orders and the Act also includes penalties for those who 
fail to comply with these orders. Maximum penalties are $2,000 for 
individuals and $25,000 for organizations. 
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Since employers are legally required to negotiate pay equity with unions in 
organised workplaces, and this research concentrates on the highly unionised 
public sector, it is important to review public sector collective bargaining in 
Ontario before moving on to report on the public service negotiations 
themselves - 
Public Sector Collective Bargaining Climate 
Collective bargaining extended into the Ontario public sector in the late 1960's 
to the early 1970's. The province passed a variety of laws covering th e labour 
relations of specific occupational groups in its public sector. It is the province 
with the highest number of statutes covering its public sector employees (1989, 
Ponak and Thompson); there are separate Acts regulating the municipalities, 
the police, the firefighters, the hospitals, the teachers, and the civil service 
together with government enterprises. The public service is covered by the 
Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act (1972), which incorporates both 
general labour relations matters and dispute resolution procedures. 
The Ontario law covering the public service has a broader application than any 
other statute in Canada regulating public sector labour relations. The civil 
servants have the right to a Grievance Settlement Board to hear disputes 
concerning classification of their positions and performance appraisals, as well 
as the usual provision for grievances arising from discipline and discharge 
without just cause (Craig and Solomon, 1993). Ironically, it is this right to 
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reclassification grievance procedure that undermined the maintenance of pay 
equity in the public service. 
Compulsory arbitration is substituted for the right to strike. Only four other 
provinces do not give civil students the right to strike: Alberta, Manitoba, 
Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island (Craig and Solomon, 1993). There was 
resistance within the civil service at the passing of the Ontario legislation 
prohibiting strikes. One occupational group, the correctional officers, went on 
illegal strike in 1979, challenging the no-strike legislation. The president of 
the union concerned, the Ontario Public Service Employees' Union (OPSEU), 
was jailed because he advised these workers to strike, in contravention of the 
Ontario statute (Craig and Solomon, 1993). The effects of this strike were to 
prove very relevant to the development of the wage gap in the civil service and 
in the dynamics of the pay equity process in OPSEU. 
At about this time, another major public sector union, CUPE, also went on 
strike illegally, this time over the interest arbitration process, which it saw as 
unable to obtain a high enough settlement for parity with other workers. A 
number of CUPE leaders were subsequently fined or imprisoned for 
encouraging workers to defy a court injunction. An arbitration panel was 
established by the government (CUPE had still refused to give an arbitrator's 
name) and after the ruling came down there was apparently some discontent 
within the workforce and union leadership that the award favoured 
management (Craig and Solomon, 1993). 
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There is growing disenchantment with the arbitration process in the Ontario 
health sector (Craig and Solomon, 1993), and this dislike of arbitration is 
compounded by the complications of pay equity, especially in the maintenance 
phase, when the overlap between the two processes - contractual collective 
bargaining and pay equity implementation - is the most acute. Hospital 
managers, the employers' association negotiator, and union negotiators felt that 
arbitrators did not always understand the pay equity implications of the interest 
awards they were making. 
The general climate of labour relations within the public sector has 
dramatically deteriorated since a brief "honeymoon" period after the NDP won 
their first ever Ontario election in 1990. After a first year of continuing with 
election promises, building on their alliance with the labour movement, the 
social democratic government moved to the right with their second budget. In 
the face of tough criticism from its traditional allies, the labour movement, and 
many party activists, the NDP government fell in line with the rest of the 
country and implemented a cost-cutting programme to trim the high deficit. 
Among these cuts were lay-offs in the public service (Mackie, 1992) and a 
social contract designed to save money in the public and broader public sector 
in consultation with the unions. Eventually, the about-turn of the government 
and labour's accusations of the undermining of free collective bargaining 
during the social contract negotiations led to a rift in the labour-NDP alliance 
in Ontario. The public sector unions in the OFL have disaffiliated from the 
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Ontario NDP, while the private sector unions have continued their support for 
the provincial party. 
Although the public service negotiations were almost completed when the NDP 
government came into power, the party's special relationship with the labour 
movement in the early days of office helped the maintenance phase of pay 
equity in the civil service. However, its subsequent stringent cutbacks 
undermined the pay equity bargaining process in the health care sector. The 
promised amendments to increase the coverage of pay equity came in the form 
of a new, weakened Act, passed in 1993. This legislation extended the pay out 
period in the public sector from five years to eight, and allowed the 
government to issue regulations defining, and limiting, maintenance in the civil 
service. 
Pay Equity Implementation in the Civil Service 
According to the schedule in the legislation, the deadline for the public sector 
to post their pay equity plans and begin wage adjustments was January 1990. 
The public service was the first part of the public sector to begin implementing 
pay equity. It took two years to negotiate a pay equity plan, which was posted 
shortly after the deadline. The first wage adjustments were paid out on this 
date, too. Pay equity adjustments ranged from $0.02 to $6.74 per hour, with 
an average adjustment of $1.82 per hour, which is equivalent to an average 
annual increase of $3,549. The equivalent annual increases ranged from $39 
267 
to $13,143 (figures calculated from the Ontario Public Service Pay Equity 
Plan, 1990). According to Coutts (1990), some of the pay increases were as 
high as 28%. The civil service pay equity settlement was notable for 
attempting to move beyond the legislative minimum, incorporating wage 
adjustments that were above the lowest male comparator level. 
The parties to this set of negotiations were the provincial government of 
Ontario and OPSEU. We know from the Coordinator of Pay Equity in the 
Compensation Programs Branch of the Human Resources Secretariat that 
before negotiations started with the union, compensation specialists were 
studying the relevant literature from the US. They also had meetings in New 
York and Toronto with experts on designing job evaluation to capture women's 
work. The personnel administrators were concerned about having a truly 
gender neutral job evaluation system and were looking towards the policy 
capturing system pioneered in New York State. 
Ministerial support was significant in the pay equity bargaining process. The 
Pay Equity Coordinator for the government was in the House when the Act 
was passed and she described the joy of the Deputy Minister of the Human 
Resources Secretariat and her colleagues. The Deputy Minister was present at 
the beginning of the negotiations. A health ministerial advisor who sat on the 
negotiating team suggested that a strong political presence - the chief negotiator 
was the Assistant Deputy Minister - signified a key difference between 
bargaining for pay equity and conventional contract negotiations. 
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Overall, she identified "... a very strong political agenda that ran through 
everything that went on and ... we were going to be one of the first and largest 
employers to actually reach a pay equity agreement. It had to be a showcase" 
(Hall, Interview, 1991, p. 2). Later on in the interview, she referred to the 
to 
enormous political pressure that was on the negotiators to wrap it up 
quickly, wrap it up within an acceptable financial framework, and do it without 
a lot of negative publicity" (Hall, Interview, 1991, p. 4). This view of pay 
equity implementation in the civil service was confirmed through analysis of 
both union and government interviews. 
The other party to the negotiations, OPSEU, began in 1911 as a fuel 
cooperative, a professional civil servants' association which expanded to 
include community college staff, hospital laboratory groups, ambulance officers 
and other hospital workers. Its membership now stands at 110,000. OPSEU 
is affiliated to the same national coordinating union, NUPGE, as NAPE in 
Newfoundland. The largest group comprises the provincial civil servants 
(69,000). 
The introductory membership leaflet points out that "despite [the] legislated 
denial of the right to strike .... 
OPSEU members have never hesitated to use the 
strike weapon when all else failed" (OPSEU, 1992). The depiction of the 
correctional officers' illegal strike indicates the culture of support and 
solidarity around this historical event: "... the correctional officers took the first 
province-wide action in defiance of anti-strike legislation. " The prestige and 
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power of this particular group within the union is relevant to an understanding 
of the gendered dynamics of the reaction to pay equity, and the position of 
women in OPSEU generally. 
OPSEU is a social union, broadening its aim from the welfare of its members 
through collective bargaining to a concern with government cutbacks, labour 
legislation, employment standards, human rights and world peace (Peters, 
Interview, 1991; OPSEU, 1992). It is politically independent from any 
political party. Even so, with the support of its parent union, NUPGE, and 
the CLC, the union was successful in a six year battle for the right for it (and 
by extension other Canadian unions) to use its dues for political purposes. 
This was the result of a challenge under the Freedom of Association section of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and in 1991 it was finally settled in the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Social unionism in Canada would have received a 
severe blow had the union lost its case (OPSEU, 1992; Craig and Solomon, 
1993). 
In 1987, just before the pay equity legislation was passed and negotiations 
started in the public sector, 54% of the union membership were women. 
Interestingly enough, at this time, when OPSEU was at its most active in the 
Equal Pay Coalition, there were the highest number of women on its executive 
board (30%) than at any other time shown in the statistics (up until 1993). By 
1993 the percentage of women on the board had dropped to 21 %, due to the 
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replacement of two retired women directors who were replaced with men 
(Wood, Interview, 1993). 
At a local level, in 1987 31 % of presidents were women (34 % in 1993); and 
38% of Vice presidents were women (39% in 1993). The number of women 
becoming treasurer increased from 32% in 1987 to 48% in 1993, but the 
percentage of women secretaries increased from 47% in 1987 to 70% in 1993. 
The Equal Opportunities Coordinator thought women "had come a long way" 
in the union but: "... the men [still] hold the power broker spots and the women 
are secretaries" (Wood, Interview, 1991, p. 6). 
Historically, OPSEU have been one of the progressive and ground breaking 
public sector unions in women's equality (Briskin, 'Interview, 1991; see also 
Briskin and Yanz, 1985). Feminists inside OPSEU mobilised support in the 
1970's to achieve the election of the first women's committee in Canada. The 
structure of the women's committee required the debate of issues in all 
regions, illustrating the convergence of feminism and democracy in unionism. 
OPSEU's women's committee is relatively powerful compared to its other 
committees, derived from an independent budget and a direct route to the 
resolutions committee and delegation to regional conventions, by-passing the 
usual route through the locals. 
OPSEU was also the first Canadian union to discuss co-worker sexual 
harassment, and after a "big struggle" (Briskin, Interview, 1991, p. 4), the 
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committee won a sexual harassment policy in the constitution in 1978. In 1984 
women9s equality policy focused upon bargaining and legislative lobbying. A 
Board decision in 1988 announced the pursuit of employment equity, both 
externally and internally. The union also have progressive policies on child 
care, video display terminals protection, job sharing, abortion and human 
rights. Translation of these central policies to the bargaining table is achieved 
with varying effectiveness. The main barrier is a lack of women in the 
negotiating teams: of So, it may be a priority of the organisation, but the 
individuals take their own agendas to the table and men are often offended with 
employment equity. It's the woman's way of negotiating. They can't do it on 
their own, so now ... they will be handed cake on a platter (Wood, Interview, 
199 1, p. 14). 
Despite this general difficulty, in the specific case of pay equity the public 
service negotiating team for OPSEU was made up of 80% women - 90% if the 
President of the union is excluded (he was only present at the very beginning 
and end of the process). The Equal Opportunities coordinator was on the 
team, and another member of the women's committee. A committed and 
knowledgeable socialist feminist was the key strategist and negotiator in 
practice. The official chief negotiator was male. He explained that the 
selection of mostly women was a political decision. Indeed, this rationale 
underlay the selection of women to negotiate pay equity in other OPSEU 
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bargaining units, too, and he identified a new cadre of women leaders 
emerging from the pay equity experience (Todd, Interview, 1991). 
Negotiating the Pay Equity Plan 
The pay equity methodology used in the civil service negotiations was 
statistically driven, utilising a complicated policy capturing approach and 
sophisticated computer programming. The aim was to incorporate the 
evaluation process into the design of a questionnaire, which had to be gender 
neutral in order to fully capture the value of women's work. This 
questionnaire was to be completed by everyone in selected male- and female- 
dominated classes, identified by the parties. Accordingly, there were no job 
evaluation committees in the Ontario public service negotiations, and a major 
section of the pay equity bargaining was focused on the joint design, 
completion procedures, collation, and analysis of the questionnaire. The 
results of the questionnaire were used as a basis of negotiations when reaching 
the final decisions on matching male and female jobs and subsequent pay 
equity adjustments. 
The conventional bargaining structure for the Ontario public service is 
centralised following a two-tiered pattern, with working conditions and benefits 
negotiated centrally complemented by separate wage settlements for each of 
eight bargaining categories, occupationally defined. This structure was 
suspended during pay equity bargaining in the civil service. Although OPSEU 
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had recognised that pay equity would not work using the existing structure 
because of the need for male comparators, the shift to a more centralised 
pattern was a difficult move. Traditionally, each of the eight categories had 
been autonomous, almost as if they were separate bargaining units, even 
though technically all the civil service employees were in one large bargaining 
unit. Category independence was important to the union, as they saw the 
ability to organize and bargain autonomously within occupational groups as 
powerful. 
Indeed, by keeping the separate categories the union was able to use pattern 
bargaining, utilising the enhanced bargaining strength of certain categories. 
One category in particular, the male dominated correctional officers, had 
traditionally been recognised as militant, willing to go on illegal strike in 1979 
to separate themselves as a group from the institutional care category, which 
was female dominated. Not surprisingly then, "... historically, [the] members 
have clung on to it and fought for category bargaining" (Peters, Interview, 
1991, p. 13). Continued employer efforts to move to global bargaining was 
interpreted by the union as a strategy to dissipate the militancy of particular 
categories. 
Pay equity bargaining broke with the tradition of category bargaining and the 
only way the union was able to countenance this was to ensure the separation 
of pay equity from conventional collective bargaining. Although the legislation 
did not require this separate structure, the Pay Equity Commission had issued 
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guidelines that recommended separate pay equity bargaining. Pay equity 
activists knew that to integrate pay equity with contract bargaining would be to 
increase the possibilities of women's pay equity adjustments being part of any 
trade-offs necessary to reach settlement. CUPE had seen this tendency in their 
efforts to bargain pay equity issues before the legislation, and OPSEU's chief 
pay equity negotiator admitted the temptation of a union to bargain away one 
group's increases to the detriment of the other when both types of bargaining 
are integrated (Todd, 1991, p. 9). Civil service negotiators in OPSEU also 
recognised that integrated bargaining would stall conventional negotiations as 
they became caught up in the long drawn out job evaluation process. 
According to OPSEU's chief pay equity negotiator, employers in general were 
consistent in wanting to negotiate pay equity together with conventional 
negotiations. He saw this position as reflecting the knowledge that " ... you can 
lose a lot in the shuffle... " this way, and that combined negotiations would be 
a clear advantage to the employer (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 9). Certainly, 
the hospital employers' association did prefer integrated bargaining, because 
this would have meant less disruption of standardised wage rates (LeMay, 
Interview, 1991). However, given the 'showcase' pay equity implementation 
in the civil service, combined with the recommendation of the goverrunent's 
own agency, the Pay Equity Commission, to bargain pay equity separately, in 
addition to the commitment of certain female bureaucrats, it is understandable 
that both union and employer in the civil service were of one mind over this 
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issue at least. It is reasonable to infer that informal bureaucratic networking 
formed a role here, too. The first Pay Equity Commissioner had been the 
immediate superior of the civil servant who became the key pay equity 
negotiator. 
Intraorganisational tensions over bargaining structure were thus contained by 
the union by keeping the pay equity negotiations separate. At the time of my 
interviews in early summer 1991, civil service pay equity adjustments had 
already been paid out (completed by December 1990) and one round of 
contract negotiations had been conducted in 1991. However, it was evident 
from opinions expressed on both union and government sides that there would 
be renewed pressures on the category bargaining system, as a direct result of 
pay equity. 
One member of the union pay equity negotiating team predicted that the 
existing structure would have to change to meet the legislation's requirement to 
maintain pay equity. Maintenance of the relationship between the male 
comparator and the female dominated classes is virtually impossible with each 
category bargaining separately. As she remarked: "... already we're out of 
whack with a certain amount of special cases that have been going on and 
different groups that have gotten more money and have thrown the system out 
of place" (Holowka, 1991, p. 8). She considered the amalgamation of 
categories as the only way to maintain pay equity and recognised that the 
president of the union had a very difficult decision to make. Apparently, that 
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year (1991) had not been a big problem since all categories had received the 
same 5.8% increase, but this would not normally be the case. 
The dilemma of the union is not to be underestimated. Apart from the need to 
ensure that their own bargaining structure does not undermine everything they 
have achieved in pay equity, there is another factor that has to be built into the 
decision on bargaining structure. The bargaining strength exemption in the 
legislation once pay equity has been achieved is still an unknown until there is 
a Tribunal case on this issue to legally define what is meant by bargaining 
strength. Most people interpreted this clause to mean bargaining strength of a 
bargaining unit, but no-one really knew exactly how it. would affect the 
maintenance of pay equity, including the Review Officers at the Pay Equity 
Commission. 
If bargaining strength is taken to mean that of a bargaining unit, then it will 
not be a tool that the employer could use to deny the maintenance of pay 
equity in the civil service because, despite the autonomous categories, all of 
OPSEU's civil servants make up one large bargaining unit. On the other hand, 
OPSEU's correctional officers' category certainly has more bargaining power 
than any other category in the civil service, so if bargaining strength were 
defined as applying to a particular group within a bargaining unit then this 
would result in even more pressure to combine the existing categories to 
prevent the employer using this clause. 
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Turning to the government, the impact of the maintenance of pay equity was 
just being realised by the negotiators in summer 1991. The Coordinator for 
Pay Equity explained that the government had decided to pay out everything 
rather than taking the full three years as they were entitled to under the Act 
because of the "... serious instability... " pay equity instalments would cause 
their pay policy practices (O'Donnell, Interview, 1991, p. 41). This 
continuing change in pay relationships, having to factor in contractual increases 
as well, would exacerbate (for them) the existing problematic consequences of 
pay equity: compression and inversion. 
Since all of the adjustments had been paid out by December 1990, pay equity 
in the civil service was in the maintenance mode, which was described as "... a 
major headache... " (O'Donnell, 1991, p. 42). There were considerable 
pressures on the government side to merge the separate categories for future 
collective bargaining. From the government's perspective, they had already 
paid out another $1.3 million for catch-up costs, to counter any changes in the 
relationship between the female dominated classes and the male comparator 
classes due to collective bargaining increases since the legislation was passed in 
1988. They were now looking at a very complicated identification of job class 
linkages to pinpoint any adjustments payable under the maintenance 
requirement in the Act. The payment of these adjustments would be much 
easier and cheaper to administer if the bargaining structure were changed so 
that all categories were combined for contractual bargaining purposes. 
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A stronger pressure for change was the perception by the government 
bureaucrats interviewed, both women who were clearly advocates for pay 
equity, that the union were using pay equity to "whipsaw" the employer. In 
other words, settling one female dominated category at one level, and then 
when negotiating for a male dominated comparator category, negotiating a 
much higher increase, knowing that this larger increase will flow to the female 
dominated category. The Coordinator for Pay Equity conceded that in the 
1991 round of contractual bargaining OPSEU opted for a 5.8% increase for all 
the categories. In her opinion, the willingness of OPSEU not to disrupt pay 
equity during this round had been largely due to the (then) special relationship 
with the NDP government. 
On the other hand, from the employer's perspective she was pessimistic about 
a special adjustment OPSEU had applied for in one male dominated job class: 
the clerk supply position. This class was a male comparator for practically all 
institutional care classes. At the time of the interview (1991) the Coordinator 
had only just heard that at the conventional collective bargaining table, the 
employer had granted a special wage adjustment. She calculated that the 2% 
increase would cost the government $1 million in adjustments to the tied 
female dominant classes. I was struck by her dismay and surprise that this 
adjustment had been granted at all; she wondered if the government negotiators 
had even realised the pay equity implications. 
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After consultation with the Director of Review of Services at the Pay Equity 
Commission, the compensation division had discovered that this practice of the 
union was legal and that, as employer, they have to pay the adjustment to both 
the male class and the tied female class. The more cooperative spirit 
engendered by the pay equity bargaining was apparently coming under severe 
strain by this development. There was a serious possibility that the 
government as employer could say that from now on they would only bargain 
the male dominated categories, or that they would only bargain one increase 
for all categories in the bargaining unit to maintain pay equity. Either 
government move towards changing the existing bargaining structure would 
limit OPSEU's bargaining, for both would decrease their flexibility and power 
in conventional negotiations. 
Moving on now to a consideration of bargaining style, it is evident from all the 
interview data that the public service pay equity bargaining was more 
cooperative than conventional negotiations. A number of accounts of the 
negotiations (both union and management) refer to the union-management 
"buddy system" devised for completion of the questionnaire and the joint 
communications as very different from normal bargaining, clearly representing 
a more cooperative mode of interaction than usual (Robinson, O'Donnell, 
Todd, and Holowka, 1991). However, the image of cooperation and the 
reasons for it occurring differed between government and union negotiators, 
and to a certain extent within each party to the negotiations. 
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As recommended by Pay Equity Commission guidelines, and as revealed in 
Human Resources Secretariat accounts of the negotiations, for the Ontario 
government a concept of model employer in this case included an expectation 
of a different mode of bargaining. 
From the government negotiators' perspective, the pay equity negotiations 
illustrated a new "partnership" with the civil service union. The word 
partnership was used by the Coordinator of Pay Equity a number of times and 
included the spillover effect of pay equity so that union-management relations 
generally were seen as better. The Assistant Deputy Minister (ADM) of the 
Human Resources Secretariat had also referred approvingly to the partnership 
with the unions and had claimed the joint negotiation of pay equity as a "... real 
coup... " (O'Donnell, Interview, 1991, p. 37). The Coordinator's superior in 
the Human Resources Secretariat at the time of the pay equity negotiations, the 
woman who did most of the actual negotiating, described pay equity bargaining 
as "... turning a new comer" (Robinson, 1991, p. 11). There were two major 
"firsts" in her view: the joint communication of pay equity policy and progress 
and the joint compilation and testing of the questionnaire. The bargaining of 
such a complex issue was to her a significant feat. 
Significantly, these "firsts" came through as noteworthy in the union 
transcripts, too, and formed part of the union negotiators' view that pay equity 
bargaining was certainly different from and even more cooperative than 
conventional bargaining. However, perhaps not surprisingly, the discourse 
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was less managerialist in the sense of a new partnership or the achievement of 
a new cooperative form of bargaining. It was rather a straightforward 
assessment that the power of the union was considerably enhanced by legal and 
political pressures on the government negotiators, and that this therefore forced 
them to be more cooperative. 
Nevertheless, the union chief negotiator described pay equity bargaining as 
it a more collaborative project than regular [conventional] collective 
bargaining... " (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 6). His female colleague, who was 
the key figure in the negotiations, differentiated between collaboration and 
cooptation and saw this important in any new kind of bargaining that may 
evolve: "... even though it was clear that we represented different interests 
from the government and we never let that go, we also recognised that to some 
extent it had to be a collaborative process in terms of getting to the end" 
(Peters, Interview, 1991, p. 23). It should be noted here that the government 
negotiators were also aware of the different interests of the parties, even while 
espousing the notion of a new partnership with the union: "... There was a lot 
more give and take .... There was more of a sense of partnership, 
[but] not to 
the extent that we ever lost sight of who we were" (O'Donnell, Interview, 
1991, p. 16). Her superior echoed this position: "There wasn't necessarily a 
singleness of purpose always between us .... 
Very often, there just is an 
employer view on a union... (Robinson, Interview, 1991, p. 13). 
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The need for collaboration is implicit in the joint negotiation of the gender 
neutral comparison of jobs, as the Act requires in unionised workplaces. As 
was pointed out by a union negotiator, the government needed the union for 
the technical information- gathering stage and the union needed the government 
for money it wanted for pay equity. At this basic level goals were 
complementary, if not mutual. 
A further indicator of cooperation is the flow of information exchange. 
Accounts of this set of pay equity negotiations made much of the joint 
communication process, but of information exchange there was little mention. 
Certainly no-one talked about. information disclosure as, a problem; after all, 
the main focus of bargaining was to design an instrument to generate 
information for both parties to work with. We know that the government 
representatives wanted a pay equity plan for the civil service very much and it 
is reasonable to assume that there would be little resistance to information 
disclosure by the government. As a "model employer" they would have 
known of the important Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal case in 1989 which early 
on had established the proposition that unions were entitled to virtually full 
information disclosure at very early stages of bargaining, differentiating pay 
equity from conventional bargaining in terms of the legal definition of good 
faith bargaining (Lennon- Shilton, Interview, 1991; Ontario Public Service 
Employees Union v. Cybermedix Health Services, 1990). One union 
negotiator estimated that there was a real long-term benefit gained from the 
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information given to them during pay equity bargaining; she said she was still 
using the statistics over a year later (Holowka, Interview, 1991). 
The indicators of trust and openness were not prominent themes in the data. 
Indeed, an expectation of high levels of trust and openness would be somewhat 
inconsistent with the general tone of all the union negotiators, even if 
government negotiators' accounts were slightly more optimistic. For example, 
the key government negotiator commented: "... I think we were quite open with 
one another along the way" (Robinson, Interview, 1991, p. 13). However, 
OPSEU had taught their members involved in job evaluation committees never 
to forget who their constituents were, and to recognise the difference between 
collaboration and cooptation. The key negotiator particularly disliked the 
managerialist model of job evaluation which assumes that participants become 
individuals with an individual voice rather than representatives of a collective. 
However, she was careful to explain that this awareness of different interests 
did not preclude working collaboratively or cooperatively (Peters, Interview, 
1991). 
Despite this general principle, an attempt was made by key union individuals to 
bargain in a more open way than usual in the civil service negotiations: 
So on an ongoing basis there were a few of us who really did 
work at building relationships with them. That's not to say that 
we changed our position ... what we had to do was work to 
understand their position and then counter it .... Our bargaining 
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was far straighter, I would say, in a sort of more up front. 
(Peters, Interview, 1991, p. 23) 
It is important to note that this negotiator was influential in setting the tone for 
the union's bargaining style since she and her technical advisor were the 
strategists even though the chief negotiator was officially someone else. She 
was also at the table all the time and bargained most of the technical issues. 
The last indicator of cooperation, problem solving, was seen differently by 
union and management negotiators. The question on problem solving 
approaches apparently touched a sensitive spot with the union's chief 
negotiator. Although he described the pay equity negotiations as being more 
collaborative than usual, he saw the push towards problem solving as 
completely unrealistic and only advocated by academics and bureaucrats. In 
his opinion, the whole concept of designating a particular set of negotiations as 
win\win was flawed as it more or less ignored the political reality of both 
parties' negotiators, but especially the union representatives. Even a 
government negotiator who had agreed with the union negotiator that the last 
round of negotiations were win\win would change his or her perception if 
political expediency dictated otherwise, and this would put both parties in a 
conflictual situation next time round. He pointed out that the media also 
played an important role in the general view as to whether any deal was 
win\win. If the newspaper reported that the union lost (or the government), 
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that was how it was seen, it did not matter if the negotiators felt it to be 
win\win. 
In contrast, the Coordinator of Pay Equity for the government identified two 
areas of difficulty that had in her opinion been resolved through problem 
solving methods. The first example was the disagreement over the scales and 
labels, settled with a compromise by both parties. The second example was 
what she called the "percent female" issue. This was an acutely difficult stage 
in the negotiations when the government (and we infer, the union) realised that 
by using the policy capturing approach they had measured the existing pay 
policy of the government, but could not easily fit their model into the 
methodology required by the legislation. The New York model they had 
followed provided for a wage line to be drawn rather than a job to job 
comparison, so they had to modify their own methodology considerably. Both 
negotiating teams would have preferred a wage line as a truer pay equity and 
viewed the lowest male comparator target as not generating fair wage 
adjustments, but the government negotiators had been told by senior 
bureaucrats that they could not establish a wage line. 
After a long and difficult phase in bargaining, both parties agreed to a proposal 
of the union involving a "percent female factor" to achieve what they felt was 
a gender neutral comparison system, and thus allowing a more equitable 
calculation of the adjustment by moving beyond the lowest male comparator. 
A careful analysis of the interviews, which included attempts to gain 
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clarification of this stage of the negotiations, did not reveal the precise nature 
of this methodology. It was, significantly, never spelt out in detail. The 
inference is that it was a technical device negotiated by the parties to enable 
settlement of the pay equity plan. 
The "percent female factor" was, however, broadly similar in concept to a 
methodology proposed in the OPSEU brief submitted to government that had 
seemed so unacceptable during the consultation phase of the legislation. This 
proposal had aimed to avoid what were perceived as management biased job 
evaluation schemes by using linear regression to demonstrate that for every one 
percent increase of women in a job class, there was (in 1986) a decrease of 
$1.15 in weekly wages. Thus, pay equity adjustments would be calculated 
using this standard rate of adjustment based on the percentage of women in 
particular job classes. 
Whatever the precise nature of the agreed methodology, the Coordinator of 
Pay Equity considered the resolution of this difficult phase of bargaining as an 
example of problem solving since the issue seemed intractable at the time; 
initially neither party could say with certainty whether the proposed solution 
would work. This problem highlights just how different pay equity bargaining 
is from conventional bargaining: the technical complexity is always extremely 
demanding, if not mystifying. This can undermine control by one or both 
parties, which is particularly unfortunate because technical method has serious 
political consequences. In the Ontario public service both parties had the 
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knowledge and skills to calculate the consequences of each technical option 
before returning to negotiations. 
In an overall consideration of how far this new type of bargaining extended 
-into a cooperative mode, the civil service negotiations were more collaborative 
than their conventional negotiations. Whether they could be called integrative 
or problem solving in nature is debateable. Also, any movement along a 
continuum of conflict\cooperation was not unidirectional. Styles of bargaining 
changed according to the stage of the negotiations, and, to an extent, according 
to the negotiators involved. What was significant in this set of negotiations 
was that the stage which we know causes the most conflict in general, 
according to the Review Officers at the Pay Equity Commission, was handled 
collaboratively. It was also the stage which illustrated most effectively the 
political nature of the pay equity process, and therefore feeds into the debate 
on whether collective bargaining is compatible with pay equity. 
The stage that the Review Officers called "equal and comparable" is that of 
deciding the match between the female dominated and male comparator jobs, 
which directly impacts on the wage adjustments to be paid out by the 
employer. It is essential at this stage that unions are familiar with the 
compensation practice of banding, because the width of the band determines 
the availability of male comparators. Although compensation experts tend to 
present their skills as objective, clearly the placement of the band is going to 
be controversial, given that the union understands the consequences. 
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In the public service negotiations OPSEU knew very well the crucial nature of 
this stage of implementation and it is evident from both union and management 
interviews that there were certain outcomes that just were not politically 
acceptable to OPSEU, whatever the numbers said. Moreover, both parties 
knew that there was a limit to the cost of pay equity, whatever the figures said. 
These constraints were clear to both parties. For example, the government's 
Coordinator of Pay Equity knew that the largest female dominated class 
(20,000), office administration, was the union's target group: "Even if they 
had come out to be demonstrated not to be undervalued, that would not have 
been acceptable. And that was quite clear" (1991, O'Donnell, Interview, p. 
13). 
A candid interpretation of the final stages of the negotiations was provided by 
the ministry of health advisor who sat on the government's bargaining team. 
For her, OPSEU's agenda was explicable in terms of political accountability of 
their largest membership group - office administration. Another group that she 
identified as a priority for OPSEU was the nurses, a group who she knew were 
attracted to an alternative union, the Ontario Nurses' Association (ONA). As 
the Manager of Compensation and Employee Relations in the Human 
Resources Branch of the Ministry of Health, she was especially interested in 
these groups because together they made up about half of her ministry's 
employees. 
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Her description of the final stages of the negotiations illustrate very well the 
relationship between the technical and the political: 
[OPSEU] were determined that women in the office 
administration classes had to get a significant payout and again 
the technicians went into the back room and spun the numbers 
and produced a set of results, identified a male comparator that 
did in fact provide the administration group with quite a healthy 
payout -I think it was something like $1.35 an hour .... It was 
fascinating to see .... So, while there was an incredibly 
sophisticated, exhaustive technical system behind it all, when it 
actually came to the negotiations it was a hot spot, it was a 
pressure point. It was the office administration group, it was the 
nurses.... (Hall, Interview, 1991, p. 3) 
This member of the bargaining team confirmed that the monetary parameters 
were part of the formula acceptable to both sides, and explained that the 
it spinning of the numbers" had to take account of that: 
OK, fine, we've got a hundred million and the office 
administration group is the group that has to be accommodated 
the most, well then how much can we give them and still have 
something left over to deal with these other groups without 
reaching that one hundred million threshold. (Hall, 1991, p. 3) 
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Confirmation of this version of what happened is provided by one of the union 
negotiators who was clearly concerned at the relationship between collective 
bargaining and pay equity, and wondered whether what they did should in fact 
be called partial pay equity. She first of all criticised the Act (as most 
unionists did in Ontario) because of its limited view of equity: primarily the 
lowest male comparator clause and the 1% limit over a predetermined number 
of years for the public sector. Then she moved on to what had been negotiated 
to fit in with these parameters and she particularly focused upon the limited pot 
of money. A crucial aspect of "spinning the numbers" was the financial 
package available. The first OPSEU run through the figures from the 
questionnaire apparently required a pay out of about 9% of payroll (union and 
management transcripts, 1991, plus informal communications), which the 
union knew it had to reduce to 1% per year for five years. 
She referred to the separate technical analyses done by the parties and the need 
to "manipulate the bands" (1991, p. 13): 
... because you 
know that you have a certain parameter as far as 
money. You know you want certain adjustments in certain 
classifications. At one point ... 
it was probably a mistake, we 
showed a pay out that increased office work and gave no 
increase whatsoever to nurses ... well ... 
because we were doing 
adjustments as far as banding, you would have to do different 
adjustments in a different area because we would never go to the 
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table and say that our nurses would not be covered by pay 
equity. (1991, p. 14) 
The evidence leads to a conclusion that the pay equity study results were 
massaged to suit political agendas, OPSEU recognising the problems which 
would arise if pay outs did not reflect certain expectations in the union, 
including wage differentials. For example, subsequently, a group of OPSEU 
nurses filed a complaint with the commission against both the union and the 
employer. And a management informant told me that ONA, the rival union, 
were paying these nurses' legal fees. 
However, one member of the bargaining team raised the question: 
If you want pay equity, can you negotiate? How do you 
negotiate a portion of equity and what portion do you really 
want? And who are you to decide that, and how can you make 
it on paper so that it's fair to everybody? When you have a 
price tag attached to it .... So, we went through this whole 
exercise ... but it wasn't the essence of what pay equity 
is, by any 
means. It's not parity. So it gets to be quite tricky. And 
you're the negotiating team and you have to justify what you did 
at the end. (Holowka, Interview, 1991, p. 15) 
These concerns are similar to those expressed by a key union pay equity 
negotiator in Newfoundland, the co-chair of the Steering Committee, to whom 
292 
compromise was the essence of negotiation and was thus contradictory to the 
concept of pay equity as an objective process. He also focused on the final 
stages when the results of the pay equity study were being negotiated in order 
to reach a pay equity settlement. The question as to whether pay equity can be 
negotiated turns upon how we define pay equity; clearly if we equate it with an 
objective process involving the scientific application of a job evaluation 
system, then it is not. For one Ontario government representative, pay equity 
compatibility with collective bargaining did not hinge upon the very evident 
political processes involved but whether the participants, and especially the 
unions, could function effectively in this manner. For example, she viewed 
pay equity as compatible with collective bargaining in the public service 
because: 
... both sides were so much creatures of the political process and 
understood the political pressures and both were under enormous 
pressure to achieve a win-win type solution .... In the broader 
health sector there has been, unfortunately, some reason to argue 
that perhaps pay equity is very difficult to achieve through a 
negotiated process, depending on the union. (Hall, Interview, 
199 1, P. 7) 
The findings presented on this case study so far makes it very clear that the 
process was highly political, and leads us to a closer examination of the power 
relationships behind that political process. The union negotiators saw 
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government9s increased cooperation with them at the bargaining table as a 
direct result of the legal and political pressures upon the negotiators. Their 
concept of cooperation was inextricably linked with the government's 
decreased bargaining power: the negotiators were forced to cooperate with the 
union to get the job done on time. This gave the union more power and they 
used it to gain a good pay equity settlement. 
The pressures of being seen as a model employer in the implementation of the 
government's own legislation impacted on the usual negotiating relationship 
between the government and OPSEU, whose bargaining power is normally 
eroded considerably because it cannot legally strike. This conclusion is 
confirmed in both government and union accounts. 
For the union, cooperation not usually gained from the government in 
contractual negotiations was forthcoming because of the requirements of the 
legislation - as an employer the government had to implement pay equity, and 
to a deadline. Moreover, the showcase character of the negotiations gave them 
an advantage all through the negotiations. The chief negotiator assessed the 
effect of the deadline and. concluded that the government were much more 
concerned about it than OPSEU not only because of their need to demonstrate 
that they were a model employer but because they needed to show other 
employers that, contrary to their criticisms, pay equity could be implemented 
in one of Ontario's biggest enterprises. 
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He explained how this affected bargaining power by referring to the 
proposition: 
... always want what you're after but never want it too much. 
Because if you do, you pay more. So, given that the 
government wanted that deadline more than we did ... we 
squeezed more money out of them because it's against this 
somewhat artificial time barrier which they had erected for 
themselves.... (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 8) 
Another member of the OPSEU pay equity negotiating team identified the legal 
requirement and political pressures as enhancing their bargaining power, 
compared with conventional negotiations. She referred to a sense of 
government desperation to meet the deadline: "... in the end, they were almost 
pleading with us to settle this... " (Holowka, Interview, 199 1, p. 22). In her 
view, the separate bargaining structure had also increased their bargaining 
power because the government could not argue inability to pay as a reason for 
not settling. 
The sense of desperation the union negotiators referred to certainly can be 
identified on the government side. The Coordinator of Pay Equity remarked 
more than once in her interview that they were afraid of the union walking out, 
especially near the end when the deadline was approaching. For example: 
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Our biggest fear was that they would walk out ... our biggest fear 
was that we would break down ... we did not want to tell that to 
them but.... (O'Donnell, Interview, 1991, p. 4) 
Her colleague and senior, the woman who did most of the actual negotiating at 
the table, referred to her constant worry that they were not going to meet the 
deadline. She described working extremely long hours, with only a few hours 
sleep every night, for long stretches of time in the months of November and 
December 1989 (the deadline was January 1990) in order to be ready at 8 am 
every morning to start another day's negotiations. It is clear that the pressure 
was considerable to make the legislation work, and to make it look good. 
The evidence indicated that concessions were the price the government was 
willing to pay for joint negotiation of pay equity with the union, in a way that 
would be acceptable politically, and allow them to reach the deadline. In 
addition, the union negotiators had the benefit of a substantial amount of 
technical expertise, both in-house and advisory, and this enhanced their power. 
Putting the gender and class implications to one side for the present, a large 
part of the public service pay equity bargaining was taken up with joint 
negotiation of an information- gathering questionnaire, reflecting the policy 
capturing approach. This phase loomed large in nearly all the interviews I did 
with the negotiators. As OPSEU's chief negotiator commented: "... we fought 
over every word, every letter, every comma, every period, the order of them, 
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the way in which they were stated ... in order to arrive at the purest statistical 
instrument... " (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 16). 
From an analysis of both union and employer transcripts, there was strong 
disagreement over whether the questionnaire should have multiple choice 
questions, over the labelling and number of scale measurements, and (only 
from a government informant) whether the government should provide 
facilitator training for multi-language and deaf respondents. In all of these 
cases, the government negotiators conceded on an issue they thought very 
important, although resolution of the scales and labelling issue was a classic 
compromise, so that each party gained some of what it wanted. With regard to 
the first issue, the multiple choice questions, a key government negotiator 
referred to the "time lag ... we had to get a decision .... We were really, really 
loathe to give up our multiple choice .... So, for us it was heart wrenching, 
technically, to give up on them .... There was no way out... " (O'Donnell, 
Interview, 1991, p. 30). Her comments indicated that this concession was 
very important to the government and that it was made because of the time 
pressure. Overall, these concessions caused some intraorganisational tensions 
for the government side, including the eventual ignoring of advice from one 
technical advisor (who later withdrew from the assignment) in favour of hiring 
another statistical advisor, who was seen as less of a purist. 
It is reasonable to conclude that the bargaining edge was with the union. The 
final settlement contained wage adjustments above and beyond the statutory 
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minimum. OPSEU is a big powerful union wi the resources to pay for 
technical expertise. Moreover, it had the benefit of a feminist pay equity 
coordinator who was committed, astute, and very knowledgeable about the 
issue. In addition, the employer was a provincial government who was 
desperate to do the right thing within the legislated timeframe. Moreover, the 
key government negotiators were committed to pay equity and a collaborative 
settlement, and were willing to be creative in order to achieve a truer form of 
equity than that required in the Act. 
As indicated in the Newfoundland case study, the concept of objectivity in job 
evaluation, and pay equity as an objective process, is a misunderstanding of 
how the policy actually works in practice. It ignores the political realities of 
the organisations involved and the collective bargaining process. The next 
section further explores those political realities by attempting to locate gender 
and class properties in the interaction of the parties involved. 
Gender and Class Dimensions 
In this section, gender and class dimensions of pay equity bargaining in the 
Ontario public service are examined. A major theme in the following analysis 
is a continuing tension between the pressures of an existing hierarchy and a 
strong labour-feminist politic. 
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Pressures of existing hierarchy 
The union's key negotiator believed that pay equity through job evaluation 
cemented existing hierarchy, which she already saw as a problem, judging 
from conversations she had heard between co-workers concerned about their 
own place in this hierarchy and their differentials compared to other workers. 
She saw the effects of this model of pay equity as divisive amongst women and 
amongst workers in general. In her opinion, OPSEU, and unions in general, 
should be pursuing wage compression, partly through lobbying minimum wage 
increases. 
Both union and management sources provided examples of where employees 
had strived to reestablish old hierarchical relationships after pay equity 
implementation, and this raises the question of maintenance of pay equity in 
the face of a strong impetus towards reestablishing the pre-existing hierarchy, 
even if undermined temporarily. 
The gendered construction of this hierarchy is highlighted by one union 
negotiator's description of resistance to pay equity throughout the process, 
11 
... where different male groups within the organisation can't take 
it 
seriously... " (Holowka, Interview, 199 1, p. 3). She particularly mentioned the 
male dominated correctional officers' group whose promotional "Guts and 
Glory" poster was brought out the year pay equity was being bargained. This 
group had been described to me by women unionists in OPSEU as "macho -" 
These workers, along with the male dominated transportation group and (male) 
299 
psychiatric workers in Ontario's top security psychiatric prison had refused to 
complete the pay equity questionnaire (Interviews with Holowka, 1991,3; and 
O'Donnell, 1991, p. 5). Interestingly enough, the union negotiators wanted a 
much more authoritarian solution to this problem than the government 
negotiators would accept; perhaps a reflection of the strong intraorganisational 
tensions in the union along gender lines. 
Another union negotiator, also a member of the Women's Committee, referred 
to a lot of resentment by the men that the women were getting a raise and they 
were not. Again, she identified the correctional officers as the main 
complainers: 
Women can't stand on their own and negotiate, women have to 
have legislation to advance ... this mostly comes from 
correctionals. They're the big guys, they know how to do job 
action, they know how do illegal strikes. They know how to get 
what they want ... balls, is what they say9 right. 
But women cry 
in the comer and wuzz and whine till they get legislation to give 
them what they need. (Wood, Interview, 1991, p. 18) 
Other men in- the union were willing to identify with the women who have 
been underpaid but "... they got a raise and you didn't; that hurts" (Wood, 
Interview, 1991, p. 18). The chief negotiator also remarked that the men who 
were dissatisfied were either those for whom pay equity had identified an 
inequity as well (with no provisions for redress under the pay equity 
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legislation), or those who thought that now the women had a raise they should 
have one, too. 
He was very well aware of the erosion of pay equity should these men be 
granted an increase, and raised the difficulty of political accountability of the 
leadership in the case of members asking the union to pursue catch-up 
increases. He pointed to the same problem with male unionists' reactions to 
pay equity in two other jurisdictions: Manitoba, Canada; and Minnesota, US. 
We also know that there were some negative male reactions in Newfoundland 
unions where the skilled trades classes were the main group who managed to 
obtain special adjustments to offset pay equity. OPSEU's chief negotiator's 
solution, admittedly in hindsight, was for there to be much more education and 
communication internally to forestall these kind of negative responses. 
It was encouraging to discover that the union leadership was committed to pay 
equity sufficiently to provide technical support the size of a "small army" 
(Holowka, Interview, 1991, p. 11), and that a high level political presence at 
the table initially symbolised the seriousness of that commitment. 
Nevertheless, at the time of my interviews pay equity adjustments were 
finished and although the chief negotiator admitted that increases for men 
would erode gains made in pay equity, the government Pay Equity Coordinator 
commented that the union had negotiated special increases for some of the 
male classes. She assessed this as a response to the unhappiness that the 
employer was picking up, too, about pay equity: 
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And it's still the perception that there still are only women doing 
typing and secretarial work. You should hear the men when 
they talk about them.... 'This office adminee is making more 
money than me. I mean I've got my degree and I've got my 
certificate. I'm a "techie" person. I'm a this, I'm a that. 
There's no way .... I do much more complex work than her and 
she's earning more than me. ' And I'm sure the union is getting 
the same things. (O'Donnell, Interview, 1991, p. 51) 
Up until that time (May 1991), these special increases had not really had much 
effect in the bigger picture but, as mentioned earlier under the bargaining 
structure, the special case increase for the clerk supply position was a different 
matter, involving the government in major costs. However, in terms of the 
wage gap, male comparator increases at least have the advantage of pulling the 
tied female dominated classes with them. 
Reassertion of pre-existing differentials was also attempted through a route 
outside wage negotiations or pay equity: reclassification grievances. Under 
public service legislation employees have this right, including appeal to a 
tribunal if unresolved, and the government Pay Equity Coordinator estimated 
that OPSEU had made some considerable gains this way. A few isolated 
groups had been awarded increases of gains of 35%. She concluded: "And we 
are seeing groups trying to reestablish pre-existing value systems through the 
classification grievance process. We have received a number of classification 
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grievances from groups specifically because of pay equity" (O'Donnell, 
Interview, 1991, p. 
From the employer's perspective this seems an everlasting process of catch-up, 
and a trend that will, in my opinion, harden government and employer attitudes 
towards the introduction of pay equity. I think it significant that the 
government's Pay Equity Coordinator, so clearly an advocate of pay equity 
and, if not pro-union, certainly not anti-union, can so soon after pay equity 
implementation clearly articulate her dismay at the mounting cost by describing 
the process as "whipsawing" the government to get more money. 
For example, the total for pay equity adjustments for the provincial 
government at the time of the interviews was $120 million, plus $1 million and 
$2 million for catch-up for years 1 and 2 respectively (O'Donnell, Interview, 
1991, p. 50). An increase for a male comparator tied to a large female 
dominated class, like office administration, would generate an enormous bill - 
pay equity for this latter class cost the government $54 million. The threat of 
the government having to pay about $53 million dollars for a proposed 20% 
classification raise for a male comparator job tied to the office administration 
class led to the government placing limitations on its liability to maintain pay 
equity. In the 1993 amendments to the original Pay Equity Act, classification 
arbitration awards paid to male comparator classes would not now be paid out 
to any tied female dominated classes; new male comparators would have to be 
found. As my government informant explained, the cost of the then pending 
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classification award alone would have cancelled any savings the government 
had made in its "social contract" agreements. 
Nevertheless, the effect of these male comparator class classification awards 
(with pay equity links severed) and reclassification of other males is that 
considerable amounts of money will be paid out to men, undermining the new 
wage relationships established by pay equity. This is money that should be 
going to women, since the policy was to redress women's discriminatory 
wages. And, according to a government informant, the cost of these 
grievances is seen by some as "small bucks" but she has calculated the 
cumulative cost over a few years for her ministry alone, and although in this 
ministry budget the cost is small, as she pointed out, there are 27 ministries 
and then the cost does not look so insignificant. 
Resistance to any changing of the status quo can be identified in both union 
and management constituencies. Not only have employees tried to change 
relationships through reclassification grievances but also managers in the 
ministries have attempted to reclassify certain groups of women to avoid 
paying out substantial pay equity adjustments. Apparently, these requests have 
come from "... fairly high level managers" (Interview, 1991, p. 47). 
The constraints of hierarchy and the pay relationships bound up in it has been 
identified both in the Newfoundland and Ontario implementation of pay equity. 
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Next, let us look at some of the transformative properties of the gender and 
class dynamic in the civil service negotiations. 
Labour-feminist politic 
A major barrier to effectively implementing the job evaluation model of pay 
equity is the technical, potentially mystifying, nature of the job evaluation 
process. For long guarded as the sole terrain of management and management 
consultants, the union's knowledge and expertise in negotiating a gender 
neutral job evaluation system is crucial. OPSEU's commitment and expertise 
in the civil service negotiations were at least equal to the employers' 
negotiators, if not greater, and this meant that the union was able to maintain 
control of the policy capturing method suggested by the government and 
accepted by OPSEU. When the methodology threatened to go off track, the 
union were able to gain the government's agreement to their creative solution. 
This innovation allowed the process to continue so that a good final settlement 
was possible. 
Negotiating the questionnaire was a long-drawn out phase of the bargaining. 
The hard bargaining over "every word, every letter, every comma, every 
period... " of the questionnaire can be further understood by locating a" sub- 
text" to these arguments which appeared on the "surface" to be conflict about 
mere technicalities (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 16). The real subject of the 
conflict was about the capturing of women's work: 
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... it wasn't a semantic issue, we weren't parsing or analysing a 
sentence. We wanted to get at nursing attributes or qualities in 
this particular question in as strong a way as we could. The 
employer knew that if he put it this way, and a lot of people 
answered the way we thought they would answer, they would 
eventually ... when you get to the end of the day, it translates into 
points and money. (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 16) 
The ability of the union to locate gendered notions of skill and work in the 
technicalities of questionnaire design was derived from a labour-feminist politic 
underlying the analysis and expertise brought to the table by the majority of the 
bargaining team. From interviews and informal communications, a major 
source of knowledge, commitment and strategy was the key female negotiator, 
who worked with the input of a female technical advisor, present throughout 
the bargaining. This key negotiator was a founder member of the Equal Pay 
Coalition and had honed her skills during her political work there. 
Feminisation of Bargaining Teams and Feminist Process 
The expertise crucial for negotiating was provided by the women in both 
parties, and the majority of negotiators were women, even if the chief 
negotiators were men. As one union negotiator commented: "So you have all 
these women and it's ... you have two men talking to each other. 
So, it's still 
the figureheads... " (Holowka, Interview, 199 1, p. 5). A government member 
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of the bargaining team (1991, p. 2) believed that neither of the chief 
negotiators fully understood pay equity: "... neither of the two chief negotiators 
felt comfortable with or in command of their material -"A new pattern of 
bargaining emerged whereby the chief negotiators settled the broad principles 
(upon the advice of their female colleagues) and then the technical issues were 
settled through negotiation between the women members of the team. One 
member of the union team confirmed that it was in this latter forum, and in 
caucus, that the women had the influence (Holowka, Interview, 1991, p. 5). 
Likewise, we can infer from the transcripts that on the management side two 
key women took control of the technical side, rather than the chief negotiator. 
It is clear from union negotiators' accounts that feminist process underlay their 
attempt at a different style of bargaining during the Ontario public service pay 
equity implementation. The key union negotiator referred to a different model 
of collective bargaining in pay equity and explained she and her female 
colleagues on the team had tried to avoid the typical scenario where the two 
men settle the deal behind closed doors or on the telephone (she referred 
disparagingly to "gross male politics" at one point). She was pleased that the 
team "... didn't hand it over to the chief negotiator" (Peters, Interview, 1991, 
p. 2 3). 
Her background was helping to found a small independent union run on 
feminist principles, encouraging membership participation and avoiding male 
dominance by allowing all members of the team to negotiate rather than rely 
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on an outside expert - usually male. This model allowed for more 
collaboration than confrontation, the latter a style she associated with 
traditional male negotiators. She deliberately sought a less adversarial process 
in pay equity bargaining, particularly appropriate in her view, given the 
technical complexity of the negotiating. As she explained: 
... with pay equity it was more of a collaboration between groups 
of people and really groups of women. So on an ongoing basis 
there were a few of us who really did work at building 
relationships with them .... So we changed the character of 
bargaining. (Peters, Interview, 1991, p. 23) 
This attempt to change the nature of bargaining to a more collaborative, 
feminist process by the key women in the union team complemented the 
management team's desire to demonstrate a new partnership with the union 
during pay equity implementation. This apparent matching of a managerial 
and feminist aim did enable a less adversarial approach to bargaining than 
usual, even if the effect was less clear in the Ontario public service than the 
early Newfoundland experience, where the effect was enhanced by three 
women management negotiators who wanted to adopt a feminist process as 
well as the union women. 
One member of the bargaining team, a member of the Women's Committee, 
explained that separate pay equity bargaining helped the feminist process to 
develop away from the more competitive climate of category bargaining (for 
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example, the men negotiators competing to finish first). Thus, the strengths of 
feminist process were allowed to emerge. 
The emphasis upon a feminist process by key OPSEU women led to other 
positive consequences. In a number of union interviews, informants pointed to 
the advantage of women leaders emerging from the increased participation of 
women in pay equity implementation (Interviews with Holowka, Todd, and 
Wood, 1991). A female pay equity negotiator noted that there were not 
enough women in negotiating positions: "The quip out there is that men 
negotiate, women organise" (Wood, Interview, 1991, p. 17). However, she 
predicted more women moving into bargaining in order to ensure maintenance 
of their pay equity adjustments. The chief negotiator, and subsequently the 
pay equity coordinator for the province, pointed to new leadership amongst 
women in general as a result of pay equity: "... I think the pay equity 
experience and the explanation to your colleagues, to your union brothers in 
this case, done at its best, has produced some of the better, and newer, women 
leaders at the local level... " (Todd, Interview, 1991, p. 3). 
Overall, the presence of an effective labour-feminist politic empowered 
OPSEU to maintain a high level of control over the content and process of the 
public service pay equity bargaining. This effectiveness was enhanced by the 
influence of employer negotiators, whose commitment to pay equity was 
limited by their position in the bureaucracy, but who were willing to cooperate 
in a creative version of pay equity for civil service women. However, only 
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time will tell how powerful the impetus towards pre-existing hierarchy will be 
in undermining pay equity implementation in the Ontario public service. 
The next chapter draws together some common themes from both case studies, 
leading to conclusions concerning the interrelationship between pay equity and 
collective bargaining, and finally placing pay equity policy in the context of an 
overall policy for women's equality. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Structural Properties of Pay Equity Bargaining: 
Constraints and Opportunities 
In this concluding chapter, some major themes emerging from the analysis of 
the case study material are discussed, with reference to the earlier chapters and 
the questions raised in Chapter I. The chapter also draws upon the experience 
of pay equity in the Ontario hospital sector. Although (as noted in Chapter 1) 
not presented in this thesis as a third major case study, the findings of this 
research are drawn upon where they provide useful points of comparison or 
contrast with the experience of pay equity in the Ontario public service and 
Newfoundland hospitals. 
After a brief summary of the constraints and opportunities identified in the case 
studies presented in Chapters V and VI., the discussion continues with an 
examination of the interrelationship between collective and pay equity through 
integrating the questions regarding bargaining structure, style and power with 
the identification and tracking of the relevant structural properties of gender 
and class. A major theme in the chapter is the ongoing tension between 
hierarchy and a labour-feminist politic. Finally, a discussion on the 
relationship between collective bargaining and the law leads to an examination 
of pay equity policies in the context of overall equality policies for Canadian 
women. 
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The case studies showed that the interrelationship between pay equity and 
collective bargaining varied in specific process and outcome. In 
Newfoundland, an effective labour-feminist alliance resulted in a progressive 
pay equity policy legalised in a collective agreement. There was a promising 
early stage of cooperative implementation featuring the consolidation of a 
labour-feminist alliance overlapping with a convergence of feminist process 
with employer preference for integrative bargaining. During this time a 
substantial number of low paid women's jobs were identified as being 
undervalued and some progress was made towards closing the wage gap. 
However, a newly elected government heralded a change in employer 
commitment. This exacerbated tensions which had emerged during the job 
evaluation stages as a result of a struggle over the reproduction of hierarchy. 
During the second phase of evaluation, traditional differentials embedded in 
this hierarchy were considered more important than the achievement of pay 
equity for women. Consequently, a large group of women who worked in a 
traditionally undervalued job were not credited with their full value within the 
parameters of the job evaluation plan. Furthermore, the impasse reached 
during this phase of evaluation was impossible to resolve in a Steering 
Committee now undermined by government reluctance to pursue pay equity as 
a worthwhile policy. 
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In the Ontario public service, pay equity bargaining evolved as mostly a 
cooperative venture, featuring the influence of a strong labour-feminist 
alliance, a government very concerned with projecting a "model employer" 
image, and feminist process gelling with managerial objectives of partnership. 
Nevertheless, within the generally cooperative nature of pay equity bargaining, 
there were tensions generated from resistance to any change in the existing 
hierarchy of wages, and indications of reassertion of traditional differentials 
embedded in that hierarchy. 
Although there was variation in the specific circumstances of the negotiations 
studied, a number of common themes emerged: the gendered construction of 
work and skill; the pressures of hierarchy; a labour-feminist politic challenging 
the status quo; cost containment in the context of retrenchment in the public 
sector; and the mutual reinforcement of feminist process and management 
notions of partnership or integrative bargaining. The specificity of particular 
sets of pay equity negotiations, and the variation in different phases of the 
same negotiations, can be explained by the shifting permutations of the 
enabling or constraining qualities of the structural properties. 
In both case studies, the key facilitator affecting the degree to which structural 
properties emerged as constraints or opportunities was the labour-feminist 
politic. Varying in its effectiveness in the empirical data, a labour-feminist 
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politic, as referred to in this concluding chapter, means the infusion of feminist 
ideology, process, practices, structure, analysis and action into labour policies 
and practices. An effective labour-feminist politic includes a recognition that 
the technical is political, such that decisions that appear to be neutral or 
objective, merely "technical, " are in reality political, saturated with the power 
relations of gender and class. Also, it incorporates an understanding of the 
link between internal and external equality, so that there is a recognition that 
central equality policies for women will only be implemented successfully if 
equality and negotiating structures articulate effectively. Thus, a labour- 
feminist politic in the context of pay equity bargaining is not just feminist, but 
captures the logic of collective bargaining and the labour relations system, both 
as constraints and as opportunities. In the negotiations studied, strategies 
deriving from a labour-feminist politic evolved as a result of feminists working 
within existing union structures and processes, or from coalition with outside 
women9s groups. 
The other facilitator affecting the pattern of structural properties in the pay 
equity bargaining studied was the level of employer commitment. Although 
not so empirically prominent in the data as the effect of a labour-feminist 
politic, employer commitment and political will were clearly forces affecting 
any shift from constraints to opportunities. Of course, favourable commitment 
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and political will were in certain situations the result of a strong labour- 
feminist politic. The positive effect of the latter is recognisable in the 
increased likelihood of proactive legislation being passed to redress women's 
discriminatory wages, or a proactive government policy being pursued. In 
terms of economic policy, however, freemarket responses to globalisation and 
economic restructuring make it less likely that state action will be favourable 
towards successful pay equity bargaining, and more likely that employers in 
general will resist implementation. 
The strongest constraint evident in the negotiations studied was hierarchy. As 
the site of interlocking gender and class properties, hierarchy had a powerful 
effect on implementation of pay equity. The term hierarchy as used in this 
concluding discussion encapsulates a multi-layered pattern of constraints, the 
most clearly identifiable of which is the pre-existing hierarchy of job and wage 
structures embedded in the collective bargaining studied. However, this 
hierarchy of differential pay and status articulates in a mutually reinforcing 
way with a gender-class hierarchy in the constituent organisations, in the 
labour relations system in general and, at a higher level of abstraction, a 
patriarchal capitalist society. 
The research illustrated the crucial nature of agency in the face of such a 
strong reinforcement of the status quo. From the evidence, it is clear the 
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unions in both case studies played a vital role in the achievement and 
implementation of pay equity policy in Newfoundland and Ontario, through the 
development of labour-feminist strategies. On the employers' side, the role of 
feminist women either as politicians or as bureaucrats has been shown to be 
important. We should therefore acknowledge the positive effect of committed 
employer negotiators in general, and women in particular, on the overall 
process and outcome of pay equity bargaining. This is in spite of the restraints 
arising from the "unequal structure of representation" (Mahon, cited in 
Findlay, 1991, p. 84) faced by women in bureaucracies. 
Reflecting the questions asked in Chapter 1, what follows is an examination of 
the bargaining structure, style and power relations in pay equity bargaining, 
attempting to understand the interrelationship between pay equity and collective 
bargaining through the identification and tracking of structural constraints and 
opportunities. 
Bargaining Structure 
In this section, we examine how far and why pay equity was negotiated 
separately from conventional wage bargaining and whether it changed 
bargaining to become more centralised or more decentralised. To answer this 
question appropriately, it is necessary to consider the structural constraints and 
opportunities embedded in bargaining structure. 
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The negotiations studied were conducted separately from conventional 
bargaining. This meant that, in theory, funding pay equity was distributive, so 
that pay equity costs were in addition to budgeting for general wage increases. 
In practice, whether the two pots of money can be kept separate is a moot 
point. In Newfoundland bargaining changed from being distributive to 
redistributive (shifting money from general wage increases to pay equity 
adjustments), following retrenchment. In the Ontario public service 
negotiations, the government had clearly set aside a separate fund of money for 
a pay equity settlement, so bargaining was distributive from the beginning. In 
contrast, Ontario hospital negotiations took place at a time when budgetary 
constraints were just beginning to bite, and were conducted in a redistributive 
context. Hospital managers balanced the financial obligations of pay equity 
adjustments and general wage increases on an annual basis, preferring to 
negotiate pay equity adjustments annually because of the uncertainty of future 
funding. 
After pay equity was achieved in the civil service, separation of the monies 
began to be more difficult and social contract bargaining as part of public 
sector retrenchment undermined the maintenance of pay equity. Upgrading of 
male comparators gained through arbitral reclassification was eventually denied 
to the tied female-dominated classes because it was argued that the cost of this 
adjustment paid to the female-dominated classes would have equalled roughly 
the same amount as the money saved in social contract negotiations. 
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In both case studies pay equity was negotiated in a more centralised bargaining 
structure than usual, especially in Newfoundland, where the five public sector 
unions bargained jointly for the first time. In Ontario, after the public service 
adjustments had been completed, the return to the traditional category 
bargaining system in the 1991 round of collective bargaining led to a new 
wage gap. But since then, in 1992 and 1993, collective bargaining rounds 
have been single-table and any new wage gap created was insignificant, a 
matter of a few cents in a few classes (O'Donnell, Interview) 1994). The 
government pay equity coordinator thought that the single-table structure had 
been possible because of the NDP government's relationship with labour. 
Whether this arrangement will continue is questionable, given the dramatic 
deterioration in public sector union and government relations. 
Traditional Canadian bargaining structures reinforce the sexual segregation of 
the labour market (Fudge and McDermott, 1991). Separate bargaining units 
representing female- and male-dominated occupations prevent any discrepancies 
in wages from emerging during conventional wage negotiations. 
Fragmentation of bargaining units extends beyond union boundaries such that 
often in one workplace, for example, a hospital, there will be a number of 
unions representing different occupational groups of workers. These unions 
themselves form part of an overall hierarchy which is topped by highly paid 
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non-unionised occupational groups, like doctors and managers (both male- 
dominated). Centralisation of the bargaining structure during pay equity 
implementation allowed a previously taken-for-granted, but hidden, job and 
wage hierarchy to be highlighted and examined. Ramifications of this 
challenge to the established wage and power relations were intraorganisational, 
interunion and union-management. 
Within OPSEU, abandonment of the category bargaining system during pay 
equity implementation in the civil service exacerbated internal tensions between 
highly paid powerful male-dominated classes and the lower paid less powerful 
female-dominated classes. In Newfoundland, disruption of NAPE's long- 
standing internal parity relations caused severe problems for the union in 
finalising any pay equity settlements. The interunion rivalry in the 
Newfoundland evaluation committees was largely derived from a struggle over 
changes to the established hospital hierarchy of wages and status. Also, it is 
evident that both unions and management used bargaining structures to enhance 
their power and control over the process and outcome of pay equity. In 
Newfoundland, single-table bargaining allowed a divide and rule strategy on 
the part of the government and employers. The manipulation of structure is 
also illustrated by the hospital bargaining in Ontario, where both OPSEU and 
the employers shifted between local and central levels of bargaining in their 
efforts to control the effects on financial outcomes and the established job and 
wage hierarchy - 
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The effect of structure on implementation of pay equity was identified by 
Evans and Nelson (1989). They argued that one explanation for more success 
at a state rather than a local level in Minnesota was the presence and actions of 
key people who were knowledgeable and committed to comparable worth, in 
contrast to local players who were not necessarily familiar with or who may 
even have been hostile to the issue. There were undoubtedly more committed 
and previously involved players in the Ontario Public Service negotiations than 
in the local hospital bargaining, where the employer, in general, was neither 
committed nor knowledgeable about pay equity. Although the structure of the 
Steering Committee in Newfoundland was similar to the evaluation committees, 
the membership of the latter tended to be drawn from within the government 
or hospital departments, many of whom were unfamiliar with the concept and 
practice of pay equity. 
Bargaining Styl 
In this section, we examine whether pay equity bargaining resulted in more 
cooperative or adversarial negotiating styles. To answer this question 
appropriately, it is necessary to consider the structural constraints and 
opportunities embedded in bargaining style. 
Based on the indicators of cooperative bargaining, it is possible to conclude 
that in general the bargaining studied in this research moved along a continuum 
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from traditional, adversarial (conventional bargaining) to a more cooperative 
style (pay equity bargaining). The extent of the move varied, with the early 
stages of the Newfoundland Steering Committee representing the most 
cooperative in the short term. But the Ontario public service pay equity 
bargaining was the most cooperative in the long term, incorporating increased 
(but variable) levels of communication, trust, openness and problem solving 
which survived the whole process, even the final fraught stages of banding and 
selection of male comparators. Moreover, this more cooperative style was 
complemented by a sound equity content of bargaining, which achieved the 
joint design of an original gender neutral job comparison system and a pay 
equity plan which was creative in its achievement of pay equity above and 
beyond the legal minimum. 
Conflict over hierarch 
However, the evidence also shows that there were phases in each case study 
where bargaining moved back along the continuum towards a conflictual mode, 
similar to conventional bargaining. Indeed, some degree of conflict is 
inevitable, given that pay equity challenges the gender-class based hierarchy 
underlying the workplace and the labour relations system itself. It was 
conflict over hierarchy which emerged as the prominent theme in all 
negotiations studied. What appeared to be technical decisions over, for 
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example, job class definitions, job evaluation system, job descriptions, rating 
jobs and banding, were actually political, affecting job and pay hierarchies in 
the final analysis. Methodologically, the identification of structural properties 
is indicated by these points of conflict. This is not to say that pay equity is 
incompatible with collective bargaining because of the inevitable disruption it 
will cause (for example, Gandz, 1987); but it is to recognise that there will be 
competing structural interests in pay equity bargaining. 
Comparing the two case studies, the most conflictual bargaining occurred 
during the job evaluation committees in Newfoundland. It should be 
remembered that the methodology used in the Ontario Public Service did not 
require job evaluation committees, and it is significant that the most difficult 
stage of negotiations in the public service was deciding the bands and male 
comparators, based upon the results of the questionnaire. In both sets of 
negotiations, the most conflict occurred when the hierarchical relationships in 
the workplace were directly confronted by the parties. Hierarchy, combining 
as it does the constraining forces of both gender and class, was the biggest 
obstacle in the way of changes necessary for equal pay for women. 
In the Newfoundland job evaluation committees, efforts by one hospital support 
union representative in particular to make visible previously unvalued women's 
work was resisted not only by government and employer evaluators but also by 
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other union representatives. The existence of such resistance, leading to 
conflict, points towards embedded power relations which are being challenged. 
Hierarchy is not simply gendered in terms of men and women, it also 
structures women's pay relationships with each other. As noted by Acker 
(1989) and Blum (1991) in their studies of job evaluations, the conflicts at this 
level were complicated, not just because they were interunion (within class) as 
well as union-management (between class), but because they were based upon 
gender as well, not just between men and women, but also between women. 
To illustrate this complex intertwining of gender and class properties, the male 
government representative in the first health care job evaluation committee 
(HC1) was in constant conflict with one female hospital union representative. 
From the evidence in the case study, and relating it with previous studies of 
pay equity processes, his consistent downgrading of women's jobs and 
upgrading of men's jobs was multi-faceted. It was a combination of class 
based cost contaim-nent (as noted also by Evans and Nelson, 1989, and 
Steinberg, 1991); class based reaction to the compression of hierarchy, 
whereby traditional differentials between managers' and workers' jobs are 
compressed (as noted by Acker, 1989); gender based defence of his own 
gender identity in the face of the hospital support unions' continuing 
justification for valuing hitherto invisible women's work (as noted by Blum, 
1991); and class based control of the classification system, as a member of the 
Treasury Board (as noted by Warskett, 1991). 
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This complexity underlying union-management conflict was compounded by 
the high levels of interunion conflict in both committees, especially the second. 
The struggle was centred on the place of women's jobs in relation to each 
other in the hierarchy, although in the second committee this was complicated 
by the presence of small male-dominated jobs within the overall female- 
dominated lab and x ray class. The hospital hierarchy was encapsulated in the 
differentials formalised by different unions representing different occupational 
groups in separate bargaining units (with the exception of the hospital support 
w. orkers, whose membership was distributed between two unions). 
We know that intraorganisational tensions in unions caused problems for 
unions negotiating pay equity, and the undermining of internal differentials 
needed a knowledgeable and committed union to be able to overcome the 
conflicts and still pursue equity. Combine this problem with the continuing 
challenge to traditional differentials between unions during the job evaluation 
stage, where members are confronted by and have to work with evidence 
contradicting their perception of a job's "right place", and it seems that the 
resistance to change is too much to overcome in some circumstances. The 
logic and persistence of the hierarchy underlying differentials within and 
between unions was being challenged, and this defeated the pursuit of pay 
equity in the second phase, and very nearly stalled it in the first phase. 
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Paradoxically, the Ontario hospital job evaluation committees were seen as 
more cooperative than the other stages of pay equity bargaining (interviews 
with McNama, Cullen, and Schecher, 1991). It is significant that these 
Ontario committees were single-union, single-employer committees. During 
the job evaluation phase in the Ontario hospital sector there was no direct 
challenge to the interunion hierarchy; it is as if the real nature of the hierarchy 
was "disguised" by the structure of the negotiating unit. So the larger 
hierarchy of which that particular bargaining unit was a part remained hidden 
from examination. 
The revealing and challenging of a rigid and taken for granted hierarchy which 
reinforces women's segregation into low paid jobs is to be commended. It is 
only then that the radical potential of pay equity policy is released. However, 
if this has to involve multi-union processes, the participating unions need the 
commitment and expertise to manage the political fall-out: the strength of a 
labour-feminist politic. Even though the political (and gendered) reality of 
unionism makes the suspension of hierarchy difficult, it is essential if women's 
interests are not to be marginalised by interunion rivalries, in addition to any 
union-management barriers to implementation. 
In Newfoundland, commitment and expertise were present at the Steering 
Conunittee level. However, it has to extend to individual evaluators who have 
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to be willing to put aside their taken-for- granted notions of hierarchy. 
Unfortunately, at the evaluation committee level this did not happen. The 
strong labour-feminist alliance at the Steering Committee level was very 
weakly represented in the committees. Thus, commitment to the concept and 
process of pay equity did not reach down to many of the members of the job 
evaluation committees, some of whom displayed an ignorance of systemic 
discrimination and consequently did not have an appreciation of the real 
purpose of the task. Only one woman representing hospital support workers in 
HC1 showed a determination based upon feminist expertise in capturing 
women's work, and the nurses' efforts in HC2 were railroaded. Moreover, 
there was no critical mass of women committed to feminist process. 
In addition to the virtual absence of a countervailing pressure, the impact of 
hierarchy in the evaluation committees was stronger than in the Steering 
Committee, who were dealing with relatively abstract aspects of pay equity in 
the initial stages and the aggregate picture towards the end. Conversely, job 
evaluation committee members had to deal with concrete, detailed scoring 
decisions. This increased the likelihood of clashes between different 
representatives about the appropriate place in the hierarchy of their 
constituents' jobs in the face of a challenge to the traditional hierarchy. 
Furthermore, a wage freeze had already prevented the reestablishment of 
differentials through the conventional collective bargaining route. 
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This negative permutation of hierarchy and a weak labour-feminist politic was 
compounded by a shift in employer commitment to cost containment, in the 
general context of a poor labour relations climate. A further structural 
constraint was the strong attachment to the gendered construction of skill and 
work evident in the interactions of two key male evaluators. The influence of 
individual male members of the Steering Committee with similarly resistant 
ideologies was lost in the strength of the labour-feminist alliance at that level 
of bargaining. 
Turning to a closer examination of the bargaining style in the Ontario civil 
service, the direct confrontation with traditional hierarchy came at a later stage 
in the negotiations. Although the mode of bargaining retained its more 
cooperative characteristic, it was at this point that it came under the most 
strain. We also know that in general this final stage of banding and deciding 
the male comparators causes the most difficulty and the most conflict in 
Ontario pay equity bargaining (Interview with Review Officers, 1991). By this 
time in the public service negotiations, however, the parties had developed a 
good working relationship. There was a mutual acknowledgement (even if 
unarticulated) of the political consequences of the technical decisions they 
made, and a clear understanding of both parties' need to shape the new 
hierarchy in a particular way. 
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Pressures on both parties, especially the union, to take into account existing 
differentials and constituents' expectations, derived from a clear sense of 
hierarchy, which in turn informed both parties' interactions during this final 
stage of bargaining. During the maintenance phase, resistance to changes in 
the traditional hierarchy threatened to undermine the new more equitable 
relationships. The favourable balance of constraints and opportunities led 
initially to an ability to manoeuvre around the pressures of hierarchy in the 
civil service negotiations. Whether the maintenance of pay equity will be 
viable remains to be seen, and depends once again upon the changing balance 
of the factors working towards reinforcement or transformation of traditional 
job and wage relations. 
Apart from ongoing tension over hierarchy, three recurring patterns emerged 
from the data which impacted on the level of cooperation observed during the 
negotiations. 
Feminist process gelling with management objectives of partnership 
It was apparent from both the Newfoundland and the Ontario Public Service 
negotiations that a cooperative venture was enhanced by the existence of a 
strong commitment to feminist process, combined with managerial notions of 
partnership, or integrative bargaining. In Newfoundland, this combination was 
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particularly noteworthy because the feminist process crossed union- 
management lines, with at least three prominent management (i. e.; 
government\employer) women on the Steering Committee aiming to obtain pay 
equity utilising a feminist process. One of them was the management Co- 
Chair. On the union side, a very high profile woman from CUPE sat on the 
Steering Committee as official national advisor. Her experience and skill in 
pay equity and other equality issues, and strong interest in feminist process, 
enabled a strong alliance with the management women feminists. 
Complementing this was a personal and professional interest in integrative 
bargaining on the part of two management male representatives. 
In the Ontario Public service, commitment to feminist process was not across 
union-management lines. However, the key OPSEU negotiator was a leading 
feminist with a background in organising an independent feminist union 
employing feminist process and practices, including modified negotiating 
practices. Her expertise and skills set the tone for the union negotiating 
strategy and tactics. Nevertheless, she was careful to differentiate between 
cooptation and collaboration. The union's negotiating team's stance, under her 
influence, complemented the government's negotiating team's objectives, which 
were to achieve pay equity for the provincial civil service through partnership 
with the union. This goal, combined with the pressure of being seen as model 
employer, influenced government negotiators so that they were more 
conciliatory than in conventional negotiation. 
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Cooperation as Concession 
For the civil service union, cooperation from the government was the direct 
result of the legislative requirement that the employer jointly implement pay 
equity, and in their view it overlapped considerably with increased union 
power. Cooperation meant the government making more concessions to the 
union than normal, and, from the chief negotiator's perspective at least, it was 
not necessarily a qualitatively different process. The key negotiator for 
OPSEU, however, did see pay equity bargaining as requiring a different 
approach and she tried to build a more collaborative relationship with the 
women in the government negotiating team. An analysis of the government 
transcripts leads to the conclusion that for the management team, being a 
model employer in partnership with the union meant making concessions on a 
number of issues that were important to them. 
This conflation of cooperation with concession also occurred in the Ontario 
hospital pay equity bargaining. Hospital managers negotiating with a number 
of unions developed a kind of ranking of how "reasonable" unions had been 
over pay equity. Unions who insisted on their legal rights under the legislation 
concerning technical procedures, which they knew had serious political 
consequences, were excluded from description as "cooperative". For example, 
a manager praised one union for being cooperative over a deal that involved 
sacrificing legitimate retroactive maintenance adjustments in return for an 
assurance of no lay-offs (Noel, Inter-view, 1992). 
330 
An interesting angle of this conflation of cooperation with concession was 
detected in the internal criticism of the female government Co-Chair of the 
Steering Committee in Newfoundland, the early stages of which most members 
praised as an example of cooperative bargaining. At the start of the first 
meeting after the replacement of the original Co-Chair (a key founder of the 
labour-feminist alliance), the new Co-Chair (from the collective bargaining 
division of the Treasury Board) apparently told the unions: "... you are not 
going to get away with now what you got away with before... " (Grimes, 
Interview, 1992). 
That this gloss is placed upon cooperation by employer negotiators in 
traditional labour relations circles is confin-ned by one woman hospital 
manager in Ontario who specialised in compensation and who remarked, rather 
resentfully, that the Director of the Labour Relations Division sat in on her pay 
equity negotiations to make that she "didn't give away the store 11 (Schecher, 
Interview, 1991). This negotiator was described by the local union 
representative as pursuing good, positive labour relations at that particular 
hospital. We are led to the conclusion that underlying this monitoring activity 
was a view that to develop good relations with the union she must be making 
too many concessions. 
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Cooperation and gender idenifty 
The marginalisation and trivialisation of the Newfoundland femocrats' work in 
pay equity was shaped and reinforced by the identification of the new, 
cooperative process with women and feminism: "that women's crowd" (term 
described by Roome, Interview, 1992). 
Labour relations is male-dominated, reflected in the culture and language of 
bargaining, with metaphors drawn from war and boxing (Dickens and Colling, 
1990). Taking into account the writing on the connection between gender 
identity and notions of work and skill (Blum, 1991; Cockburn, 1983; Phillips 
and Taylor, 1986), perhaps cooperation, a departure from the traditional way 
of doing things, was seen in some way to threaten the masculinity of those men 
involved in the labour relations field. If this is the case, then not only is 
labour relations as a system gendered in the way that Acker (1989) discussed, 
in terms of what is seen as important to fight for and "gendering" class, it is 
also gendered in a much deeper way. 
There was some evidence of gendered differentiation in style in hospital 
bargaining which resonated with gender identity. One hospital manager in 
Ontario revealed a "macho" bravado in his account of trouncing the union: 
"... brinkmanship - that's what it was ...... and referred to participation 
in the 
pay equity process as interfering with good negotiations practice (Interview, 
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Hamil, 1992). Another (male) manager criticised the previous manager's 
round table approach and reined in a more participatory team of management 
negotiators, who were causing what he saw as problems in the pursuing of 
bargaining strategy and tactics. Participation is a central tenet of feminist 
process, both in general and in its application to collective bargaining. It is 
part and parcel of what is seen as a move away from what is seen as a male, 
elitist and adversarial style of negotiating (Interviews with Peters, 1991, and 
Youden, 1992). 
However, it is also the case that women who are in a minority in the labour 
relations field are likely to accept male definitions of 'normal' or 
appropriate' behaviour and are pressured to behave like the majority of the 
men who have traditionally dominated the activity, otherwise their credibility 
as managers and negotiators may be undermined (Dickens and Colling, 1990). 
This pressure to conform to the male standard probably explains the behaviour 
and attitude of the new Co-Chair of the Pay Equity Steering Committee in 
Newfoundland, a woman who had long experience in negotiations and who was 
Director of the Collective Bargaining Division of the Treasury Board. 
This research indicates a convergence of cooperative with feminist process. 
According to studies summarised by Shepela and Viviano (1984), any work 
that women do is undervalued. So if cooperation is associated with women, it 
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will tend to be undervalued. Not only will there also be a tendency to reject 
cooperation as concession (class based) but that tendency may well resonate 
with a tendency to reject cooperation as not masculine in some way, 
undermining the traditional male standard, even the gender identity of the men 
who predominate in the field (gender based). 
Bargaining Power 
In this section, we examine the question of whether unions have more or less 
power when bargaining pay equity. Giddens' notion of power as taking 
control of the direction of events by utilising available resources to enhance 
power, even by the less powerful in an established unequal relationship, is 
useful to understand the power dynamic in pay equity bargaining. In the 
public sector, this unequal power relationship is more pronounced because of 
the employer as sovereign government, economic manager and legislator (see 
Chapter III). With this in mind, the pay equity bargaining power dynamic 
depends largely upon the ability of the unions to recognise, access and 
effectively use the (unequal) resources available to them. This means taking 
advantage of the structural opportunities as well as recognising the structural 
constraints. A discussion of a number of recurring patterns which emerged in 
the case studies will follow. 
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Notion of "model employer" increased union power 
In the civil service negotiations, an important basis of OPSEU's increase in 
power was because of the pressure on the government to be a model employer 
in implementing its own legislation. Fulfilling this political requirement 
involved finishing on time, demonstrating to other large (and critical) 
employers that pay equity could be bargained, that it could be bargained within 
the deadline, and in a collaborative fashion. All these aspects of being the 
"model employer" created an opportunity for OPSEU to enhance its bargaining 
position. 
The importance of this factor is highlighted by the Ontario hospitals' 
experience, where it was absent. Instead there was cost containment, 
combined with a strong employer resistance to undermining the rigid hierarchy 
so central to hospital organisational culture and practices. However, a diluted 
form of the model employer factor came through in the Newfoundland 
negotiations for a Pay Equity Agreement, where unionists described the 
government desperate for an agreement, just as Ontario public services unions 
described the government there desperate for a pay equity plan settlement. 
The Newfoundland government's commitment to pay equity was originally 
founded in political expediency - in an election year the previous Premier 
needed labour on side after an especially acrimonious labour relations climate 
towards the end of his term of office. Consequently, in the early stages the 
unions also were able to take advantage of the government's need to be 
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recognised as a model employer in partnership with the public sector unions 
and as progressive on women's equality. 
Information increased union power 
An early Tribunal case in Ontario clarified that the employer was legally 
obliged to provide virtually full information disclosure at the beginning of 
negotiations in order to demonstrate good faith bargaining. Public service 
bargaining led to a degree of information disclosure satisfactory to both 
parties, and notable towards the end for its relative openness. One public 
service union negotiator pointed out that she was still using all the new 
information over a year later. 
Conversely, in the Ontario hospital bargaining, information disclosure was 
resisted by the employer virtually throughout the sector. Unions had redress to 
a legal enforcement mechanism in the Review Services and the Pay Equity 
Hearings Tribunal, and in most cases information disclosure disputes were 
resolved in favour of the unions after the intervention of a Review Officer. 
Information on wages of non-union, especially management, employees was 
valuable information and the ability of the unions to exercise their rights to full 
information increased their power in pay equity bargaining in comparison with 
conventional negotiations. Union access to information so jealously guarded 
before granted symbolic power to the unions as well. 
336 
Despite the absence of legislation, Newfoundland pay equity bargaining 
generated adequate infon-nation for both sides, at least on the Steering 
Committee. But in the job evaluation committees it was a source of conflictl 
mainly because employer and government evaluators alleged that the unions 
had more information than they had access to, thus eroding management's 
power. This was due to differences in intraorganisational bargaining, with the 
hospital unions in particular having more experienced and informed 
representatives on the committees than their employer and government 
counterparts, and working with a better internal communications system. 
Legislation increased union power 
The Ontario negotiations were characterised by opportunities to utilise power 
derived from the legislation, itself obtained only after sustained and effective 
lobbying by an effective labour-feminist alliance. Unions varied to the extent 
to which they took advantage of their increased rights in the process and 
content of bargaining. 
In Ontario, the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) and specific unions had 
pressured for legislation to increase their power to negotiate equal pay for 
women, after a decade of trying unsuccessfully to achieve this through 
collective bargaining. It is no surprise, then, that Ontario unions identified a 
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significant increase in their power, especially since all provincial civil servants 
and hospital workers are prohibited from striking, giving a bargaining 
advantage in pay equity negotiations compared to conventional negotiations. 
Union negotiators explained any increased cooperation levels by reference to 
the increase in their power: previously employers had been able to refuse to 
bargain equal pay, now employers were legally obliged to negotiate the whole 
process. 
Moreover, unions had the benefit of third party intervention in the event of a 
dispute, and the eventual redress of the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal. 
Although the public service negotiations were conducted without reference to 
the dispute resolution services provided by the Pay Equity Commission, the 
Ontario hospital unions enhanced their bargaining power considerably by their 
use of the Review Services. A general employer resistance to pay equity, and 
a particular resistance to required information disclosure, was largely 
overcome by frequent referral to the Review Officers. Employer resistance to 
the principle and practices of gender neutrality in the negotiating of the gender 
neutral job comparison scheme was countered less successfully and to varying 
degrees by the unions appealing to the Commission for intervention. Only one 
union made a stand on gender neutrality, taking numerous employers to the 
Tribunal in an attempt to obtain a legal definition of gender neutrality. 
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Although not operating in a legislative framework, Newfoundland union 
representatives identified an increased level of power in pay equity bargaining 
deriving from the collective bargaining process itself. The union common 
front had enabled a stronger bargaining position than in conventional wage 
negotiations. This union power was combined with an influential labour- 
feminist alliance, in a generally advantageous permutation of gender and class 
properties. But, in the face of a disintegration of the transformative pattern, 
including a shift from a cooperative to resistant employer, legislation would 
have had a clear advantage over collectively bargained pay equity. In Ontario, 
hospital unions were able to use the legislation to obtain equity adjustments and 
a fairly successful degree of maintenance, despite retrenchment and employer 
resistance (Harris, Interview, 1992). 
Labour-feminist politic crucial to fulfil the promise of power 
As indicated in Chapter IV, previous studies of comparable worth 
implementation in the U. S. had revealed a strong tendency of collective 
bargaining to undermine women's interests (Acker, 1989; Evans and Nelson, 
1989). Given the political nature of the process, Evans and Nelson stressed 
the importance of knowledgeable monitoring and control in their comparable 
worth case study. Practitioners and academics echoed this view (for example, 
bargaining studied in this project it is clear that a labour-feminist politic was 
crucial for effective control of the process. The power dynamic was 
dramatically affected by the development of such a politic. 
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Feminist analysis of organisational practices, including collective bargaining 
and the place of women in it, is essential for the recognition of apparently 
technical decisions as political and to generate the commitment to fight for 
change. It is particularly important that unions recognise the gendered nature 
of labour relations and strive to overcome it by introducing equality structures 
that articulate effectively with governance and negotiating structures. 
Moreover, the nature and purpose of collective bargaining, including what is 
seen as important and "in the general (union/class) interest, " has to be defined 
in a way that does not marginalise women's interests. Indeed, based on their 
pay equity studies, Evans and Nelson (1989) concluded that class was 
patriarchal in both concept and practice. 
In this research, the public sector unions studied were characterised by varying 
degrees of labour-feminist politic. In Newfoundland, the two key public sector 
unions featured good equality policies with fairly representative governance. 
Most important, there were clear links between equality and pay equity 
negotiating structures at the Steering Committee level, less formally in NAPE 
than CUPE, whose National Director of Equal Opportunities sat on the 
Committee and was a key figure in a labour-feminist alliance. The alliance 
was characterised by feminist analysis and strategy present in both unions, but 
more particularly in CUPE, complemented and strengthened by the feminists 
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negotiating for the employer. Overall, the resulting labour-feminist politic 
added up to a powerful force for change. Even allowing for the shift in 
political will, if this politic had penetrated to the evaluation committees, the 
process and outcome may well have been very different. Divide and rule 
strategies are less likely to be successful in the face of a united front. 
The Ontario public service bargaining featured an extension of the powerful 
labour-feminist alliance which had successfully lobbied for the legislation into 
the negotiations themselves. The key union negotiator was a founder member 
of the Equal Pay Coalition (EPC). Her position of strength was shaped and 
enhanced by the impressive equality policies of OPSEU, and the long-standing 
influence of an effective women's committee, some of whose members were in 
the pay equity bargaining team. This set of negotiations exemplified the 
strength of a formal link between equality and negotiating structures in the 
context of a powerful and expert labour-feminist politic. Moreover, committed 
women in the bureaucracy, including one at Deputy Minister level, added to 
this favourable pattern of facilitating factors. 
These findings from the two case studies were reinforced by examining 
hospital bargaining in Ontario. Although this was fragmented and complex it 
is possible to point to a pattern which links the power and success of the 
different unions involved in pay equity bargaining with the existence of a 
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labour-feminist politic, either stemming from feminist analysis and strategy 
within the union (the result of previous or ongoing infusion of feminism into 
the labour movement) or from a current alliance with outside groups. CUPE 
emerged in the forefront in terms of process and outcome of pay equity 
bargaining, with its built in feminist-informed pay equity structures and 
processes combined with hard bargaining to obtain money for their low paid 
women workers. 
Compared to CUPE's labour-feminist politic, which featured a solid labour 
emphasis, the Ontario Nurses Association (ONA) pursued a labour-feminist 
politic characterised by a more feminist accentuated strategy - utilising feminist 
analysis to achieve full value of their jobs through "true" gender neutrality. 
ONA stands out as the one union whose strategy was to challenge the system 
up to the Tribunal level in order to stretch the legislation as far as possible to 
attempt a more radical interpretation than was possible in their existing 
collective bargaining relationships. 
ONA tapped into the resources offered by key individuals in the Equal Pay 
Coalition (EPQ to bolster its legal battle with the hospital employers. It hired 
as legal counsel a founder member of the EPC. Evidence to buttress ONA's 
arguments was available through the labour-feminist network (which in this 
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case stretched across the border to feminist critics of traditional job evaluation 
schemes in the United States), and was used to great effect during the Tribunal 
hearings (interviews with Andrews, Hodder, and McDermott, 1991; analysis of 
Pay Equity Reports [P. E. R. Vols. 1-4,1990-1993]). 
In their systematic pursuit of procedural standards, ONA challenged the rigid 
hierarchy in the Ontario hospitals, despite strong resistance by hospital 
employers, and the Ontario Hospital Association (OHA), whose gender biased 
job comparison scheme was sold to the individual hospitals for pay equity 
implementation. There were a number of hearings based on ONA's two 
gender neutrality cases, which resulted in jurisprudence favourable to unions in 
the areas of choice of representative, content of proposals, information 
disclosure, recognition of the bargaining agent, full and informed discussion, 
good faith bargaining, as well as gender neutrality. It is possible from an 
analysis of the biographies of the Tribunal panellists in the annual reports of 
the Pay Equity Commission, combined with information gleaned during 
interviews in Toronto, to conclude that the labour-feminist network (especially 
in the shape of the EPQ extended into the Tribunal. This also enhanced the 
power of ONA in its dealings with the pay equity legislation, and, indirectly, 
the power of other unions wishing to use the law to exercise their full rights. 
The labour-feminist politic behind the majority of the Tribunal's decisions have 
been challenged within the Tribunal itself by a more traditional labour relations 
interpretation of the pay equity legislation, evident in the inconsistency of some 
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key decisions, for example, the definition of the employer. Progressive 
decisions of the Tribunal have been challenged in the law courts by employers, 
too, based upon traditional labour relations jurisprudence. It is suggested here 
that this pattern of progressive decisions and subsequent challenge is 
indication, at a formal legalistic level, of the in-built resistance to changing the 
existing hierarchy in the workplace, and is representative of a similar kind of 
conflict in principle as in the pay equity negotiations themselves. 
Earlier in this chapter it was suggested that the labour relations system was 
gendered in two senses: not just because collective bargaining is liable to 
marginalise women's interests, but also because traditional labour relations as a 
male-dominated practice is caught up in a gender identity resistance to change. 
This possibility adds to the likelihood that the tensions between the traditional 
and the new progressive pay equity jurisprudence are the manifestation of a 
tension between the powerful mediation of hierarchy and a labour-feminist 
politic which is challenging it. 
Once again, we are drawn to the conclusion that the labour-feminist politic is 
crucial to fulfil the promise of pay equity. The unions that have managed to 
release the radical potential of the pay equity legislation have done it in spite of 
a law which has been criticised as incorporating a weak model of pay equity. 
So, even though the law was designed to contain change to an acceptable or 
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t manageable' level, and broadly reinforced existing collective bargaining 
structures (Fudge and McDermott, 1991; Burkart, 1990), unions were able to 
manipulate it to gain more benefit for their low paid women members than was 
perhaps intended. 
This management of a resource - the law - by the less powerful to shift the 
balance of power with the more powerful, shows that structural constraints are 
not always insurmountable, and illustrates the creativity of unions in utilising 
the pay equity legislation in conjunction with their collective bargaining 
process. The opportunity provided by the law was seized by some Ontario 
unions in the face of strong resistance on the part of health care employers, 
and the CUPE Equal Opportunities representative was pleased with the general 
trend of Tribunal decisions, which she saw as strengthening a potentially weak 
maintenance clause in the Act. In contrast, Newfoundland unions could not 
take advantage of any legislation when the government changed its mind over 
pay equity as a policy. A supportive legislative framework can survive a 
withdrawal of political will (repealing a pay equity law would be very 
unpopular), whereas implementation through collective bargaining is 
vulnerable. 
Thompson's concept of the rule of law (1975) elucidates this articulation 
between the law and collective bargaining at a theoretical level. He recognised 
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that the law mediates class relations and thus represents structural 
reinforcement of the status quo. However, he also argued that the law had its 
own logic and could be used by the ruled (the less powerful) to achieve 
change. If we understand the pay equity legislation as mediating gender-class 
relations, it is clearly a constraint, reinforcing an existing hierarchy, but within 
its own logic it is possible to locate an opportunity for change. This is what 
the feminist-informed unions achieved in Ontario by using the law, challenging 
the traditional labour relations jurisprudence to the advantage of women. 
Unions in Ontario with a labour-feminist politic achieved, through the 
Tribunal, a largely progressive interpretation of the pay equity law that 
demanded changes in both the process and content of bargaining during pay 
equity negotiations. However, a Tribunal decision in late 1993 (Group of 
employees v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union) made it clear that there 
could be no absolute standards because of the very nature of collective 
bargaining. The ruling appeared in the context of a gender neutrality challenge 
from a small group of OPSEU nurses in the civil service who had filed a 
complaint that the union and the government had designed a gender biased job 
comparison system in their pay equity implementation, which had resulted in 
low level payouts for nurses in the bargaining unit. 
The 1993 decision by the Tribunal clarified the role of collective bargaining 
within the parameters set by legislation: 
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... the comparison system and its gender neutrality are 
specifically subject to collective bargaining according to 
subsection 14(2)(a). Collective bargaining by its very nature 
involves give and take by both parties. While there are 
constraints on parties' bargaining under this Act, constraints 
imposed by standards in the Act itself, we cannot see how 
gender neutrality can be an absolute standard. Indeed, to 
find gender neutrality to be an absolute standard would be to 
undermine the explicit statutory direction to employers and 
bargaining agents found in section 14(2)(a). The legislature 
specifically directed employers and unions to bargain a gender 
neutral comparison system and a pay equity plan. The 
statutory directive to negotiate implies a relative standard for 
gender neutrality. That is, while the Act provides room for 
some discretion to the negotiating parties, the Act also set 
some parameters to that discretion. (Group of employees v. 
Ontario Public Service Employees, 1993, p. 64) 
Following this guideline, the Tribunal decided that the parties had made " ... a 
reasonable effort to accurately collect job information on the four criteria. vv 
(Group of employees etc., 1993, p. 65). Knowing the strength of the OPSEU 
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labour-feminist expertise behind these negotiations, and the high level of 
government commitment, it would be surprising if the decision had been any 
other. Politically this was a key case, given the showcase nature of the 
negotiations themselves. 
This Tribunal decision feeds into the debate of whether pay equity can be 
negotiated, a theme present in the early consultative phase and the case study 
data. The assumption behind the argument that pay equity cannot be 
negotiated is that pay equity is about an objective standard of equality, an 
objectively reached calculation based upon a sophisticated and 'scientific' job 
evaluation scheme. Managerialist notions of job evaluation committee 
members 'leaving their hats at the door' and objectively', rationally ranking 
jobs to the exclusion of any biases, rests upon this assumption. Even union 
pay equity negotiators seemed to take on board this assumption to some 
degree, although after some experience of implementation it became apparent 
to more union than management representatives that the standard of 
'objectivity' was an artifact, ignoring the political nature of what may seem to 
be technical (and therefore apparently 'objective') decisions. 
Once it is understood that job evaluation schemes themselves are not objective 
(see Chapter IV), and their implementation is not objective, then the objection 
that collective bargaining somehow contaminates the process is invalid, since 
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negotiating is merely an extension of the political nature of evaluation schemes 
and the gender-class properties that are embedded in them. Bearing this in 
mind, it becomes crucial indeed to ensure that employee representatives in this 
political process have the analysis and skills to recognise the technical as 
political in order to achieve any closing of the wage gap at all. 
But it should be pointed out that even if a union has the advantage of a labour- 
feminist politic extending to its pay equity negotiators, it has to have the 
resources and the power to pursue its chosen strategy. For example, ONA 
spent $1 million a year from 1989 to 1991 on legal costs only, not allowing for 
staff time and other expenses (Andrews and Hodder, Interview, 1991). This 
kind of financial commitment is not possible for many unions. The OFL 
Director of Human Rights (Women's Issues) explained the dilemma of many 
unions who knew they had a legitimate claim but could not afford to pursue it 
through the legal enforcement mechanisms: 
So do you go to the Tribunal where you think you can get 
another 10 cents? You think you can get 15 women 10 cents 
more an hour, do you spend $100,000 of your local money to 
get that and leave no money for arbitrations, no money for 
regular bargaining? No money for education? No. You cut the 
best deal you can. And also the Pay Equity Act is written in 
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that way. It's not an equal value. It's a narrowing, not 
elimination of the wage gap. So, ... this is where we talk about 
the difference in still taking that principled stand. (Sceviour, 
Interview, 1991, p. 18) 
As a way of enhancing unions' power in pay equity bargaining, it seems as if 
the advantage of the Tribunal as an enforcement mechanism is theoretical 
rather than practical for most unions. It could be argued that ONA is an 
atypical union, with a cluster of characteristics favouring pursuit of its 
principles through the Tribunal, and that CUPE is a more realistic model of 
pay equity implementation for most unions. The push for an ultimate gender 
neutral plan was not a major issue for CUPE. It adopted a relatively low-key 
strategy of using the Review Services for obtaining the fullest information 
disclosure possible and hard bargaining at the evaluation stage to gain more 
money for its low paid women. A strong, effective labour-feminist politic has 
to take account of the practical limits to the possibility of power the Tribunal 
route offers. 
It is also worth noting here the increasing importance of employer resistance to 
pay equity, presenting a major challenge to the most enlightened and 
determined negotiating team. This study of pay equity included the impact of 
retrenchment in the public sector and this constraint will probably be 
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exacerbated in the future and play a larger role than in the negotiations studied. 
In a hostile climate of general free-market economic policies and economic 
restructuring, equal pay for women will become even more elusive, 
particularly in the private sector. In mid 1991, after only a short period of pay 
equity implementation in the private sector, there was already a significant 
difference between the cost of pay equity in the private sector (an average of 
0.3% of payroll per year) and the public sector (an average of 2%) (Sceviour, 
Interview, 199 1). 
Pressing for women's rights under the legislation in the private sector may 
cause some employers to move away from the province to avoid pay equity 
responsibilities (Hamil, Interview, 1991). The threat of this in a recession will 
be difficult to counter-vail when negotiating a pay equity plan. Since there is 
no intervention by the Pay Equity Commission until an employee complains, it 
is unlikely that situations like this will come to light at all. Some of the more 
political private sector unions (for example, the Canadian Auto Workers, and 
the United Steelworkers of America) have achieved good settlements (Review 
Officers, Interview, 1991). But since private sector unions in general tend not 
to be as social and political as their counterparts in the public sector, and 
female memberships are lower, it is doubtful that many will negotiate pay 
equity in a knowledgeable and determined way. 
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In addition, the public/private sector difference in pay equity settlements will 
be due to the lower unionisation rate in the private sector. Evidence collected 
in this project indicated that in the hospital sector the non-union employees 
have gained little from the pay equity process. We know, for example, that 
virtually all non-union personnel in the hospitals were evaluated using a job 
evaluation plan that was unable to capture and value women's work effectively, 
according to an important ONA case on gender neutrality. With no union to 
represent them, and no access to the labour-feminist network, women who are 
not in senior management positions have stayed largely in an undervalued, 
underpaid position in the job and wage hierarchy. And this will probably be 
the fate of many women in the private sector without union protection. 
Judging from the evidence in these case studies, hierarchy was the predominant 
constraint in the implementation of pay equity, potentially undermining any 
attempts to change the status quo and threatening to reassert itself if any 
changes in traditional wage relationships were achieved. Even in the face of 
this powerful constraint, opportunities were seized to at least change the shape 
of wage structures to some degree, with variable success. However, it must be 
said that some women's jobs are just not going to be of equal value to men's 
jobs, even if a gender neutral job evaluation scheme were used consistently and 
fairly. This is the inevitable result of their systematic exclusion from skilled 
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jobs in the development of a sexually segregated labour market, involving 
organised labour, employers and the state, as discussed in Chapter II (see also 
Warskett, 1991). Given that this is the case, pay equity on its own will not 
achieve wage equality for women, and has to be placed in the context of an 
overall equality strategy. 
Policy must be aimed at three interlocking spheres: the economy, the family 
and the state. Earlier (Chapter II) it was argued that the gender wage gap is 
caused by structural inequalities in the labour market. Consequently, equality 
policies have to be aimed at structural change. In the economy, they have to 
move beyond neo-classical attempts to counter supply side "deficiencies" (for 
example, education, training, mobility) and policies to reduce labour market 
segmentation (for example, anti-discrimination and wage-improvement policies) 
(Gunderson, Muszynski and Keck, 1990). 
Pay equity goes some of the way as a proactive measure, tackling 
discriminatory wages as a structural, rather than individual problem. But in 
order to be effective it has to cover all women, provide for comparisons across 
the primary and secondary labour market barriers, and be implemented in an 
enlightened way. Otherwise pay equity will not have a dramatic effect on the 
wage gap, may reinforce inequality in the labour market in the long-run, 
causing divisiveness between men and women and between women. In view of 
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these inadequacies, some women's advocates have called for a complementary 
wage solidarity policy, focusing on increasing the minimum wage, increasing 
entry level wages, and reducing differentials by flat-rate wage increases rather 
than percentage increases. 
Because of the interdependence of women's workplace and domestic equality, 
the state also has to implement complementary policies aimed at equality in the 
home. Government should aim for comprehensive subsidised day care, and 
legislative frameworks and education programmes to better balance work and 
family so as to encourage a more equitable sharing of housework, child and 
elder care. An abandonment of the male breadwinner family model underlying 
the state's policies affecting the economic, legal, social and personal lives of 
women is essential. Only by undermining the structural and ideological 
barriers to women's equality embedded in all our institutions and practices, can 
there be a real closing of the wage gap. 
In the meantime, given that pay equity policy provides a route to gain money 
for low paid women, and will close some portion of the wage gap at least, it is 
essential for unions representing women to develop a labour-feminist politic to 
take advantage of this opportunity. Overall, the impact of pay equity on 
bargaining style, structure and power appears to be positive for women in their 
unions provided those unions develop effective equality bargaining strategies 
derived from a labour-feminist politic. Whatever the combination of 
constraints and opportunities and the eventual effect on women's wages, one 
354 
trend that was seen as very positive by many union pay equity negotiators was 
the development of a new cadre of women union activists and leaders. This 
bodes well for future equality bargaining, for we know that equality in the 
workplace is inextricably linked with equality in the unions, and that more 
women at the bargaining table will increase the likelihood of a labour-feminist 
politic informing negotiating policy and practice. 
355 
Reference List 
Abbott, M. (1990). Pay equity: Means and ends. Policy Forum Series, 20. 
John Deutch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, Queen's 
University, Kingston. 
Acker, J. (1989). DoiLag comparable worth: Gender, class and pay equi! Y-. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Adams, J., & Griffin, J. (1983). Bargaining for Equality. In L. Briskin & L. 
Yanz (Eds. ), Union sisters: Women in the labour movement. Toronto: 
Women's Educational Press. 
Adamson, N., Briskin, L., & McPhail, M. (1988). Feminist organizing for 
change. Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Anderson, J. (1989). The structure of collective bargaining. In J. Anderson, 
M. Gunderson & A. Ponak (Eds. ), Union-management Relations in 
Canada (2nd ed. ). Don Mills: Addison Wesley. 
Armstrong, P. & Armstrong, H. (1994). The double ghetto: Canadian women 
and their segregated work (rev. ed. ). Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart. 
Armstrong, P., & Armstrong, H. (1986). Beyond sexless class and classless 
sex: Towards feminist marxism. In M. Barrett & R. Hamilton (Eds. ), 
Politics of diversily. London: Verso Editions. 
356 
Armstrong, P., & Armstrong, H. (1988). Taking women into account: 
Redefining and intensifying employment in Canada. In J. Jensen, E. 
Hagen, & C. Reddy, (Eds. ), Ferninisation of the labour force: 
Paradoxes and promises. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Armstrong, P., & Armstrong, H. (1990). Theorizing women's work. 
Toronto: Garamond. 
Armstrong, P., & Armstrong, H. (1990, Summer). Lessons from pay equity. 
Studies in Political Economy, 32,29-54. 
Armstrong, P., & Armstrong, H. (1991). Limited possibilities and possible 
limits for pay equity: Widiin and beyond the Ontario legislation. In J. 
Fudge & P. McDermott (Eds. ), Just wages: A feminist assessment of 
pay equily. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Arrowsmith, D. (1986). Pay equity: Legislative framework and cases. 
Queen's Papers in Industrial Relations, Industrial Relations Centre, 
Queen's University, Kingston, ON. 
Arthurs, H. (1981). Labour law and industrial relations in Canada. Toronto: 
Butterworths. 
Attenborough, S. (1982). Bargaining for Egualily. National Union of 
Provincial Government Employees. 
Averitt, R. (1968). The dual economy: The dynamics of American Indusjjy 
Structure. New York: Norton. 
Bail, M. (1985, September-October). Getting 'the girls' to the top. Canadian 
Dimension, 2(4), 8-9. 
357 
Baker, M., & Robeson, M. (1981). Trade union reactions to women workers 
and their concerns. Canadian Journal of Sociolo , ý(l), 19-31. 
Balkan, D. (1985, Winter). Practicing what we preach .... women, unions and 
affirmative action. Canadian Women Studies, ý(4). 
Barrett, M. (1980). Women's oppres ion today. London: Verso. 
Barrett, M. & Hamilton, R. (1986). Introduction. In M. Barrett & R. 
Hamilton (Eds. ), Politics of diverst. London: Verso Editions. 
Barrett, M. & McIntosh, M. (1980). The 'family wage': Some problems for 
socialists and feminists. Capital and Class, 11,51-72. 
Barrie, R. (1988). The Pay Eguijy Act of Ontario: Implications of collective 
bargaining. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 
Beaumont, P. (1987). The government as a model employer: A change in 
direction in Britain. Journal of Collective Negotiations in the Public 
Sector, 16(3), 185-200. 
Becker, G. (1964). The economics of discrimination. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
Beechey, V. (1977). Some notes on female wage labour in capitalist 
production. Capital and Class, 3,45-66. 
Beechey, V. (1982). The sexual division of labour and the labour process: A 
critical assessment of Braverman. In S. Wood (Ed. ), The deglgdatio 
of work? London: Hutchinson. 
358 
Beechey, V. (1983). What's so special about women's employment? A 
review of some recent studies of women's paid work, Feminist Revie_ 
15,23-45. 
Beneria, L., & Roldan, M. (1987). The classroads of class and gender. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Bergmann, B. (1971). The effect of white incomes on discrimination in 
employment. Journal of Political Econogjy, L9(2). 294 - 313. 
Bhaskar, R. (1978). A realist theoKy of Science. Sussex: Harvester. 
Bhaskar, R. (1979). The ]possibilijy of naturalism: A philosophical critique of 
the conteMorgy human sciences. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities. 
Black, D. (1993). Canadian women get short shrift, U. N. says. Women in 
Management, 4(l), 5. 
Black, E., & Silver, J. (1990, Winter). Contradictions and limitations of final 
offer selection: The Manitoba experience. Industrial Relations, 45(l), 
146-164. 
Bluestone, B. (1970). The tripartite economy: Labour markets and the 
working poor. PoveM and Human Resources Abstracts, 5(4), 15-34. 
Blum, L. (1991). Between feminism and labour: The significance of the 
comparable worth movement. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Blyton, P., & Goodman, J. (1990). Canadian industrial relations: An 
introductory overview. EMployee Relations, 12(2). Special issue on 
industrial relations in Canada: Contemporary comparisons and change. 
359 
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (1975). The problem with human capital a Marxian 
critique. American Economic Association: Proceedings and 12a2grs, 
65(2), 74-82. 
Braverman, H. (1974). Labour and monopoly capitalism. New York: 
Monthly Review Press. 
Brenner, J. (1987). Feminist political discourses: Radical versus liberal 
approaches to the feminisation of poverty and comparable worth. 
Gender and Sociely, 1(4), 447-465. 
Brenner, J., & Ramas, M. (1984). Rethinking women's oppression. New 
Left Review, 144,33-71. 
Briskin, L. (1990, January-February). Women, unions and leadership. 
Canadian Dimension, 24(l), 38-41. 
Briskin, L. (1991). Autonomy, integration and legitimacy: An analysis of 
socialist feminist practice in Canada. York University, Social Science 
Division, Working Paper Series. 
Briskin, L., & Yanz, L. (1983). Union sisters: Women in the labour 
movement. Toronto: Women's Educational Press. 
Bronfenbrenner, M. (1976). Potential monopsony in labour markets. 
Industrial and Labour Relations Review, 2(4), 577-88. 
Bryman, A. (1988). Quantily and gualily in social research. London: Unwin 
Hyman. 
Burgess, R. (1984). In the field. London: Unwin Hyman. 
360 
Burkart, L. (1990). Implementing pay eguily in Ontario. School of Industrial 
Relations Research Essay, Series No. 28. Kingston: Industrial Relations 
Centre, Queen's University. 
Burt, S. (1991). Legislators, women, and public policy. In S. Burt, L. Code 
& L. Dorney (Eds. ), Changing patterns: Women in Canada. Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart. 
Burton, C. (1991). Job evaluation and pay equity in the New South Wales 
public sector. Workshop on job evaluation. In The National Pay 
Equily CaMpaign Conference Repo . London: National Pay Equity 
Campaign. 
Cadieux, R. (1984). Canada's equal pay for work of equal value law. In H. 
Remick (Ed. ), Comparable worth and wage discrimination: Technical 
possibilities and political realities. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press. 
Campbell, B. (1982, March). Women: Not what they bargained for. 
Marxism Todgy, 18-23. 
Canadian Human Rights Commission. (1987). Proposal for reform of egual 
pay for work of equal value legislation in the federal jurisdiction. 
Ottawa: Author. 
Canadian Labour Congress, 15th Constitutional Convention. (1984). Policy 
Paper (No. 25) on Women and Affirmative Action. Ottawa: Author. 
Canadian Labour Congress, 5th Biennial National Women's Conference. 
(1985, September). Making affirmative action work. Ottawa: Author. 
361 
Canadian Labour Force Development Board. (1994). Putting the pieces 
together: Towards a coherent transition system for Canada's labour 
force. Ottawa: Author. 
Canadian Labour Market Productivity Centre. (1992). Quarterly Review, 
Ottawa: Author. 
Cappelli, P. (1985). Theory construction in industrial relations and some 
implications for research. Industrial Relations, L4(l), 90-112. 
Carter, D. (1992). Canadian industrial relations in the year 2000: Towards a 
new order? Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 
Casselton, V. (1993). The honeymooners. Labour Times, 1(4), 5. 
Chaison, G., & Andiappan, P. (1987, Fall). Profiles of local union officers: 
Females v. males. Industrial Relations, 26,281-283. 
Chaison, G., & Andiappan, P. (1989, Spring). An analysis of the barriers to 
women becoming local union officers. Journal of Labour Research, 10, 
149-162. 
Chaison, G., & Rose, J. (1989). Unions: Growth, structure, and internal 
dynamics. In J. Anderson, M. Gunderson & A. Ponak (Eds. ), Union- 
management relations in Canada (second edition). Don Mills: Addison 
Wesley. 
CLC to regroup, tap local activism in bid to increase political power. (1990, 
May). The Globe and Mail, p. A5. 
362 
Chaykowski, M. (1990). Implementing pay equity in the unionised sector. In 
M. Abbott, Pay eguily: Means and ends. Policy Forum Series - 20. 
Kingston: John Deutch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 
Queen's University. 
Coates, M. (1989). Pay and employment equity. Queen's Papers in Industrial 
Relations, No. 84. 
Coates, M. (1992). Is there a future for the Canadian labour movement? 
Kinsgton: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 
Cockburn, C. (1981). The material of male power. Feminist Review 9,41- 
58. 
Cockburn, C. (1983). Brothers: Male dominance and technological change. 
London: Pluto Press. 
Cohen, 1. (1987). Structuration theory and social praxis. In A. Giddens & J. 
Turner (Eds. ), Social theoKy today. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press. 
Cohen, M. (1988). Women's work, markets and economic development in 
nineteenth-centuiy Ontario. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
Cohen-Rosenthall, E., & Burton, C. (1987). A guide to union-management 
cooperation. New York: Praeger. 
Colling, T., & Dickens, L. (1989). Equalily Bargaining - Why No ? 
Manchester: Her Majesty's Stationary Office for the Equal 
Opportunities Commission. 
363 
Collins, E. (1991). An overview of European policy developments. Opening 
plenary on equal value - international comparisons. In, The National 
Pay FAuily CaMaign Conference Report. London: National Pay 
Equity Campaign. 
Conklin, D., & Bergman, P. (1990). Pay eguily in Ontario: A manager's 
ggide. Halifax: The Institute for Research on Public Policy. 
Connelly, P., & MacDonald, M. (1986). Women's work: Domestic and 
wage labour in a Nova Scotia community. In M. Barrett & R. 
Hamilton (Eds. ), Politics of diversily. London: Verso Editions. 
Cornish, M. (1986). Equal pay: Collective bargaining and the law. Ottawa: 
Labour Canada. 
Cornish, M. (1987). Ontario's new Pay FAuily Act: From a union 
perspective. Toronto: Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing 
Education Series. 
Cornish, M., & Ritchie, L. (1980). Getting organized: Building a union. 
Toronto: Women's Educational Press. 
Cornish, M., & Trachuk, L. (1988). Impact of the Pay Equily Act on 
collective bargaining - from a union pgrspective. Paper presented at the 
Canadian Bar Association, Ontario. 
Coutts, J. (1989, November 25). Court ruling widens sweep of equity laws. 
The Globe and Mail, p. A9. 
Coutts, J. (1990, February 5). Pay equity moves in Ontario bogged down in 
negotiations. The Globe and Mail, p. A21. 
364 
Coutts, J. (1990, March 3). Equal pay act violates rights of women, lawyer 
charges. The Globe and Mail, p. A9. 
Craig, A., & Solomon, N. (1993). The system of industrial relations in 
Canada (4th ed. ). Scarborough: Prentice Hall. 
Crompton, R., & Sanderson, K. (1980). Gendered jobs and social change. 
London: Unwin Hyman. 
Cuneo, C. (1990). Pay equi1y: The labour-feminist challenge. Toronto: 
Oxford University Press. 
Davies, * C. (1988). Pay equity in the unionized environment. In Implementing 
pay eguily: Getting on with the ipb. Conference proceedings. Toronto: 
Canadian Institute. 
Dickens, L. (1989). Women - an undiscovered resource? Industrial Relations 
Journal, 20(3), 167-75. 
Dickens, L. (1992). Anti-discrimination legislation: Exploring and explaining 
the impact on women's employment. In W. McCarthy (Ed. ), Lega 
intervention in industrial relations: Gains and losses. Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
Dickens, L., & Colling, T. (1990, April). Why equality won't appear on the 
bargaining agenda. Personnel Management, 48-53. 
Dickens, L., Townley, B., & Winchester, D. (1988). Tackling sex 
discrimination through collective bargaining. Manchester: Her 
Majesty's Stationary Office for the Equal Opportunities Commission. 
365 
Docksey, C. (1987). The European community and the promotion of equality. 
In C. McGodden (Ed. ), Women. employment and European egualily 
law. London: Eclipse Publications. 
Du Plessis Novitz, R., & Jaber, N. (1990). Pay equity, the 'free market' and 
state intervention. New Zealand Journal of Industrial Relations, L5, 
251-62. 
Edelson, M. (1987). Challenging unions: Feminist process and democracy 
the labour movement. Ottawa: Canadian Research Institute for the 
Advancement of Women (CRIAW). 
Eisberg, R., & Resnick, R. (1974). Quantum physics. New York: John 
Wiley and Sons. 
Ehrenberg, R. (1989). Econometric analysis of the empirical consequences of 
comparable worth: What have we learned? In M. Hill & M. 
Killingsworth (Eds. ), Comparable worth: Analysis of evidence. Ithaca: 
ILR Press. 
Ellis, V. (1988). Current trade union attempts to remove occupational 
segregation in the employment of women. In S. Walby (Ed. ), Gender 
segregation at work (pp. 135-156). Milton Keynes: Open University 
Press. 
Ellis-Grunfeld, R. (1987). Pay equity in Manitoba. Manitoba Law Journal, 
16(3). 227-236. 
366 
England, P. (1984). Explanations of job segregation and sex gap in pay. 
Comparable worth: Issue for the 80's, 1. Washington: U. S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. 
ECO (1990). Equal Opportunities Commission. Egual Day for men and 
women: Strengthening the Acts. Manchester: Equal Opportunities 
Commission. 
Equal Pay Coalition. (1988, December). Bringing pay eguily to those 
presently excluded from Ontario's Pay Eguily Act. Submission to the 
Pay Equity Commission, Toronto, ON. 
Evans, S., & Nelson, B. (1989). Wage justice: Comparable worth and the 
paradox of technocratic reform. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Ferner, A. (1989). The research process in the cross-national industrial 
relations case study: Research on railways in Britain and Spain. 
Workshop on research methods, Fundacion Juan March, Madrid. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). Against method: Outline of an anarchistic theory of 
knowledge. London: NLB. 
Findlay, S. (1991). Making sense of pay equity: Issues for a feminist political 
practice. In J. Fudge & P. McDermott (Eds. ), Just wages: A feminist 
assessment. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Field, D. (1983). ' The Dilemma Facing Women's Committees. In L. Briskin 
& L. Yanz (Eds. ), Union sisters: Women in the labour movement (pp. 
293-306). Toronto: Women's- Educational Press. 
Fisher, R., & Ury, W. (1981). Getting to ye . Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
367 
Flamming, J. (1987). Women made a difference: Comparable worth in San 
Jose. In M. Katzenstein & C. Mueller (Eds. ), The women's 
movements of the United States and Western EuLQpe. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press. 
Folbre, N., Bergmann, B., Agarwal, B., & Floro, M. (Eds. ). (1992). 
Women's work in the world economy. In Issues in Contemporary 
Economics, Proceedings of the Ninth World Congress of the 
International Economic Association. Athens: Macmillan Academic and 
Professional. 
Frager, R. (1983). No proper deal: Women workers and the Canadian labour 
movement, 1870-1940. In L. Briskin & L. Yanz, Union sisters: 
Women in the labour movement. Toronto: Women's Educational 
Press. 
Freeman, A. (1991, Septemer 6). Recession ravaged Ontario, study says. 
The Globe and Mail, p. Al. 
Fryer, J. (1988). Breakdown of public sector collective bargaining. In P. 
Kumar (Ed. ), Industrial Relations in the 1980's. Kingston: Industrial 
Relations Centre, Queen's University, Kingston, ON. 
Fudge, J., & McDermott, P. (Eds. ). (1991). Just wa-ges: A feminist 
assessment of pay egui1y. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Fudge, J., & McDermott, P. (Eds. ). (1991). Putting feminism to work. In J. 
Fudge & P. McDermott, Just wages: A feminist assessment of 12ay 
eguity. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
368 
Galbraith, J. (1973). Economics and the public puipose. Boston: Houghton- 
Mifflin. 
Galt, V. (1990, May 19). CLC to regroup, tap local activism in bid to 
increase political power. The Globe and Mail, p. A5. 
Galt, V. (1992a, April 24). Public servants expect to obtain right to strike. 
The Globe and Mail, p. A8. 
Galt, V. (1992b, April 25). CUPE examines medicare. The Globe and Mail, 
p. A6. 
Gandz, J. (1987). Pay eguily in the context of collective bargaining. A report 
prepared for the Ontario Women's Directorate, Government of Ontario. 
Toronto: Ontario Women's Directorate. 
Gardner, M. (1991). Hopeful but modest: Research design for industrial 
relations. In D. Kelly (Ed. ), Researching industrial relations: Methods 
and methodolggy. Sydney: Australian Centre for Industrial Relations 
Research and Teaching. 
Gaskell, J. (1986). Conceptions of skill and the work of women: Some 
historical and political issues. In M. Barrett & R. Hamilton (Eds. ), 
Politics of diversily. London: Verso Editions. 
Gay, V. (1989, March). Collective bargaining as a material defence in equal 
value cases. Industrial Law Journal, 18(l), 63-66. 
Gibb-Clark, M. (1990, May 25). Pay equity catch-up costs put at 2 to 6% of 
year's wages. The Globe and Mail, p. B5. 
369 
Giddens, A. (1976). New rules of sociological method. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Giddens, A. (1979). Central problems in social theory. London: Macmillan. 
Giddens, A. (1984). The constitution of society. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giles, A., & Murray, G. (1988). Towards an historical understanding of 
industrial relations theory in Canada. Relations Industrielles, 43(4), 
780-810. 
Gilligan, C. (1982). In a different voice. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Godard, J. (1989). Beyond empiricism: Alternative philosophies of science 
and the study of industrial relations. Queen's PaMrs in Industrial 
Relations, 3. 
Gordon, D. (1972). Theories of povejU and underdevelopmen. Lexington: 
D. C. Heath. 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. (1992). Change and challenge: 
A strategic plan for Newfoundland and Labrador. St. John's: Author. 
Gregory, J. (1987). Sex. race and the law: Legislating for egualily. London: 
Sage. 
Group of employees, Applicant v. Ontario Public Service Employees Union, 
Respondent and Crown in Right of Ontario (Management Board 
Secretariat), Respondent. (1993). 4 P. E. R. 57. 
Gunderson, M. (1975). Male-female wage differentials and the impact of 
equal pay legislation. Review of Economics and Statistics, 57. 
370 
Gunderson, M. (1980). The male-female earnings gap: A current assessment. 
Toronto: Ministry of Labour, Research Branch. 
Gunderson, M. (1982). The male-female earnings gap in Ontario: A 
summary. Toronto: Ministry of Labour, Research Branch. 
Gunderson, M. (1989). Male and female wage differentials and policy 
responses. Journal of Economic Literature, 27(l), 46-72. 
Gunderson, M., Muszynski, & Keck, J. (1990). Women and labour market 
pove_M. Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women. 
Gunderson, M., & Riddell, W. (1988). Labour market economics: Theory, 
evidence and policy in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. 
Haignere, L. (1990, April). Pay eguily uRdate. Paper delivered to the 
Canadian Bar Association. Toronto. 
Hamilton, R. (1986). Working at home. In M. Barrett & R. Hamilton (Eds. ), 
Politics of diversily. London: Verso Editions. 
Hartmann, H. (1976). The historical roots of occupational segregation: 
Patriarchy, and job segregation by sex. In M. Blaxall & B. Reagan 
(Eds. ), Women and the workplace: The iMplications of occupational 
segregation. Chicago: University of Chicago. 
Hartmann, H. (1983). The case for comparable worth. In P. Schlafly (Ed. ), 
Egual Day for unegual work: A conference on comparable worth. 
Washington: Eagle Forum Educational and Legal Defense Fund. 
Hodson, R. (1978). Labour in the monopoly, competitive, and state sectors of 
production. Politics and Soci=, a(4), 429-80. 
371 
Heery, E., & Kelly, J. (1988, Dec. ). Do female representatives make a 
difference? Employment and Socie1y. 
Hodson, R. (1978). Labour in the monopoly, competitive, and state sectors of 
production. Politics and Soci=, a(4), 429-80. 
Humphries, J. (1977). Class struggle and the persistence of the working class. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics. 
Humphries, J., & Rubery, J. (1984). The reconstitution of the supply side of 
the labour market: The relative autonomy of social reproduction. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, ý, 331- 346. 
Hyman, R. (1974). Inequality, ideology and industrial relations. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 12(2), 171-90. 
Hyman, R. (1972). Strikes Oth ed. ). London: Macmillan Press Ltd. 
Hyman, R. (1982). Review of T. Kochan (1980), Collective Bargaining and 
Industrial Relations. Homewood: Irwin. In Review Symposium, 
Industrial Relations, 21(l), 100-114. 
Hyman, R. (1989). The political economy of industrial relations. London: 
Macmillan. 
Isaacs, J. (1987). Power and marxist theoKy: A realist view. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press. 
Jain, H. C., & Sloane P. J. (1981). FMal employment issues: Race and sex 
discrimination in the United States. Canada, and Britain. New York: 
CBS Educational and Professional Publishing. 
372 
Jenson, J., Hagen, E., & Reddy, C. (Eds. ). (1988). Feminisation of the 
labour force: Paradoxes and promises. New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
Jones, B. (1991). The Northern Ireland experience. Workshop on a pro- 
active approach to equal value. In The National Pay Eguily Campaign 
Conference Rej2o . London: National Pay Equity Campaign. 
Kaufman, L. (1986). Job evaluation systems: Concepts and issues. Research 
and Current Issues Series. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, 
Queen's University. 
Kealey, G. (1980). Toronto workers respond to industrial capitalism. 1867- 
1892. Toronto. 
Kealey, L. (1986). Factors affecting women's labour force participation. 
Background report for the Royal Commission on Employment and 
Unemployment, Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Keat, R., & Urry, J. (1975). Social theory as science. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Kelly, J. (1988). Pay eguily management. Don Mills: CCH Canadian. 
Kenrick, J. (1981). Politics and the construction of women as second-class 
workers. In F. Wilkinson (Ed. ), The dynamics of labour market 
semnentatiOn. London: Academic Press. 
Kessler-Harris, A. (1988). The just price, the free market, and the value of 
women. Feminist Studies, 14(2), 235-49. 
373 
Kirk, J., & Miller, M. (1986). Reliability and validity in qualitative research. 
Sage Universily Paper Series on Qualitative Research Methods, Vol. 2, 
Bevely Hills: Sage. 
Kovach, K., & Millspaugh, C. (1990). Comparable worth: Canadian pay 
equity legislation. Academy of Management Executive, 4(2), 92-101. 
Kuch, P., & Haessel, W. (1979). An analysis of earnings in Canada. Ottawa: 
Statistics Canada. 
Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Kumar, P. (1991). Industrial relations in Canada and the United States: From 
uniformity to divergence. Queen's Papgrs in Industrial Relations 1991- 
2. Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 
Kumar, P. (1993). Collective bargaining and women's workplace concerns. 
In L. Briskin & P. McDermott (Eds. ), Women challenging unions: 
Feminism. democracy and militancy. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Kumar, P., & Cowan, D. (1989, March). Gender differences in union 
membership status: The role of labour market segmentation. Kingston: 
Queen's University, School of Industrial Relations. 
Labour Canada. (1988). Women in the labour force. 1986-1987 edition. 
Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
Labour Canada. (1992). Labour-management partnerships program: 
Background rmation. Ottawa: Author. 
Land, H. (1980). The family wage. Feminist Review, ý, 55-78. 
374 
Lakatos, 1. (1970). Falsification and the methodology of scientific research 
programmes. In I. Lakatos & A. Musgrave (Eds. ), Criticism and the 
glowth of scientific knowledg . Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Larkin, J., & Pollack, M. (1985, December). Half the sky... and then some. 
Canadian Dimension, 19(5), 41-42. 
Lavigne, M. (1993). Women and power: The guiet revolution. Quebec: 
Quebec Status of Women Council. 
tax, D., & Sebenius, J. (1986). The manager as negotiator. New York: Free 
Press. 
Leighton, D. (1993). How can women access boards? Women in 
Management, 4(2), 1,7. 
Lennon-Shilton, E. (1989). Bargaining pay equity: The information problem. 
In The pay equily plan: Deadline December 31.1989. Toronto: Dept. 
of Education, Law Society of Upper Canada, 1989, Gl-G19. 
Leonard, A. (1987). Judging inequalily: The effectiveness of the industrial 
tribunal system in sex discrimination and egual pay cases. London: 
Yale Press Limited.. 
Lewicki, R., -& Litterer, J. (1985). Negotiation. Homewood: Irwin. 
Lewis, D. (1988). Just give us the mgney. Vancouver: Women's Research 
Centre. 
Lewis, J. (1985). The debate on sex and class. New Left Review, 149,108- 
120. 
375 
Little, M. (1989a, September). Overcoming the odds. Our Times, 22-24. 
Little, M. (1989b, December ). Movement makeover. Our Times, 12-14. 
MacDonald, M. (1993). Balancing work and family. Women in Management, 
A(l), 4. 
MacEwan Scott, A. (1986). Industrialisation, gender segregation and 
stratification theory. In R. Crompton & M. Mann (Eds. ), Gender and 
stratification. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Mackie, R. (1991, April 30). Ontario faces record deficit. The Globe and 
Mail, p. Al. 
Madden, J. (1973). The economics of sex discrimination. Lexington: Heath. 
Malveaux, J. (1984). Powerless by definition: Occupational and pay patterns 
of women in the workplace. In L. Stamm & C. Ryff (Eds. ), Social 
power and influence of women. Boulder: Westview Press. 
Manicas, P. (1980). The concept of social structure. Journal for the Theo[y 
of Social Behaviour, 10(2) 65-82. 
Manitoba Civil Service Commission. (1988). Pay eguily implementation in 
the Manitoba Civil Service. Manitoba: Author. 
Marchak, P. (1987). Rational capital and women as labour. In H. Maroney 
& M. Luxton (Eds. ), Feminism and political economy: Women's work 
and women's strudes. Toronto: Methuen. 
Maroney, H. (1987). Feminism at work. In H. Maroney & M. Luxton 
(Eds. ), Feminism and political economy: Women's work. women's 
struggles. Toronto: Methuen. 
376 
Marsden, R. (1982). Industrial relations: A critique of empiricism. 
Sociology, 16(2), 232-250. 
Marsden, R. (1989). A critigue of industrial relations: Towards a political 
economy of production. Unpublished paper. 
Marshall, R. (1976). The economics of racial discrimination: A survey. 
Journal of Economic Literature, 12(3), 849-71. 
Martin, G. (1985). Union social services and women's work. Social Service 
Review, 59,62-74. 
Massey, D., & Meegan, M. (1985). Profits and job loss. In D. Massey & 
M. Meegan (Eds. ), Politics and method. London: Methuen. 
McDermott, P. (1991). The pay equity challenge to collective bargaining in 
Ontario. In J. Fudge & P. McDermott, Just wages: A feminist 
assessment of pay eggily. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
McBride, S. (1987). Hard times and the rules of the game: The legislative 
environment of labour-capital conflict. In R. Argue, et al (Eds. ), 
Working people and hard times. Toronto: Garamond. 
McFarland, J. (1979). "Women and unions: Help or hindrance. " Atlantis, 
48-70. 
McKenzie, E. (1988). The Ontario Pay F: auily Act and its effect on collective 
bargaining. Kingston: Queen's University School of Business. 
377 
McKeown, M. (1988). The Pay Equity Act: A legal perspective. Working 
Papgr Series No., NC 88-20. London: National Centre for 
Management Research and Development, University of Western 
Ontario. 
Meuller, C. (1987). Collective consciousness, identity transformation, and the 
rise of women in public office in the United States. In M. Katzenstein 
& C. Meuller (Eds. ), The women's movements of the United States and 
Western EurgRe. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Middleton, C. (1979). The sexual division of labour in feudal England. New 
Left Review, 113/114,147-168. 
Milkman, R. (1980). Organizing the sexual division of labor: Historical 
perspectives on "women's work" and the American labor movement. 
Socialist Review, 10,95-150. 
Milkman, R. (Ed. ). (1985). Women, work and Rrotest: A centujy of U. S. 
women's labor histo1y. Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Mincer, J. (1974). Schooling, experience and earnings. New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Molyneux, M. (1979). Beyond the domestic labour debate. New Left 
Review, 116,3-27. 
More, C. (1982). Skill and the survival of apprenticeship. In S. Wood (Ed. ), 
The degradation of work? London: Hutchinson. 
Most polled want traditional family. (1994, June 4). The Evening Telegram, 
P. 11. 
378 
National Council on Welfare. (1979). Women and poveM. Ottawa: Author. 
National Pay Equity Campaign. (1991, September). Proceedings of the 
National Pay Equily Campaign Conference. London, England. 
Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union. (Undated). The Newfoundland 
and Labrador Nurses' Union. St. John's: Author. 
Newfoundland Statistics Agency. (1994). Extract from unreferenced 
government document. St. John's: Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador. 
Oakley, A. (1981). Interviewing women: A contradiction in terms. In H. 
Roberts (Ed. ), Doing feminist research. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul. 
O'Connor, J. (1973). The fiscal crisis of the state. New York: St. Martin's. 
Ollman, B. (1971). Alienation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
O'Neill, J. (1984). An argument against comparable worth. Comparable 
worth: Issue for the 80's, !- Washington: Commission on Civil Rights. 
Ontario Federation of Labour. (1984). Making up the difference. Toronto: 
Author. 
Ontario Federation of Labour. (1988). Pay eguily ggid . Toronto: Author. 
Ontario Federation of Labour. (1990). Taking stock and moving forward: 
I 
Union women in the 1990's. Toronto: Author. 
Ontario Women's Directorate. (1986). Report of the consultation panel on 
pay eguily. Toronto: Author. 
379 
Ontario Women's Directorate. (1990). Infoflash: Basic facts. In A fact sheet 
on women in Ontario. Toronto: Author. 
Ontario Women's Directorate. (1991). Infoflash: Labour force. In A fact 
sheet on women in Ontario. Toronto: Author. 
Ontario Women's Directorate. (Undated). Work and family. Toronto: 
Author. 
Ontario Public Service Employees' Union. (1992). What is OPSEU?. 
Toronto: OPSEU Communications Department. 
Ontario Public Services Employees Union, Applicant v. Cybermedix Health 
Services, Respondent (1990). 1 P. E. R. 41. 
Ornstein, M. (1982). Gender wage differentials in Canada: A review of 
previous research and theoretical framework. In Egualily in the 
workplace, Series A, No. 1. Ottawa: Women's Bureau, Labour 
Canada. 
Ouimet, L. (1988). Pay equi1y: Management and union working together. 
Working Paper Series No. NC 88-17. London: National Centre for 
Management Research and Development, School of Business 
Administration, University of Western Ontario. 
Panitch, L., & Swartz, D. (1988). The assault on trade union freedoms. 
Toronto: Garamond Press. 
Parr, J. (1985). Women at work. In W. Cherwinski & G. Kealey, Lectures 
in Canadian-labour and working-class history.. St. John's: Committee 
on Canadian Labour History, Memorial University of Newfoundland. 
380 
Pay Equity Agreement. (1988). Between the Treasury Board, on behalf of the 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador and those Employers 
covered by the Public Service (Collective Bargaining) Act, 1973; and 
The Association of Allied Health Professionals, The International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, The Canadian Union of Public 
Employees, The Newfoundland Association of Public Employees, and 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union. St. John's: 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Pay Equity Bureau. (1988a). Pay eguily: ]Egualily at work (job evaluation). 
Winnipeg: Author. 
Pay Equity Bureau. (1988b). Pay eguily in Manitoba: A discussion papgr. 
Winnipeg: Author. 
Pay Equity Commission. (1988a). Pay equity adjustments. Pay egui1Y 
implementation series, No. 14. Toronto: Pay Equity Commission. 
Pay Equity Commission. (1988b). Effective pay equily committees. Toronto: 
Author. 
The pay equily newsletter. (1991). St. John's: Government of Newfoundland 
and Labrador. 
Payne, L. (1993). Newfoundland left high and dry, Our Times, L2(4), 32. 
Pennell, J. (1989). Consensual bargaining: Labor negotiations in battered- 
women9s programs. Journal of Progressive Human Services, 1(l), 59- 
74. 
381 
Peterson, R., & Tracy, L. (1976). Behaviourial model of problem solving in 
labour negotiations. British Journal of Industrial Relations, L4(2), 159- 
173. 
Peterson, R., & Tracy, L. (1985). Problem solving in American collective 
bargaining. Advances in industrial and labour relations, 2,1-50. 
Piore, M. (1970). Jobs and training. In Beer, S. & Barringer, R. (Eds. ), The 
state and the poor. Cambridge: Winthrop. 
Phillips, A., & Taylor, B. (1980). Sex and skill: Notes towards a feminist 
economics. Feminist Review, 6,79-88. 
Podrebarac, G. (1988). From act into action. Working paper series, NC 88- 
21. London: National Centre for Management and Research, 
University of Western Ontario. 
Polachek, S. (1984). Women in the economy: Perspectives on gender 
inequality. Comparable worth: Issue for the 80's. Washington: U. S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. 
Ponak, A., & Thompson, M. (1989). Public sector collective bargaining. In 
J. Anderson, M. Gunderson, & A. Ponak. Union-management relation 
in Canada. Don Mills: Addison-Wesley Publishers. 
Portman, L., Grune, J., & Johnson, E. (1984). The role of labour. In H. 
Remick (Ed. ), Comparable worth and wage discrimination: Technical 
possibilities and political realities. Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press - 
382 
Potts, A. (1987, November). The implications of pay equity for collective 
bargaining in Ontario. Human resources management in Canada, 55, 
519-524. 
Pruitt, D. (1981). Negotiation behavior. New York: Academic Press. 
Public Service Alliance of Canada. (1990). Egual pay: It's the law. Ottawa: 
Public Service Alliance of Canada. 
Quaid, M. (1993). Job evaluation: The myLh of equitable assessment. 
Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Rachlis, M., & Kushner, C. (1992, October). Under the knife. Report in 
Business Magazine. 
Remick, H. (Ed. ). (1984). Comparable worth and wage discrimination: 
Technical possibilities and political realities. Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press. 
Remick, H., & Steinberg, R. (1984). Technical possibilities and political 
realities: Concluding remarks. In Comparable worth and wage 
discrimination: Technical possibilities and political realities. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
Riddell, C. (1986). Canadian labour relations: An overview. In C. Riddell 
(Ed. ), Canadian Labour Relations. Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press. 
Ritchie, L. (1983). Why are so many women unorganized?. In L. Briskin & 
L. Yanz (Eds. ), Union sisters: Women in the labour movement (pp. 
200-211). Toronto: Women's Educational Press. 
383 
Riverdale Hospital (1990). The Riverdale Hospital, Applicant v. Canadian 
Union of Public Employees, Local 79, Respondent; Canadian Union of 
Public Employees, Local 79, Applicant v. The Riverdale Hospital, 
Respondent. 2 P. E. R., 1. 
Robinson, J. (1934). The economics of j=erfect competitio . London: 
MacMillan. 
Robb, E. (1987). Equal pay for work of equal value: Issues and policies. 
Canadian Public Poligy, 13(4), 445-461. 
Robb, B. (1988). The Pay Eguity Act of Ontario - implications for collective 
bargainigg. School of Industrial Relations Research Essays, Kingston: 
Queen's University. 
Roethlisberger F., & Dickson, W. (1947). Management and the worker. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Roome, R. (1989, March-April). Pay equity in Newfoundland and Labrador. 
Personnel in Perspective, 6-10. 
Rubery, J. (1978). Structured labour markets, worker organisation and low 
pay. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2,17-36. 
Russell, B. (1990). Back to Work? Labour. State and Industrial Relations. 
Toronto: Nelson. 
Russell, S. (1987). The hidden curriculum of school: Reproducing gender and 
class hierarchies. In H. Maroney & M. Luxton (Eds. ), Feminism and 
political economy: Women's work and women's struggles. Toronto: 
Methuen. 
384 
Sack, J. (1987). Pay equity in Canada: Union responsibilities. Egual Day 
collective bargaining and the law: Conference speeches. Ottawa: 
Labour Canada. 
Sanford, B. (1988, Fall). [Interview with Ann Marie Wierzbicki]. Union 
Maid. Women and Environments, 10(4), 11-13. 
Sangster, J. (1985). Canadian working women. In W. Cherwinski & G. 
Kealey, Lectures in Canadian labour and working-class history. St. 
John's: Committee on Canadian Labour History, Memorial University 
of Newfoundland. 
Sarra, J. (1986). Report on the Ontario Government's public hearings on pay 
eguily. Toronto: Ontario Federation of Labour. 
Savage, D. (1992). Care and feeding of the Neo-Conservative Revolution. 
CAUT Bulletin, 39(9), 3-4. 
Schienstock, G. (1981). Towards a theory of industrial relations. British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 19(2), 170-189. 
Schutz, A. (1962). Collected papers I: The problem of social reali! y. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. 
Shamie, S. (1986). Narrowing the gender wage ggp: Is egual value legislation 
the answer? Research and Current Issues Series No. 46. Kingston: 
Industrial Relations Centre, Queen's University. 
Shepela, S., & Viviano, A. (1984). Some psychological factors affecting job 
segregation and wages. In H. Remick (Ed. ), Comparable worth and 
n. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
385 
Silverman, D. (1985). Qualitative methodology and sociology: Describing the 
social world. Aldershot: Gower. 
Skipton, S. (1991). Equal value: An alternative approach. Employee 
Relations, 13(l), 17-23. 
Statistics Canada. (1986, Census). Selected characteristics for census 
divisions and census subdivisions (Tables 94-102 and 94-112). Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1988a). Annual Report of the Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada under the Corporations and Labour Returns Act, Pa 
II - Labour Unions (1986). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1988b). Labour market activily survey - Canada's women: 
A profile of their 1986 labour market experience. Ottawa: Minister of 
Supply and Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1988c). The labour force (December 1987). Ottawa: 
Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1990a). Annual report of the Minister of Supply and 
Services Canada under the Corporations and Labour Returns Act, Pa 
H- Labour Unions (1988). Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1990b). Earnings of men and women (1990). Catalogue 
13-217, Annual. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
386 
Statistics Canada. (1991). Women in the labour force (1990-1991 Edition). 
Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada. 
Statistics Canada. (1992). Catalogues 13-213 and 71-201. Ottawa: Minister 
of Supply and Services Canada. 
Steinberg, R. (1986). The debate on comparable worth. New Politics, 1,108- 
26. 
Steinberg, R. (1987, April 10). From radical vision to minimalist reform: fty 
eguily in New York State. Unpublished paper presented at the 
Sociological Forum, Penn State University. 
Steinberg, R. (1991). Job evaluation and managerial control: The politics of 
technique and the techniques of politics. In J. Fudge & P. McDermott 
(Eds. ), Just Wages. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
Steinberg, R., & Haignere, L. (1987). Equitable compensation: 
Methodological criteria for comparable worth. In C. Bose & G. Spitze 
(Eds. ), Ingredients for women's employment policy. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Stinson, J. (1982). Bargaining for Equality. The Facts (Canadian Union of 
Public Employees), 4(5), 15. 
Sutcliffe, P. (1991). Interviewing, observation and ethnography: Techniques 
and selection criteria. In D. Kelly (Ed. ), Researching industrial 
relations: Methods and methodology. Sydney: Australian Centre for 
Industrial Relations Research and Teaching. 
387 
Swidinsky, R., & Kuperschmidt, M. (1991). Longitudinal estimates of the 
union effects on wages, wage dispersion and pension fringe benefits. 
Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations, 46(2). 
Task Force on Barriers to Women in the Public Service. (1990). Beneath the 
veneer: The report of the task force on barriers to women in the Dublic 
service. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Service Canada (DSS cat. no. 
BT22-19/3-1990E). 
Thompson, E. (1975). Whigs and hunters: The origins of the Black Act. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin Books. 
Todres, E. (1987). With deliberate care: The framing of Bill 154. Manitoba 
Law Journal, 16(3), 221-226. 
Top heavy male. (1990, June 24). In Sunday EUress, p. 3. 
Treiman, D., & Hartmann, H. (1981). Women, work and wages: Egual pay 
for jobs of egual value. Washington: National Academy Press. 
Walby, S. (1990). Theorizing patriarchy. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Walton, R., & McKersie, R. (1965; 1991). A behavioral theoly of labour 
negotiations. New York: McGraw Hill. 
Warskett, R. (1990). Wage solidarity and equal value: Or gender and class in 
the structuring of work place hierarchies. Studies in Political Econoffiy, 
32,55-83. 
Warskett, R. (1991). Political power, technical disputes and unequal pay: A 
federal case. In J. Fudge, & P. McDermott. Just wages: A feminist 
assessment of pay equi1y. Toronto: University of Toronto. 
388 
Weiler, P. (1986). 'Ibe wages of sex: The uses and limits of comparable 
worth. Harvard Law Review, 99,1728-1807. 
Weiner, N., & Gunderson, M. (1990). Pay eguily: Issues, options and 
expgriences. Toronto: Butterworths. 
Wertheimer, B., & Nelson, A. (1975). Trade union women: A study of their 
participation in New York Cily locals. New York: Praeger. 
Westwood, S. (1984). All day every day: Factory and family in the making of 
women's lives. London: Pluto Press. 
White, J. (1980). Women and unions. Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council 
on the Status of Women. 
White, J. (1983). Women and part-time work. Ottawa: Minister of Supply 
and Services, prepared for the Canadian Advisory Council on the Status 
of Women. 
White, J. (1993). Sisters and solidapýý. Toronto: Thompson Educational 
Publishing. 
Whitehouse, G. (1992). Legislation and labour market gender inequality: And 
analysis of OECD countries. Work. Employment and SocigV, ý(1), 65- 
86. 
Willborn, S. (1989). A Secretary and a Cook: Challenging women's wages in 
the courts of the United States and Great Britain. Ithaca: ILR Press, 
Cornell University - 
Women are not making corporate strides: Study. (1992, June 30). Evenin 
Telegram, p. 18. 
389 
Women at the top: A progress report. (1990, December). ReDort on Business 
Magazine, 56-68. 
Women's Policy Office. (1987). Women in Newfoundland and Labrador: A 
changing population. In Women and Newfoundland fact sheet series. 
St. John's: Author. 
Women's Policy Office. (1992). Women in the Newfoundland labour force: 
Occupational segregation. In Women and Newfoundland fact sheet 
series. St. John's: Author. 
Women's Policy Office. (1992). Women in the Newfoundland labour force: 
Labour force activity. In Women and Newfoundland fact sheet series. 
St. John's: Author. 
Women's Policy Office. (Undated). Women's Policy Office. St. John's: 
Author. 
Yin, R. (1989). Case study research: Design and methods. London: Sage 
Publications. 
York, G. (1992, July 24). Michael Wilson's quiet revolution. The Globe and 
Mail, p. Al. 
Zabaida, S. (1974). What is scientific sociology? Economy and Soci=, 2(l) 
69-83. 
390 
APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
AAHP 
AFL-CIO 
AFSCME 
CAW 
CFL 
CLC 
CUPE 
CWS 
EPC 
NAPE 
MEW 
NCPE 
NDP 
NFL 
NHNHA 
NLNU 
NPEC 
NUPGE 
OECD 
Association of Allied Health Professionals 
American Federation of Labour-Congress of Industrial 
Organization 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees 
Canadian Auto Workers 
Canadian Federation of Labour 
Canadian Congress of Labour 
Canadian Union of Public Employees 
Cooperative Wage Study Job Evaluation System 
Equal Pay Coalition 
Newfoundland Association of Public Employees 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers 
National Committee on Pay Equity 
New Democratic Party 
Newfoundland Federation of Labour 
Newfoundland Hospital and Nursing Home Association 
Newfoundland and Labrador Nursing Union 
National Pay Equity Campaign 
National Union of Provincial Government Employees 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
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OFL Ontario Federation of Labour 
OHA Ontario Hospital Association 
ONA Ontario Nurses Association 
OPSEU Ontario Public Service Employees Union 
SEIU Service Employees International Union 
TLC Trades and Labour Congress 
UNA United Nurses of Alberta 
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APPENDIX 2 
THE NEWFOUNDLAND PAY EQUITY AGREEMENT, JUNE 1988 
The Newfoundland Pay Equity Agreement aims to achieve pay equity by 
redressing systemic gender discrimination in compensation for work performed 
by all employees in female-dominated classes within the bargaining units 
represented by the Association of Allied Health Professionals (AAEP), the 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW), the Canadian Union 
of Public Employees (CUPE), the Newfoundland Association of Public 
Employees (NAPE) and the Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union 
(NLNU), and whose members are employees covered by The Public Service 
(Collective Bargaining) Act, 1973. 
According to the Agreement, pay equity: 
... means a compensation practice which 
is based primarily on 
the relative value of the work performed, irrespective of the 
gender of the employees, and includes a requirement that no 
Employer shall establish or maintain a difference between wages 
paid to male and female employees, employed by that Employer, 
who are performing work of equal value. (1988,2.1) 
Deadlines for the achievement of pay equity are built into the Agreement, 
including originally a retroactive clause requiring the first pay equity wage 
adjustment for certain identified groupings of employees on April 1,1998. 
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(This retroactivity was cancelled by an incoming government in March 1991). 
Wage adjustments are to be up to a maximum of 1% per year of the relevant 
previous year's payroll, until pay equity is achieved or until the end of the 
fourth consecutive year, whichever is the sooner. If by then pay equity is not 
achieved, then the remaining adjustments are to be paid out in the fifth year. 
The Agreement requires a joint committee structure to implement pay equity so 
that the unions and employers involved have equal representation. All 
committees are to be gender balanced and have to reach unanimous decisions 
throughout the process. The Steering Committee, with one male and one 
female Co-Chair, one each from union and employer groups, has an on-going 
responsibility to identify employee communication and education programs 
relating to pay equity. But, most important, it is responsible for monitoring 
the implementation of pay equity: "Its mandate is to ensure that the Pay Equity 
Agreement is met by the parties" (3.4). 
In this role, the Steering Committee has to select a gender neutral job 
evaluation system for all female- and male-dominated classes for each grouping 
(one or more bargaining units combined for the purposes of pay equity 
implementation). This job evaluation system is to assess value using the 
criteria of skill, effort, responsibility and working conditions. Part of the 
Committee's task is to determine the weight of each factor within these 
critena. 
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The Committee also has to identify which job classes are going to be compared 
using the selected job evaluation system. Job class is defined as those 
individual positions in a grouping that are sufficiently alike in duties, 
responsibilities and qualifications reasonably required for performance of work 
to warrant like treatment. In Newfoundland, a female-dominated class means a 
job class with five or more employees, 60% or more of whom are female. A 
male-dominated class means a job class with five or more employees, 60% or 
more of whom are male. The Agreement gives the Committee discretion to 
lower the minimum number/percentage if it is established that historically a 
certain class is dominated by males or females. 
At this point in the process, the Steering Committee is responsible for the 
appointment of Job Evaluation Committees who are required to evaluate 
selected male- and female-dominated job classes through the application of the 
selected job evaluation system. In the Agreement, the Job Evaluation 
Committees (established for each grouping) are to jointly agree upon 
questionnaires/job description forms, interview/observation procedures and the 
employees involved in these processes, and train the evaluators. In practice, 
the Steering Committee undertook these tasks in the first two groupings 
evaluated, so that the Job Evaluation Committees started their work after job 
descriptions were completed and after training sessions organised by the 
Steering Committee. The Agreement simply mandates the Job Evaluation 
Committees to "evaluate classes" (4.3.3) and requires all decisions to be 
395 
unanimous. To carry out this task, the evaluators were in practice required to 
reach consensus on a numerical score for each job class, based upon the 
factors making up the four criteria mentioned above. 
The next stage of the process involves the Steering Committee calculating the 
pay equity adjustments, based upon the results of the Job Evaluation 
Committees. Evaluated male-dominated classes are calculated into a male 
wage line by plotting the value of the male-dominated jobs classes against the 
wages paid for those classes. The same task is then undertaken for the female- 
dominated job classes. In most workplaces, a female wage line appears below 
that of the male wage line, showing the wage gap between male- and female- 
dominated jobs of equal value, and in turn indicating the pay equity 
adjustments to be paid to close that gap. In the Newfoundland Agreement, 
women's jobs which are below the male wage line are to be brought up to the 
male wage line. Exemptions for pay equity comparison purposes are: service, 
temporary training or development program or assignment, red-circling 
incumbent, and skill shortage. 
A weak enforcement clause of the Agreement refers to the mandate of the Pay 
Equity Steering Committee to flestablish procedures to monitor the progress of 
pay equity implementation; ensure compliance with the Pay Equity Agreement; 
and monitor consistency of implementation across various groupings" (3.5.4). 
This clause echoes the earlier (3.4), already quoted, specifying that the 
Steering Committee's mandate is to ensure that the Pay Equity Agreement is 
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met by the parties. However, this role of the Steering Committee has been 
very difficult to put into practice - 
Consequently, enforcement is largely limited to dispute resolution procedures, 
which are included at the end of the Agreement. Should the Job Evaluation 
Committees be unable to agree, then the Steering Committee has the power "to 
endeavour to resolve the dispute" (4.12). Failing settlement at this level, either 
party may refer the dispute to binding arbitration. At this stage, the 
procedures follow the route of the traditional route of labour relations dispute 
resolution. 
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APPENDIX 3 
ONTARIO PAY EQUITY ACT, 1988 
The Ontario Pay Equity Act applies to all public sector employers, and all 
private sector employers with 10 or more employees. Employers covered by 
the Act have to identify systemic gender discrimination in compensation by 
if undertaking comparisons between each female job class in an establishment 
and the male job classes in the establishment in terms of compensation and in 
terms of the value of the work performed" (Section 4, No. 2). Value is to be 
measured as a composite of skill, effort, responsibility, and working 
conditions. Under the Act, pay equity is achieved "when the job rate for the 
female job class that is the subject of the comparison is at least equal to the job 
rate for a male job class in the same establishment where the work performed 
in the two job classes is of equal or comparable value" (Section 6, No. 1). 
In order to achieve pay equity, all public sector employers, and private sector 
employers with 100 or more employees, are required to produce and post pay 
equity plans for employees' approval. These plans must describe the job 
evaluation system to be used; provide the results of the evaluation itself; 
identify any exemptions, with reasons; describe how pay equity will be 
achieved; and provide a schedule for the adjustments and eventual achievement 
of pay equity - 
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Deadlines are provided according to sector and size. The public sector (which 
includes the civil service, Crown corporations, health care facilities, 
universities and colleges, several external agencies, school boards and 
municipalities) had to post pay equity plans by January 1,1990, begin wage 
adjustments on the same date, and complete pay equity adjustments five years' 
later. 
Private sector organizations of 100 or more employees also have to prepare 
pay equity plans according to a fixed schedule (See Table 3). Plans have to be 
posted by a deadline (500 or more employees: January 1,1990; 100 to 499 
employees: January 1,1991), and wage adjustments have to begin one year 
later. There is no mandatory deadline for completion of equity adjustments, 
but adjustments are to be at least 1% of the previous year's payroll, until pay 
equity is achieved. Smaller organizations (10 to 99 employees) have a choice 
of whether to post pay equity plans. Those who do post plans have longer to 
prepare for pay equity than the larger organizations, have no mandatory 
deadline for completion of pay equity adjustments, and are only required to 
contribute 1% of payroll each year. Those who do not post plans lose their 
chance of a phased-in adjustment to equity, and their compensation practices 
must achieve pay equity by an early mandatory deadline. 
Each stage of the pay equity plan is open to some degree of negotiation, within 
the broad framework of the legislation, and must be a joint process in a 
unionized workplace. However, the employer alone implements pay equity in 
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non-unionized organizations, subject to the employees' agreement with the final 
pay equity plan. If an employer exercises the option not to post a plan then an 
employee can complain to the employer if the equity implementation is not 
seen as complying with the Act. If the employee is not satisfied with the 
employer's response, then she can apply to the Pay Equity Commission, a 
government body set up to monitor pay equity implementation and settle 
disputes. 
As noted, the pay equity legislation specifies that the selected job evaluation 
system must measure value based on a composite of skill, effort, responsibility 
and working conditions, and that it must be gender neutral. In a unionized 
workplace, union and management must jointly choose a scheme to evaluate 
the current pay structure. Next, the parties must bargain to determine gender 
predominance, so that predominantly female job classes can be compared with 
predominantly male job classes. According to the Act, a "female" job class 
has to include at least 60% female employees, and a "male" job class has to 
include at least 70% male employees. However, in addition to this quantitative 
criterion, there are two more factors which may be considered: historical 
incumbency and gender stereotyping. For example, where one out of three of 
a firm's engineers is female, because of a recent appointment, the historical 
gender pattern of recruitment and gender stereotyping of engineering work 
would indicate a male job class, despite the percentage indicator of only 66% 
male employees. Comparisons are initially to be within a bargaining unit, but 
400 
if no male comparator is available then comparisons can be made across 
bargaining units, or with non-union positions if there are no other bargaining 
units in the establishment. 
The job analysis and evaluation process is the longest and most complicated 
bargaining phase. The Commission has issued booklets detailing how to 
conduct this and every other stage of the pay equity process; guidelines 
recommend a joint union-management committee, with female and major 
occupational group representatives. Once it has been decided which classes are 
of equal value, then any exemptions have to be negotiated. Allowable 
exceptions when determining pay equity adjustments are for seniority, merit or 
performance pay, temporary training or development positions (provided these 
processes do not operate in a discriminatory way), temporary skills shortages. 
An unusual exemption is allowable once pay equity is achieved: differential 
pay is then acceptable if it is due to differences in bargaining strengths. The 
parties then have to negotiate how equity is to be achieved. Given that only 
1% of the previous year's payroll is statutorily required, a schedule of pay 
equity adjustments has to be agreed upon. 
The Ontario model is proactive, but it also incorporates a complaints element. 
The Pay Equity Commission consists of a Pay Equity Office and a Pay Equity 
Hearings Tribunal. The Pay Equity Office is responsible for research and 
education, monitoring pay equity implementation, and general support services 
for the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, which is empowered to make final and 
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binding judgements on any complaints or disputes referred to the Pay Equity 
Commission. 
Review Officers working in the Pay Equity Office are appointed to monitor 
pay equity plans, investigate pay equity complaints and can initiate the 
settlement of pay equity disputes. They have the power to decide if a 
complaint is not to be pursued because it is trivial, vexatious, or made in bad 
faith, or is beyond the jurisdiction of the Pay Equity Commission. They also 
have considerable powers of investigation, including the right to enter any 
place at any time to obtain documents and question persons about a complaint. 
The Review Officers can make orders of a wide ranging nature to bring about 
compliance with the Act. Parties dissatisfied with an order made by a Review 
Officer can appeal to the Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal, which can conduct a 
full and formal hearing on the dispute and make its own decision. 
The Pay Equity Hearings Tribunal has administrative and enforcement powers 
in its own right. It is entitled to make a number of orders concerning the 
implementation of the Act, including ordering the Review Officer to design a 
pay equity plan if an employer has failed to post one; ordering the 
reinstatement with compensation of an employee wrongfully dismissed because 
of pay equity matters; ordering pay adjustments to female employees who were 
not accorded pay equity; and ordering the revision of pay equity plans. It may 
make general remedial orders and the Act also includes penalties for those who 
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fail to comply with these orders. Maximum penalties are $2,000 for 
individuals and $25,000 for organizations. 
The Pay Equity Commission has to submit an annual report on its activities 
and affairs to the Minister of Labour. Also the Pay Equity Act requires a 
comprehensive review of the Act and its operation seven years after the 
effective date. 
